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Preface 
 
It is such a paradox that China’s rural land has reemerged as one of the major 
factors responsible for social inequality, conflicts and poverty – socio-economic ills 
which the land revolution aimed to redress. The goals of the revolution were short-
lived as the problems confronting China are far more severe than in the pre-reform 
era under Mao who abolished the system of unequal landownership that prolonged 
the deprivation of the Chinese peasantry. In spite of  30 years of unprecedented 
economic growth triggered by the market-led reform, China is facing new challenges 
of equitable and sustainable development whereby land tenure continues to be a 
perplexing issue to be effectively addressed and tackled. The trajectory of China’s 
land reform thus is a contradiction in terms—if Mao was still alive, he would be 
devastated by the fact  that the reform  through  both collectivization  and  ongoing 
decollectivization  has  not  proved  to  be  an  effective  mechanism  for  pro-poor 
institutional changes.  
 
My research  aims to develop a better understanding of the nature, dimensions and  
context of China’s land tenure reform by employing interdisciplinary perspectives. 
Three years ago, I had little idea of how to design this research when I decided to 
embark upon a challenging and uncertain career at the University of Groningen. But I 
believed that I would succeed given my deep-rooted interests and experience in rural 
development in China. The strong support of my promoters Prof. Peter Ho and Prof. 
Leon  Verstappen  gave  me  ample  confidence  to  conduct  the  research.  Their 
encouragement and guidance in this process were indispensable. I learnt how to 
develop a critical and comprehensive and thus integrated approach to studying the 
complex issues. I also benefited from their invaluable insights and experience in this 
field of study, which contributed to the successful completion of this study within a 3-
year time span during which I worked as a project manager and researcher at the 
Centre for Development Studies (CDS) of the Faculty of Spatial Sciences. I would 
like to extend my sincere gratitude to both promoters in this regard. My special 
thanks also go to the external readers – Prof. Benjamin van Rooij, Prof. Meine Pieter 
van Dijk, Prof. Rafael Wittek, Dr. Arjan de Haan and Dr. Hans Schoenmakers for 
their critical and constructive comments on the earlier drafts.  
 
My research was a part of the Protection of Farmers’ Land and Property Rights in 
China  (ProLAND)  project  coordinated  by  the  CDS.  This  project  provided  an 
indispensable contribution to an understanding of China’s land tenure reform and 
land  management  through  research,  training  and  internationalization  for  Chinese  
land researchers, experts and policy-makers. Our collaboration with the Chinese and 
Dutch partners was pleasant, stimulating and fruitful. In particular, I would like to 
acknowledge the strong backing of the funding organization – the Asia Facility for 
China of the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs under Mr. Jorden Splinter as  project 
adviser. It was a great pleasure to work with him whose patience and support were 
absolutely invaluable not only to me, but also to the rest of the project team in view 
of unexpected obstacles which arose from the highly controversial and sensitive 
topics.  I  would  also  like  to  thank  dedicated  colleagues  from  the  project’s 
implementing institutions in both countries, Prof. Paul van der Molen, Prof. Xiaoying 
Wang, Prof. Xiaoping Shi, Prof. Peixin Zhu, Dr. Yinping Dai and Mr. Xiaoyun Zou, 
among others, for  their insightful advice and facilitation of the research.  
 
Working  with  my  CDS  colleagues  has  been  memorable  and  enjoyable.  Special 
mention goes to Dr. Pieter Boele van Hensbroek for countless rounds of reading my 
draft chapters and for providing meticulous remarks and advice. Dr. Leandro Vergara 
Camus made very constructive comments on my chapters and his advice on some 
critical readings were highly useful. And to Mr. Arthur de Boer, who met me on my 
first  day  of  arrival  and  ever  since  has  provided  unflagging  support.  I  greatly 
appreciate the collegial friendships formed, which I hope will continue far into the 
future. I am fortunate to have met so many nice colleagues at the Faculty of Spatial 
Sciences  and  the  Faculty  of  Law.  In  particular,  I  would  like  to  thank  the  senior 
management staff of the two faculties for their kind facilitation of the research and 
the provision of needed resources. Special thanks are due to Stiny Tiggelaar for her 
wise and timely advice on  preparations for the PhD graduation process and her time 
spent on helping me through all those complicated procedures. I would also like to 
extend my sincere gratitude to other faculty colleagues for their involvement and 
support; there are too many names to mention here. 
 
No pain no gain; but to me, the pain pales in comparison to the contribution I am 
making in my current capacity as assistant professor at the Faculty of Law. This PhD 
study has groomed me well for this new career path, which I believe will pay off, as 
we have been working on land reform issues on a global scale. In a nutshell, the last 
3 years have been extremely rewarding, which has given me the confidence to strive 
for greater achievements in the coming years. As China has become an emerging 
world economic power, its reform experiences – irrespective of success or failure – 
have many repercussions on the world political and economic landscape. I believe 
that significant work lies ahead for me.  
 
A Chinese saying – “behind a successful man stands a strong woman” – may apply 
to many people. Although I do not think that I am that successful, I believe that my  
wife Lin is my greatest pillar of support. Her unfailing encouragement and love have 
eased and lightened this somewhat tough journey and made it less painful. There is 
no way I can thank her for her boundless sacrifice. The same can be said of my 
beloved daughter Yang,  my parents and family members, whose caring support and 
love I humbly cherish. My mother would have been so happy and proud of me if she 
could see it herself today! Her dream has come true. To my many Chinese and 
Dutch friends, I would like to say how much I appreciate their friendship. Here, I 
would  like  to  thank  Dr.  Zhenghong  Chen  and  his  family  for  all  their  care  and 
encouragement over the last two years, which made my time in the Netherlands 
highly memorable and enjoyable. Finally, I would like to thank Gina Rozario, my 
English editor, for her brilliant job in editing this manuscript. I really learnt a lot from 
her.  
 
I hope that the reader will gain some insights from this study. I must say that it 
remains an uncompleted mission for me. I plan to spend more time on a substantial 
revision  of the  manuscript.  As  China’s land  tenure  reform continues, I hope my 
research will deepen and grow so that it keeps abreast with current reform and future 
policy  changes.  I  also  hope  to  continue  enjoying  the  support  and  inspiration  of 
colleagues  and  friends  as  I  embark  on  new  adventures—psychologically  and 
intellectually.    
 
Yongjun Zhao 
Home in Groningen, The Netherlands 
May 2010  
  
Summary 
 
Despite  its  unprecedented  achievements  in  rural  development,  China  remains  a 
lower-middle income country. Unsound practices in farmland use and management 
have  contributed  to  farmland  loss,  rising  social  conflicts  and  deprivation  of  the 
landless,  which perpetuates rural poverty and land tenure insecurity of the weak and 
poor. The current hybrid land tenure systems characterized by collective ownership 
and  individual  use  rights    exert  both  positive  and  negative  effects  on  land 
governance.  China’s  approach  to  land  laws,  policies  and  institutional  reforms  is 
characterized by inherent weaknesses  which impede the strengthening of peasants’ 
rights and collective action in the process. With the simplistic assumption on the 
importance  of  land  tenure  to  facilitate  its  transferability  and  scaled  agricultural 
production, the current reform is undergoing a risky transformation that may backfire. 
In this sense, the Chinese approach bears resemblances with other countries whose 
experiences have failed the poor and have produced unintended consequences. In 
essence, the failure  to take into account the livelihoods of the poor especially from 
sustainable land use perspectives exemplifies their pursuit of short-term gains rather 
than  longer-term  solutions  to  complex  rural development issues.  The  challenges 
confronting  China’s  rural  development  require  a  renewed  understanding  of  what 
constitutes an appropriate land tenure system that suits the local conditions of a 
given community. This needs a holistic study of what kind of land tenure systems 
exist in China, how they have worked in the past, what their problems are, and how 
they can be redressed to suit the needs of the poor.  
 
This thesis  adopts an interdisciplinary approach to the study of China's land tenure 
reform  –  past,  present  and  prospects.  It  provides  a  critical  lens  to  examine  the 
conditions and dynamics of land tenure, rural development and governance linkages 
and  the  underlying  social,  political  and  economic  context.  It  discusses  the 
controversial history of China's land reforms to throw light on the political nature of 
the reforms. In a review of China’s reorientation towards more individualistic and pro-
market instruments in land policy and legislation changes, this thesis outlines the 
institutional challenges for sustainable land use and management. On the basis of  
this framework, research  was  conducted  on the  ground where  local land tenure 
practices and experimentations are taking place in both developed and poor villages 
in  China.  It  maps  out  different  land  tenure  systems  –  individual,  collective, 
shareholding and commune – as well as their impacts on the livelihoods of the poor 
and  rural  governance,  local  responses  and  local  institutional  innovation  in  land 
tenure arrangements. This approach takes land tenure as an integral part of rural 
development, natural resources management and village governance, which means  
that  it  is  interwoven  with  multiple  social,  political,  economic  and  biophysical 
parameters.  
 
The study contends that an ill-designed land tenure system characterized by the 
mainstream  state-led  pro-market  approaches  will  not  fulfill  preconceived  policy 
objectives of integrated rural-urban development and scaled agricultural production.  
Rather, it has caused social fragmentation, weak collective power of the poor and 
unsustainable natural resource use and farming practices. Unless  the land tenure 
system addresses the wider determinants of institutions, power, politics and social 
development, poor peasants will continue to remain marginalized in their struggles to 
articulate  their  interests.  For  this  reason,  it  is  important  to  provide  more 
institutionalized  space  for  the  poor  to  participate  in  land  governance  processes. 
Although  land  tenure  is  important  to  sustainable  development,  it  is  not  the  only 
contributing factor. A particular land tenure system can only work in the long run 
provided that the overall social, political and economic conditions support it. Thus, 
land users ought to be given the choice and discretionary power to define their 
preferred land tenure systems with the strong support of government, businesses 
and the wider public.  
 
This thesis contributes to the study of China's transition not only in the land and 
property  rights  fields,  but  also  governance  and  social  development  challenges 
underpinned by land reform. From sectoral perspectives, this study discusses many 
issues    surrounding  natural  resources  management  in  respect  of  land,  forests, 
grassland and water. It contributes to the ongoing theoretical debates on property 
rights and institutional changes, which have not adequately addressed the conditions 
for pro-poor land tenure as interpreted differently by different stakeholders.  
 
This  thesis  will  be  of  interest  to  researchers,  practitioners,  policy-makers  and 
students  with  a  background  in  development  studies,  anthropology,  sociology, 
political sciences, law, economics, geography and public administration. It will help 
them  understand  the  major  rural  development  challenges  facing  China,  the 
implications of which  are critical  to China’s emergence as a world power.  
  
Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
 
1.  Rationale 
 
1.1  Rural poverty, governance and land tenure reform 
China’s remarkable economic growth, which resulted from its market reform in the 
1980s, has been coupled with heavy loss of its natural resources such as the arable 
land upon which the majority rural population rely. In recent years, the loss of arable 
land is almost 700,000 ha annually. Between 1987 and 2001, non-agricultural land 
use rendered at least 34 million Chinese peasants landless. It is estimated that by 
2030 the total number of landless peasants will exceed 78 million. This vulnerable 
group, especially in poorer regions, has found it extremely difficult to pursue other 
economic  opportunities  to  make  ends  meet.  Other  factors  such  as  soil  erosion, 
desertification  and  downgrading  of  farmland  fertility  have  further  constrained  the 
government’s  goal  of  sustainable  rural  development.  The  continued  economic 
pressures on land and other resources have weakened the already fragile agriculture 
and ecology and posed a direct threat to national food security, which is absolutely 
crucial to feed China’s population of 1.3 billion. To keep the current 1.2 billion ha of 
arable land intact has been a daunting task of the central government (Zuo et al, 
2004: 116-117).  
 
In many parts of poor regions, for example, Sichuan province with a high-rate of 
population density, inefficient land use, poverty and poor village governance, and 
with an average of 0.54 ha of arable land per capita, peasants have not shown their 
interest in land investment due to high capital costs and extremely low economic 
returns from farming.1 Thirty-forty percent of them are not willing to receive their land 
use  contracts  due to  their  concerns  over the  heavy  land-related  taxes and  fees 
imposed on them.2 Local government adds an extra burden on peasants by charging 
                                                 
1 This means that peasants’ low interest in farming can be conducive to land loss because they can 
just let it go to local government and developers for construction use. Also disputes on rightful 
compensation often occur among them. 
2 Although the abolition of agricultural tax policy was started in 2006 nationwide, Chinese peasants 
still have heavy economic burdens to cope with increasing costs of living, materials, education, 
health and so on.   2 
various costs such as those for irrigation works on their land, which make their 
benefits  from  the  land  even  more  minimal.  In  addition,  land  adjustments  are 
undertaken every few years to accommodate demographic changes. Any reduction 
of the number of family members in a household would lead to the loss of plots of 
land to those with increased family members. This practice often causes conflict 
among the peasants. Women are vulnerable to the loss of land upon marriage and 
divorce, although women are equal in law. Although the law grants the peasants 
renewable 30-year use rights, the peasants do not know how to use the law to resist 
unexpected expropriations. 
 
The high rate of out-migration has also made the landless poor more vulnerable to 
economic  and social shocks  due to  a lack of  diverse and  reasonable  economic 
opportunities and an underdeveloped social safety net in both rural and urban areas. 
As a result, women, children and the elderly are usually left to eke out a living. There 
are  only  a  few  cases  of  land  transfers  given  these  constraints,  especially  the 
extremely low economic return from the land. To ensure that they can still till the land 
if needed at a later stage, some migrants abandon their land rather than transfer it to 
others. The land then becomes lies to waste and cannot be used by the others who 
need it. Obviously, the concept of economics of scale is not applicable to these 
poverty-stricken regions given the very low level of family farming and unwillingness 
of the peasants to give out their land for other purposes.3 
 
The alliance of the village collective, local government and developers such as real 
estate agencies, whilst consistently promoting rapid local economic development, 
also contributes to rural land tenure insecurity. Peasants are marginalized and prone 
to forced evictions, unfair compensation and insufficient provision of social security, 
all of which lead to an increasing number of cases of land conflicts. The vulnerability 
of the poor in these conflicts is also exacerbated by a lack of effective organization 
due to the widening economic and social division among the peasants. This also 
contributes to a lack of effective democratic village governance. The most eminent 
form of village organization-regular village congress, for instance, is often bypassed 
because the village collective has less capacity to rally the masses than it did in the 
past due to inherent economic and political problems. In a study of selected villages 
in Sichuan, it is found that around 30% of the peasants do not participate in village 
elections. And 70% of them do not know how to deal with their leaders, some of 
whom corruption charges. Since 2006, the provincial government has brought more 
than  one  thousand  cases  of  illegal  land  management  predominated  by  local 
government officials to justice (CIRD, 2001). 
                                                 
3 Land rentals among peasant households do occur, the extent of which, however, lacks statistics.    3 
 
Despite  30  years  of  market  reform  and  China’s  success  in  terms  of  poverty 
alleviation,  the  country  remains  as  a  lower-middle  income  country  (World  Bank, 
2007). Rural poverty still poses a huge challenge for the government to build a well-
off and equitable society. According to an official of the State Council Leading Group 
Office for Poverty Alleviation and Development at the launching ceremony of the 
community-centred  rural  development  programmes in  Guangxi  Province in 2006, 
with a population of 1.3 billion, China still has more than 23 million people who do 
not have adequate access to food supply and shelter, and more than 40 million 
people who live on an annual income of less than US$ 140. China is at a new stage 
of  continuous  poverty  alleviation  and  more  importantly,  consolidation  of  the 
achievements  made.  The  objective  was  to  implement  a  new  model  of  rural 
development in 60 villages nation-wide that would be community-centred. As such, 
local communities would become the owners and implementers of rural development 
programmes  with  resources  provided  by  the  government,  non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and individual citizens. Deemed as a prominent shift away 
from top-down conventional approaches to development, this model was envisaged 
to return power to the people who could have a stronger voice in rural development 
and  governance  processes.  In  particular,  the  programme  attempted  to  integrate 
poverty alleviation into village self-governance and democratic decision-making. This 
is the first initiative with the immense financial and technical support of the major 
international development agencies in China, where the government was willing to 
involve civil society bodies to improve the effectiveness of poverty alleviation.4  The 
wide range of fields covered included community development, health, education, 
water resources management and agriculture, and so forth. It is far too early to 
assess  their effectiveness in  poverty alleviation  due  to  the  severe  challenges  of 
implementation at the local level and the complexity of rural development. 
 
In fact, exploration of more effective rural development measures has always been 
on the political agenda of the Chinese government. The watershed that marks the 
policy  changes  remains  the  post-1978  agenda  aimed  at  replacing  collective 
agriculture  with  the  Household  Responsibility  System  (HRS)  in  which  peasant 
households  gained  substantial  autonomy  and  became  the  basic  unit  of  rural 
agricultural production. The HRS is seen as a crucial step towards the revitalization 
                                                 
4 The State Council Leading Group Office for Poverty Alleviation and Development is the principal 
department in charge of policy-making and implementation concerning poverty alleviation. In recent 
years,  it  has  collaborated  with  the  major  international  development  organizations  in  testing 
community-based innovative development projects. 
 
   4 
of the rural economy in the aftermath of the collectivization era. It is coupled with 
changes in village governance marked by village elections, which are deemed to 
constitute a fundamental shift towards empowering citizens over many matters that 
affect their livelihoods and sustainable rural development (Plummer, 2004). 
 
It is important to note that the new model of rural community development and the 
existence  of  the  HRS  are  not  coincidental.  Rather,  it  shows  the  institutional 
complexity  involved  in  the  selection  of  models  of  development  for  different 
stakeholders. To a certain extent, the HRS has been an institutional basis of village 
governance. Yet it has failed the poor peasants in providing an avenue for them to 
claim their rights and voice their concerns over political decision-making. This seems 
a contradiction in terms as this somewhat individualized household-based institution 
should have significantly strengthened their power. In this sense, the model is not 
new, and it can only be seen as a supplement to the HRS and a last resort for the 
central  government  to  win  the  support  of  the  majority  of  rural  poor.  Under  the 
assumption that poverty can be better dealt with when the poor are given more 
power and choices, this model was expected to carry spillover effects beyond the 
vicinity of the pilot areas. But how can it have the assumed effects when the HRS 
and village elections themselves have not been effective in poverty alleviation and 
village governance? In other words, how this model addresses the issue of power 
and agency in the wider rural development landscape? And how can greater poverty 
alleviation  outcomes  be  achieved  when  there  is  lack  of  genuine  grass-roots 
democratic governance (see Hutton, 2006; Pei, 2006; Xu, 2003)? 
 
All these questions point to the issue of the extent to which village governance can 
contribute  to  more  effective  poverty  alleviation  results.  This  question  cannot  be 
answered easily without substantial empirical research. But it can be expected that 
village governance is not the only determinant. Rather, it is directly interwoven with 
the wider political economy of the village and country as a whole. In the rural setting, 
the most obvious direct factor for peasant livelihoods is the land whereby agricultural 
production, social and political relations and governance are inextricably linked. The 
aforementioned new model of development does not reflect the mainstream policy 
which is top-down in nature. Neither do its projects involve land-specific targets. 
Rural development programmes have downplayed the most sensitive issue of land.5 
Although  land  has  become  the  most  critical  issue  of  rural  development  for  the 
                                                 
5 Land is such a sensitive issue for many government departments and international development 
organizations. The latter except the World Bank, UNDP and DFID have hardly embarked on any 
land reform projects till now. The land-related projects mainly deal with the connection between 
land governance and public service delivery and rural development. Also see Sally Sargeson 2004 
“Full circle? Rural land reforms in globalizing China”, Critical Asian Studies 36:4, 637-656.   5 
Chinese government, policy developments tend to emphasize control rather than 
create  incentives  for  peasant  participation  and  mobilization  in  decision-making 
processes concerning their land use and management. There is a need to explore 
this fundamental facilitator for more genuine community-centred village governance, 
which has much to do with the social and political processes concerning rural land 
use, management and governance. 
 
The land reform history of the post-1949 era reveals that land has manifested itself 
as a critical impetus for the overall economic and political reform agenda of the 
government. According to Xu (2003), once land and other natural resources were 
institutionalized as publicly-owned, the government automatically managed to put the 
society under its direct control. Subsequently, Chinese society is internalized in the 
governance structure. Under this condition, democracy can only be a form of social 
mobilization  at  best.  However,  this  does  not  mean  that  there  is  no  margin  for 
democratic governance in the Chinese countryside. The substitution of the HRS for 
the old commune has enabled the creation of relatively autonomous family groups, 
whose rights are sometimes in conflict with those of the public or nation-state. This 
contestation for family interests should be seen as the most fundamental origin of 
grass-root democratic governance. When the HRS was created, the government had 
to  find  an  appropriate  institution  to  manage  it.  Then  there  came  the  village 
administrative committee which is elected by peasants and meant to serve their best 
interests. The Chinese land reform, and in this case, the creation of the HRS, to a 
large extent has a direct impact on rural governance and development.  
 
Given its association with agricultural inefficiency and chronic rural poverty, the HRS 
has been widely attacked by many liberal scholars and officials. It is a farming unit 
under the direct management of the village collective or administrative committee as 
rural land is collectively owned by law. This dual institutional arrangement has been 
seen as a stumbling block to market-oriented agricultural development and rural 
governance, as the dominant force of the village collective can disadvantage the 
participation of the majority poor in land and agricultural management (see Chi, 2002; 
Wang, 1999; Xie, 2001). Despite these tendencies, it is unlikely that the government 
will change the current system in the foreseeable future. Instead, the government 
may  modify  it  in  certain  ways  to  strengthen  individuals’  land  rights  in  land  use 
changes. This further explains the government’s extreme caution in any further land 
institutional reform in order to maintain social and political stability. The inextricable 
link  between  rural  development,  governance  and  land  reform  poses  a  major 
challenge for innovative economic, social and political reform.   6 
1.2  Land tenure insecurity and social conflicts 
In enhancing individual incentives in productive farming and democratic governance, 
the HRS has worked well in the beginning of the reform era. However, with the 
economic  reform  gaining  its  momentum,  this  system  has  gradually  shown  its 
weakness. From an egalitarian or equity point of view, access to land is not a major 
problem  in  China  due  to  the  existence  of  the  HRS  as  opposed  to  many  other 
developing countries. However, China bears much resemblance to them in terms of 
insecure land tenure in many parts of the country especially in those coastal cities 
where the market economy has developed the fastest.   
 
The  escalating  loss  of  arable  land  to  urban  development  has  caused  mounting 
conflicts between the evicted peasants and local government and has triggered the 
deterioration of social and political stability. Over the last decade, cases of land 
takings have grown drastically more than 15 times, and still the growth rate cannot 
be  effectively  contained.  These  conflicts  stem  from  the  inequality  and  injustice 
surrounding land appropriation where individual households do not receive sufficient 
compensation and where the level of transparency of the land acquisition process is 
inadequate. Those evicted do not receive proper notice and they are unable to voice 
their  concerns  effectively.  They  hardly  have  access  to  the  courts  to  lodge  their 
complaints. More strikingly, most land takings are carried out in the name of the so-
called  public  interests  in  terms  of  infrastructural  construction  and  real  estate 
development. For instance, more than 50% of such appropriations are meant for 
road construction, 16% for factory, and 13% for development zones or industrial 
parks (Zhu et al 2006: 781). Despite the central government’s attempt to strengthen 
legal  and  policy  instruments  to  reverse  this  trend,  local  governments  and  their 
aligned businesses have continuously ignored these orders, abused their power and 
infringed upon the land rights of the peasants. The struggles between the landless 
and local state and developers embody the large power imbalances between them 
and the resulting land tenure insecurity for the former. 
 
Furthermore, land takings have severely and negatively affected the livelihoods of 
the poor. For the majority, land provides a social safety net and thus remains an 
important asset upon which they depend. Given an average of 0.08 ha of arable land 
per capita, which is below the UN standard on the minimum area of land required for 
human survival, how to ensure that the peasants can maximize their benefits from 
the land remains a critical challenge (Wen, 2005). The loss of arable land can have 
devastating effects on their livelihoods in the absence of other economic activities in 
most of the Chinese countryside. As a result, many of these landless peasants have 
undertaken rural-urban migration since the late 1990s, which to a certain extent   7 
served the purpose of urban sprawl and development. But it is important to note that 
most of the rural migrants are short-term labourers rather than long-term settlers in 
the Chinese towns and cities. To some, migration continues to be an intrinsic part of 
China’s transition to a market economy (Huang & Pieke, 2003). This unsustainable 
solution  to land takings  has  become  apparent  when the migrants return to  their 
villages because of loss of employment especially in times of economic crisis. The 
effects on their livelihoods upon their return can also be worsened by the fact that 
there is a lack of access to basic social services and employment in the countryside. 
Above all,  landlessness is  a  major threat to  these migrants.  And this can  only 
exacerbate the current situation of social inequality between urban and rural dwellers 
and ultimately lead to their further impoverishment.  All  these factors  continue  to 
contribute to peasant struggles and conflicts with the state.  
  
Some scholars regard the issue of land tenure insecurity and weak property rights of 
the  Chinese  rural  population  as  contributing  factors  for  land  takings  and  social 
conflicts without paying enough attention to the root causes of the problems. In their 
view,  land  privatization  is  necessary  to  reverse  the  current  situation.  Under  this 
assumption, once land has been privatized, peasants will be able to sell and buy it 
and eventually develop it into large-scale farms, which will benefit both agricultural 
productivity and rural development and provide a firmer establishment of the rule of 
law  and  democracy  in  the  Chinese  countryside  (Mao,  2003).  However,  as  Wen 
(2005) argues, if this is the case, what would happen to those hundreds of millions of 
displaced subsistence peasants? He further contends that the government cannot 
adequately provide the required social security and social services to the 900 million 
rural  poor,  which  indicates  the  futility  of  such  a  grand  ideology.  International 
experiences also show that there is no definitive relationship between land tenure 
and  peasant  investment.  Land  tenure  security  matters.  But  peasants  are  more 
preoccupied by political and economic insecurity than insecure tenure or land title. 
Policy-makers  should  focus  more  on  the  rural  sector  and  broader  judicial  and 
political reforms rather than tinker with the tenure system (Smucker et al, 2002). In 
fact, to a certain extent, the current land tenure system in China has ensured a social 
safety net for the poor and avoided the growth of a large landless class as seen in 
many other developing countries (Huang, 2003). To others, extreme rural poverty 
and hard livelihoods pose a major threat to China’s agriculture. Thus, it is more 
about the lack of adequate access to legal rights and poor quality of life of the rural 
population that are the main issues confronting China’s rural policies than the non-existence 
of land privatization (Li, 2003). 
 
   8 
1.3  Ineffective land policy responses 
Against this backdrop, one simply would ask what has gone wrong with government 
land laws and policies and what are the issues to be redressed to make land work 
for the poor. Neo-liberal scholars may point to the issue of collective ownership as a 
major  obstacle  to  sustainable  livelihoods,  tenure  security  and  good  village 
governance; thus, giving legal titles to individual households would be the ultimate 
solutions. They believe that the security of individual property ownership and the fair 
distribution  of  land  is  a  universal  instinct,  which  is  crucial  for  rapid  economic 
development. And property rights are vital in transforming peasant societies into self-
sustaining modern plural societies (Hutton, 2006: 186; De Soto, 2000). 
 
Rural land in China is owned by the village collective mostly and the state under 
special  conditions.  The  collective  is  represented  by  the  village  administrative 
committee. Peasants are granted land usufruct rights with the land being subject to 
readjustment  and  expropriation.  The  current  legal  framework  does  not  clearly 
stipulate peasants’ legal status and responsibilities. Neither does it clarify how their 
benefits and interests can be realized. Even though certain policies on safeguarding 
their rights exist, many peasants are not aware of them and they are vulnerable to 
forced eviction (MLR, 2000: 246). Although the law grants land transfer rights to the 
peasants, the transfer has to be approved by the village administrative committees 
first. Of course, the transfer right is not the same as the western legal definition of 
private land right. As Pi (1999) argues, the current land rights cannot be equated 
with the ownership per se. What peasants have is the right to cultivate and harvest 
the land only. This means that the village collective and local government have much 
more  power  than individual households  in  deciding  on  specific land  use. It  also 
explains why the current collective property regime is often seen as ambiguous in 
nature and that it lacks credibility to safeguard peasant rights and interests which is 
partly enshrined  by  law.  It is further argued  that  this is  a deliberate  institutional 
arrangement by the state; thus, the state serves its own interests rather than those of 
the poor peasants. For some, the issue of “who owns what” remains to be addressed 
in contemporary rural China (Ho, 2005; MLR, 2000).  
 
It is difficult to understand why this dual tenure system has failed the poor in the first 
place.  Ideally,  the  collective  institution  should  have  played  an  essential  role  in 
organizing the peasantry in agricultural production and social relations. Ironically, 
one can also argue that because of the HRS, individual households have too much 
control over their land resources, which leaves the collective institution meaningless 
except for authoritarian control measures as enshrined in law, for instance, in the 
case of land expropriation. In other words, the collective plays a bigger role in village   9 
political economy rather than specific matters concerning the daily lives of the poor. 
The mismatch between the collective and individual households is attributable to 
poor governance, improper use of natural resources and poverty.  
 
The Chinese government has been under tremendous pressure to reform the land 
sector in order to deal more effectively with land takings and unsustainable land uses. 
The efforts are evident in many policy circulars and orders issued in the past few 
years, all of which have one thing in common—imposing more stringent rules on 
local  government  performances  concerning  land  expropriation  with  a  view  of 
improving transparency in land governance processes. Nonetheless, one can hardly 
find any specific move towards the strengthening of peasant rights and power in land 
administration. Moreover, there is a lack of stipulations and mechanisms for peasant 
participation in land governance processes. To many experts’ disappointment, the 
ambiguity issue of the collective ownership has not been addressed. However, even 
if this issue were to be addressed, and peasants were to be given full individual land 
titles, it would be hard to predict the effectiveness and consequences, while the 
wider political economy and power imbalances remain unchanged.  
 
Furthermore,  current  policies  juxtapose  collectivization  and  market-oriented 
mechanisms for land governance especially those concerning land rights. On the 
one  hand,  concern  over  social  and  political  instability  overrides  any  intention  to 
institutionalize  land  privatization  or  establishment  of  a  fully-fledged  land  market, 
whereas the market is increasingly treated as the lasting solution to China’s land and 
agrarian  problems.  In  other  words,  the  village  collective  maintains  the  primary 
position of legitimate control of the land and village affairs, which often contributes to 
weakening land rights of the poor and land-induced corrupt practices of the collective 
and higher-level governments (see CLSPI et al., 2008). On the other hand, arable 
land loss and its associated poverty and poor governance continue to pose a threat 
to  the  legitimacy  of  the  collective  and  local  state.  As  a  result,  policy  changes 
gradually  reflect  the  use  of  market-oriented  institutions  to  strengthen  individual 
peasants’  land  rights  and  safeguard  their  best  interests,  albeit  to  a  very  limited 
degree of effectiveness. It is also important to note that any land policy changes 
reflect the readjustments of social and political relations with vested interests, which 
is  a  huge  challenge  for  the  government.  As  one  official  from  the  State  Council 
Research  Office  remarked  on  the  government  policy  changes,  “we  all  know  the 
problems, but linking them with policy is another thing, because when you change 
one aspect, then the others may be negatively affected. That is why the current 
policy is focused on stringent administrative control in land policies rather than any   10 
other measures”.6 However, failure to define the problems can lead to the delay in 
coming up with innovative approaches to China’s land reform.  
 
In a nutshell, government land policies and legislations carry a market feature with 
Chinese  socialist  characteristics.  This  seems  a  necessary  requirement  for  the 
transformation of the Chinese economy into a fully-fledged market economy. With a 
market economy, according to Fu (2001), peasants should be given the right to sell, 
subcontract or mortgage their land in order to improve agricultural productivity and 
competitiveness. And this will help transfer them to non-farm activities in urban areas 
and  safeguard  them  from  land  evictions.  It  will  ultimately  lead  to  good  land 
governance  under  the  rule  of  law.7 Although  the  Chinese  government  does  not 
ostensibly allow free individual-to-individual land sales, it does appreciate any means 
of strengthening individual rights but in a vacuum where other institutional backup is 
lacking. This approach has much to do with the formalization of land titles through 
land registration first. By doing so, some envisage that it will help solve various land 
claims, disputes and moreover, strengthen land administration for the purpose of 
better land use planning and policy-making.  
 
In fact, land registration in China has been practiced since the early 1990s but with 
limited  progress.  It  was  even  stalled  in  1995  due  to  a  national  policy  aimed  at 
reducing peasants’ economic burden. What the target unit for land registration ought 
to  be--village  group  or  administration  village 8 remains  controversial.  The  Land 
Management Law treats the village group as the basic unit of land ownership in 
cases where land is owned by two or more village groups. It is argued that if the 
village  group  is  targeted,  land  registration  can  be  a  complex  process  given  the 
difficulty in clarifying the different interests of households, solving the disputes on 
land boundaries and finding the technical fix. Others argue that land registration at 
the  level  of  village  group  would  ensure  that  the  peasants’  land  rights  could  be 
protected more effectively. As a result, land registration has taken different forms in 
different regions (Ho, 2003; MLR, 2000). Land registration is also pushed by the 
major international actors such as the World Bank, which has supported the Chinese 
                                                 
6 Interview at the European Conference for Agriculture and Rural Development in China in Leeds, 
UK, in April 2009.  
7 In fact, quite a number of top researchers for the Chinese government uphold that the ultimate 
goal of land reform in China would be the realization of land market exactly as in the West, but it 
would take a few generations to realize it, according to an interview with a researcher from the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in December 2009. 
8 In China, an administrative village can consist of several natural villages or groups with each 
having its own administrative unit, but under the overall administration of the village administrative 
committee.   11 
government researchers in land titling projects. Faced with many challenges, these 
projects have played a minimal role in influencing land policy.9 
 
One cannot tell what the implications of land registration mean for the peasants. For 
instance,  the  2007  Property  Law  allows  local  government  to  issue  relevant 
regulations on land registration, although it does not provides any clarifications on 
the scope, method and agency of land registration. Moreover, Article 246 states that 
local government “may” produce relevant regulations on registration of immovable 
goods before any state law and regulations on the scope, agency and methods of 
registration  are  passed.  As  an  expert  from  the  Ministry  of  Land  and  Resources 
remarked, “not serious; land registration is just an administrative tool, and can hardly 
have  any  impact  on  the  land  rights  of  the  poor”. 10 The  issue  is  whether  this 
conventional approach can benefit the poor in the changing social, economic and 
political  contexts  in  China.  Policy-makers  and  academics  have  not  reached  a 
consensus on how the land in China can be better governed. In short, how to make 
land tenure work for the poor remains the halfway house for all. In other words, what 
constitutes a well-defined pro-poor land tenure system that suits the Chinese context? 
 
1.4  International experiences of land reform 
As discussed earlier, the Chinese government has taken into account how the West 
has developed its property rights systems and in particular land registration and 
cadastral  management  system.  It  has  also  been  aware  of  the  problems  of  the 
Western legal approach to land reform as experienced in other countries especially 
transitional economies. As a transitional economy itself, the Chinese government 
understands that the slow progress made in land reform has its political, economic, 
social and cultural ramifications. Thus, it must avoid the unintended consequences of 
land reform practised in other countries. Nonetheless, China ought to learn from the 
success and failure of those countries for its own policy-making.  
 
It  is  well  known  that  the  Western  legal  property  rights  approach  provides  legal 
binding status for individual property rights. Its core lies in the stipulation of property 
rights as an individual right enshrined in civil codes and constitutions. Moreover, land 
transfers are conducted based on a valid legal ground or a real agreement essential 
to any transfer. And land registration is institutionalized to reflect the high-level of 
                                                 
9 Outcomes of the recent projects were presented at an international conference on China land 
policy reform held in Beijing in 2006. An integrated policy framework was recommended, which 
includes the importance of land registration. See DRC & World Bank (2006). 
10 Interview in Beijing in May 2008.   12 
equity and transparency in land administration. Although countries differ in their legal 
stipulations in the transfer of properties, for example, in the cases of German, French, 
English and Dutch law (van Vliet, 2000), all these systems require every transfer to 
be  backed  by  real  agreement.  In  Dutch  law,  ownership  is  defined  as  the  most 
comprehensive  real  right  to  the  owner.  Transfer  of  landownership  requires  the 
drawing up of notarial deeds, which are registered with a special public registry or 
the Dutch Cadastre. On common ownership, the Dutch Civil Code stipulates that 
ownership of each owner of the common property must be written into a notarial 
deed and the deed must be registered (Wang, 2006). With regard to usufruct right, 
the person with this right can exert his right against anyone who infringes on it (Kleijn 
et al., 2006). In addition, many European countries are in the process of converting 
their  land  registry  systems  to  electronic  database  format  to  allow  electronic 
transmission  of  land  transfer  documents  and  direct  access  to  the  database  to 
effectuate  land  transfers  and  registrations  (Murray,  2007).  The  land  registration 
system in these countries suggests that a workable land administration is built upon 
good  governance,  appropriate  resources,  cultural  sensitivity,  equity,  quality  and 
commitment. Sustainable development is best promoted by secure, flexible, and all-
inclusive land tenure structures (Törhönen, 2003).  
 
The legal and institutional development concerning land tenure and administration in 
these countries certainly differs greatly from the case of China. This does not mean, 
however, that there is nothing in common between the two. The fact is that the 
Chinese government and legal scholars in particular have already started linking the 
two in terms of mutual exchange and research cooperation. For instance, the Dutch 
Civil  Code  has  even  been  translated  into  Chinese,  and  Dutch  land  law  and 
institutions are widely recognized by the Chinese government as a valuable learning 
framework.11 The issue remains as to what the Chinese policy-makers can learn 
from  the  Western  experience.  Although  the  central  government  may  attempt  to 
standardize its legal and regulatory regimes, many localities may be reluctant to 
follow or they may even resist the central rulings (Mertha & Zeng, 2005). It is difficult 
to foresee what measures that the government will take to ensure that its rules and 
regulations are in harmony with local needs. Nonetheless, good land governance as 
characterized by the principles of transparency, accountability and rule of law ought 
to be learnt and adhered to. Moreover, it is important to learn from the lessons of 
                                                 
11 The University of Groningen has played an important role in bridging China and the Netherlands 
in land governance research collaboration. In the past few years, it has initiated research projects 
in collaboration with both Dutch and Chinese government and research institutions, coordinated 
training in land registration for Chinese officials and experts, and organized Chinese government 
officials’ visit to their Dutch counterparts. See http://www.rug.nl/cds 
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other countries especially those transition economies that have implemented the 
Western model or the property rights approach to land administration with high social, 
cultural and economic costs paid. 
 
Simply following the Western model has proven a failure for those post-socialist 
countries  undertaking  drastic  land  reform  programmes  with  a  focus  on  land 
redistribution, titling and registration. For example, the case of Russia demonstrates 
that with the advent of land reform there has been a low level of private farming and 
unequal access to land for poor farmers. This reform process has reproduced the 
former Soviet forms of de facto property rights regimes and agricultural production. 
The majority of poor farmers still hold on to the collective means of production and 
are inactive in participating in the reform process because they are marginalized by 
the powerful rural elite and local polity. Although a formal land transfer system is in 
place, it is the unwritten rules and informal procedures that have reinforced social 
stratification (Allina-Pisano, 2004). Other countries also exemplify the difficult issues 
obstructing land reform as these are inextricably linked with local politics. In the case 
of Moldova, it is evident that land reform characterized by rural de-collectivization 
has brought unintended consequences in terms of extensive land fragmentation and 
the emergence of a land lease market whereby individual farmers lease their lands 
to agricultural enterprises, which in turn consolidate the lands (Cashin & McGrath, 
2006). In Vietnam, the ongoing land reform with an introduction to systematic land 
registration has met the resistance of local communities because the new land rights 
imposed on them conflict with their actual land relations. It is evident that this reform 
has not brought about greater tenure security for farmers and has not exerted any 
major  effect  on  agricultural  growth  (Sikor,  2006).  These  cases  illustrate  the 
complexities and scales underpinning the functioning of property systems. As Ye 
(2000)  points  out,  the  reforms  in  these  countries  have  favored  non-agricultural 
groups which dominate the land market to gain lucrative benefits; as a result, many 
poor farmers became their tenants. This issue poses a severe challenge for these 
countries to ensure equity and efficiency in the functioning of their land management 
systems. 
 
Furthermore, African experiences of land reform illuminate the fact that land reform 
policies focused on land titling and registration according to the Western model have 
yet to prove to be successful because colonial history, local politics and culture have 
a  strong  bearing  on  policy  implementation  (Daley  &  Hobley,  2005).  Pogrammes 
underpinned by individualization of landownership are seen as a threat to social 
security as a result of enlarged land holdings and landlessness. Still, customary land 
tenure  systems  promote  a  sense  of  communal  responsibility  for  land  resource 
management and therefore enable land to be preserved for future generations. It is   14 
argued that Africa may need flexible alternatives to the existing statutory systems 
being tested, and that common rights models in the name of communal titles should 
be further researched. In addition, from a technical point of view, land conveyances 
through land deeds and title registration have proven to be costly to the majority poor 
who cannot afford to pay the registration fee. And informal fee payment methods 
have made the registration unfeasible for most of the people in developing countries 
(Törhönen,  2003).  As  a  result,  land  titling  has  actually  reduced  tenure  security, 
further promoted social inequality, weakened the position of women, exacerbated 
landlessness and thus had no major effect on land and credit markets. To redress 
this problem, recognition of the role of customary systems in land management is 
called for. For instance, in Botswana, customary land tenure systems and statutory 
law co-exist, which provides an innovative and robust land management system in 
response to societal needs (Adams et al, 2003; Birgegard, 1993).  
 
International organizations with the mandate to introduce land titling programmes in 
developing  countries  have  been  cautious  about  those  programmes.  More 
community-based approaches that can better accommodate low-income groups are 
considered. In a nutshell, the forms of landownership depend on the nature of the 
resource itself and existing social arrangements. And an effective land policy reform 
will only be made more feasible by an open and broadly based policy dialogue, 
carefully chosen  and  evaluated  pilot  projects and  sharing  of  experiences  across 
countries  (Deininger  et  al.,  2003:  17).  It  is  important  to  note  that  land  titling 
programmes  under  certain  circumstances  can  contribute  to  tenure  security  and 
improved welfare. But tenure security or the farmers’ secured rights to use land can 
be achieved through other means than individual land titling and registration (Palacio, 
2006). This means that it is important to learn from these cases how formal policies 
and informal or local practices are interwoven and shape each other, the implications 
of which would be useful for furthering land policy reform. 
 
Given  the  social  and  political  complexity  in  land  tenure  reform  in  the  regions 
discussed  and  the  fact  that  Western  models  of  land  administration  may  not 
contribute to the effective functioning of a rural economy, there is a need to find ways 
to strike a balance between market-oriented approaches and state intervention in 
property rights arrangements. The state must play a key role in guiding institutional 
changes  in  the  reform  process  (Ho  &  Spoor,  2006).  Moreover,  community 
participation is a prerequisite for land reform programmes to build up legitimacy for 
land administration. This is a useful approach in studying the societal needs and 
understanding  complex  local  realities  in  which  poverty,  power  and  politics  are 
interwoven  with  societal  choices  for  viable  programmes  that  address  the 
fundamental issues of poverty related to land (McEwen & Nolan, 2007). Lessons   15 
from  these  countries  indicate  that  agrarian  reform  does  not  follow  the  transition 
paradigm. This paradigm marked by a linear change from a traditional communist 
system  to  a  modern market  economy  with  the  introduction  of  more  market  and 
socially  and  technologically  advanced  elements  has  proven  an  illusion.  Rural 
opposition to land privatization suggests that market-oriented production is a social 
contract, which has to be built over time before achieving success (Ellman, 2003).  
 
These lessons should be learnt by the Chinese government, which means that its 
land policy has to be flexible enough to allow for the dynamic forms of land tenure 
that cater for the specific social, economic, cultural and political context. The account 
of these international experiences also makes this study interesting given that China 
is transforming rapidly into a more developed market economy. The associated land 
policies changes may have far-reaching implications for the Chinese society and the 
rural poor population in particular. 
 
2.  Research objective, focus and questions 
 
There  are  three  basic  reasons  why  land  tenure  and  its  relationship  with  village 
governance and sustainable rural development deserve in-depth study. First, the 
current  land  tenure  system  in  China  has  not  been  analyzed  more  holistically 
especially  in  terms  of  its  social  and  political  dimensions  and  the  linkages  with 
sustainable natural resource use and agricultural development. Analysts have given 
one-sided  attention  to  how  land  tenure  can  contribute  to  economic  and  social 
development. According to Rigg (2006: 198), there is a need to reconsider some old 
questions (e.g. teleological thinking on landownership and economic development) 
on how best to achieve pro-poor development in the rural South, as livelihoods have 
become de-linked from farming, and poverty and inequality from landownership (also 
see Bandeira & Sumpsi, 2009). China is not excluded in this case, as urbanization 
continues to undermine the possibility of sustained rural development and agriculture 
in particular. Second, there is very little empirical research in China into how land 
tenure is perceived by different stakeholders and how it is organized by the people 
themselves. Third, it is therefore important to develop better understanding of the 
multi-faceted  nature  of  land  tenure  and  the  conditions  in  which  a  pro-poor  land 
tenure system can be explored and probably created.  
 
The overall objective of the present study is to contribute to the understandings of 
land tenure reform and local practices in China, to develop a better understanding of 
the institutional changes needed to tackle land-related poverty, power and politics   16 
and to explore locally-based forms of land tenure that serve the best interests of the 
poor. The study consists of three specific objectives: 
 
•  to contribute to the theoretical development of land tenure and property rights 
approaches; 
•  to  develop  a  critical  understanding  of  land  laws,  policies  and  institutions 
underpinning sustainable land use and China’s social, economic and political 
transformation; 
•  to  discuss  the  opportunities  and  constraints  for  pro-poor  land  institutional 
experimentation at the grassroot level.  
 
This study hypothesizes that land tenure regimes, be they collective, customary or 
private  ownership,  are  inextricably  linked  with  the  economic,  natural  resources, 
social, cultural and political conditions of a given setting. A property rights regime 
involves a wide range of issues of landownership, land registration and an enabling 
institutional framework, be they policy, law, administration and diverse forms of state-
society interactions. Thus, this study focuses on major challenges for policy-makers 
in understanding land tenure as shaped by inter-related historical, social, political 
and economic processes among different actors at different social organizational 
levels.  A  proper  fit  among  these  dimensions  determines  the  security, 
appropriateness  and  effectiveness  of  pro-poor  land  tenure.  Land  law  and  policy 
development will need to be catered for this context. And any preconceived thinking 
on one type of land tenure regime will preclude the search for innovative institutional 
designs in the local context. Thus, a new paradigm shift needs to be developed 
towards a pro-poor approach that is participatory in nature and grants the peasants 
the choice over their preferred types of land tenure. A land tenure regime can only 
work  in  the  interests  of  the  poor  on  condition  that  its  combination  with  other 
conditions—the aggregate effects serve the sustainable development need of the 
poor population. By doing so, this approach will also contribute to the understanding 
of  China’s  agrarian  future  underpinned  by  contradictions  of  urban  and  rural 
development and sustainable natural resource use and governance. 
 
The  main  research  question is  formulated  as  follows:  to  facilitate  a  successful 
economic,  social  and  political  transition,  why  the  ongoing  state-led  land  tenure 
reform measures characterized by an inclination to market-oriented and hybrid forms 
of  individual  and  collective  land  tenure  arrangements  have  not  ensured  the 
accomplishment of the policy goal of farmland preservation and sustainable land use? 
This is a grand question without immediate answers and one size-fits-all solutions. 
Moreover, it reveals the need for the exploration of flexible approaches to address   17 
the pressing issues of tenure insecurity, poor governance and poverty challenges in 
the Chinese countryside. The following specific questions are discussed to this end: 
 
•  What are the historical, social, political and economic contexts in which land 
tenure reform in China has taken place? 
•  To what extent has the current land tenure system facilitated or obstructed 
village governance and sustainable rural development? 
•  How  different  land  tenure  arrangements  are  linked  with  land  use,  rural 
governance, social and political relations? 
•  What are the social, economic and political meanings derived from the land 
reform process for different actors, how are these meanings construed and 
what  are  the  implications  for  formally  and  informally  organized  land 
management practices and power struggles among them?   
•  What constitutes a pro-poor land tenure system? 
 
3.  Research methods and constraints 
 
This study takes a comprehensive approach covering micro and macro-levels of 
research. On the one hand, it draws on two empirical fieldwork cases in contrasting 
regions—Hebei  and  Guangdong  provinces  in  terms  of  their  disparate  economic, 
environment and social parameters. Hebei is chosen as it is one of the poor regions 
that are experiencing natural resources depletion, chronic poverty and unsustainable 
land  use  and  governance.  In  particular,  it  exemplifies  the  issues  around  the 
implementation of the HRS in agricultural development. By contrast, Guangdong is 
one of the most developed economies in China, where local governments are bolder 
than  Hebei  in  putting  forward  the  so-called  land  institutional  experimentation  in 
varying  forms,  however,  with  many  problems  encountered.  More  importantly,  in 
many peri-urban areas of this province, many peasants have gradually lost their 
interests in keeping the land for farming, as they would rather give it out to the local 
developers in return for high cash compensation. But to what extent this short-term 
solution to poverty can be sustainable is unaddressed by most studies. The two 
regions in combination are representative of the overall picture of China’s ongoing 
land tenure reform agenda and local practices. This study locates them in the overall 
land reform history, policy development context and local practices in other regions 
in order to present a wider lens into which the linkages among them can be better 
explicated. By doing so, it is expected that this study can provide a more holistic 
introduction  and  analysis  than  just  focusing  on  fieldwork  findings.  Therefore,  it 
requires a combination of various methods and approaches during the course of the 
research.   18 
 
Ethnographic methods are applied in combination with other qualitative approaches 
given  the  complexity of  the  research  topics  in terms  of their  political  and  social 
sensitivity and the need to look into the perspectives of different social and political 
actors. The use of the participant observation method allows a great level of flexibility 
in  adjusting  different  methods  and  engaging  with  a  wide  range  of  actors  in  the 
research process (Levi-Strauss, 1976). By doing so, the questions concerning the 
ways of life of the community, their culture and behavior and perspectives can be 
explored. It is not only limited to the study of community at the micro level, but also 
useful for macro-level analysis of powerful groups and institutions and how they gain, 
maintain and exercise power. 
 
The selection of specific research sites was a lengthy process due to the efforts 
made in reaching out to many contacts in China. Without their support, it would not 
been possible especially for a Chinese researcher working at a Dutch university. The 
collaboration with many research institutions in China enabled me to have direct 
contacts with some government staff and village cadres. This greatly facilitated field 
entry and data collection. It was also to my advantage to “study up” in this research 
in terms of arranging interviews with government staff and obtaining documents and 
information on related topics. However, I met difficulties in making appointments and 
conducted  these  meetings  because  they  were  time-consuming.  Sometimes 
interviewees’ reluctance to receive me also posed a challenge to the whole research. 
There was little chance to here their critical views on relevant policies and laws. It 
was reasonable that they had many concerns as well especially when they did not 
know what kind of information they should give me. Moreover, I did not hold the 
assumption that they were supposed to know everything. As the research topic is 
complex in nature, it is hard for anyone to provide comprehensive informative facts, 
figures and viewpoints.  
 
The fieldwork was the most difficult part of the study. Even with local government 
and village cadres’ approval, lack of the support of the peasants rendered a major 
constraint.    It  was  not  possible  to  just  entre  the  home  of  randomly  selected 
households for an interview. Quite often, I was “kicked out” by the house owner who 
just had no time for me. Even when I explained to them about the approval of their 
leaders for the interview, they kept showing their hesitation and concerns over the 
purpose of my research. This constraint nullified the use of the conventional methods 
of questionnaires and focus group discussions.  
 
To remedy this constraint, building trust was absolutely crucial to the entire fieldwork 
process. I experienced this difficulty when even I went to the paddy field to talk to the   19 
peasants. In many cases, although they could not drive me off the open field, our 
conversations did not last as long as I had hoped. But it was a more fruitful exercise 
than knocking on their doors. Therefore, informal interview or rather chatting with the 
peasants with open-ended questions was the main tactic. Getting to know them 
gradually through chatting helped build mutual trust and revealed the appropriate 
ways of conducting discussions. Furthermore, I spent much time in the field just 
observing what was happening and locating the people who I found most interesting. 
In short, doing the research on the land that the local peasants were tilling provided 
me with a more direct access to their way of life. By doing so, their livelihood practice, 
life  histories,  activities,  organizations,  networks  and  viewpoints  were  obtained 
(Mitchell, 1969). All the data from the field was thus combined with those from the 
government and research institutions for further analysis.  
 
In  a  nutshell,  I  took  a  flexible  approach  to  the  fieldwork  and  meetings  with 
government and research staff to develop a reasonable degree of trust, openness 
and honesty, which was crucial for the validity of the data and continued research 
with these participants. During the process of data analysis, for instance, managed 
to keep the key informants updated of my research progress and continued to solicit 
their views on the findings. Moreover, they continued to provide me with the updated 
information on the field. This way of research was a mutual learning process, in 
which  I  benefited  from  the  experiences  and  views  of  the  informants  whose 
contribution was crucial to the finalization of research data analysis. 
 
Reviewing or desk research of the existing literature on land reform in China was 
conducted throughout the research, which was used to reflect upon my research 
findings. However, there is limited literature on China relevant to the research topic, 
although it was useful in one way or another. In particular, empirical studies on 
micro-level land struggles and land use remain minimal, which is a key constraint to 
the development of a critical mass of the debates on local views and practice. This 
disadvantage was dealt with by actively resorting to the literature on international 
experiences and practices in relevant subjects, and linking them with the case of 
China. This effort plays an important role in defining the cutting-edge research topics 
pertinent to the case of China.  
 
Overall, the empirical data collected serves the purpose of the analysis of different 
stakeholder  perspectives  rather  than  quantitative  data  analysis.  Given  the  main 
purpose of this study, this approach attempts to fill in the gap of understanding the 
multifaceted nature of land tenure, which requires more qualitative and quantitative 
investigations. Also due to the constraints to the fieldwork, it was not possible to gain   20 
much  expected  in-depth  study  of  the  local  situations including  even  stakeholder 
perspectives.  
 
4.  Theoretical framework 
 
The theoretical framework for this study comprises three parts. First, it outlines the 
specific issue of land tenure as an institution to the understanding of its importance 
of and interconnection with sustainable rural development. Second, it provides the 
latest critiques of development, which serves the basis of explicating the current 
constraints to China’s social and economic development. It is in this context that the 
social,  political,  cultural  and  economic  dimensions  of  land  tenure  reform  can  be 
studied  to  illuminate  the  changing  social  and  power  relations  between  different 
actors.  Moreover,  a  pro-poor  approach  is  used  to  deepen  the  understanding  of 
community practice on development and land reform in particular. Third, it outlines a 
study  of  institutional  development  to  provide  cross-cultural  critique  on  land 
institutions in general and land law in particular, which underpins complex social 
relations. This will help to throw light on how the meaning of land tenure is construed 
by different actors especially the local poor in the overall development context.  
 
4.1  Land tenure and sustainable rural development 
Given the international debates on land tenure especially in terms of privatization, 
collectivization  and  communal  ownership,  one  may  wonder  whose  land  tenure 
security it is being meant. Land tenure may carry different meanings for different 
interpreters  especially  community  and  state.  Land  as  a  property  should  be  first 
interpreted  as  a  set  of  rules  and  responsibilities.  As  Dekker  (Dekker,  2001:15) 
defines, “Land tenure is the institutional arrangement of rules, principles, procedures 
and practices, whereby a society defines control over, access to, management of, 
exploitation of, and use of means of existence and production”. This interpretation 
further  implies  that  it  is  a  sanctioned  social  relationship  between  people--not 
between people and land itself. This relationship is latent in the daily power struggles 
for  legitimate  authority  to  control,  allocate  and  exploit  the  land  (von  Benda-
Beckmann, 1995). Thus, it is always hard to define exactly what tenure security 
means for different actors in different contexts.  
 
The complex social relations embedded in land tenure can further complicate the 
challenges for sustainable land management. Land tenure security does not just 
stem  from  individualistic  approaches.  As  strongly  argued,  “the  notion  that  only   21 
individual Western-style ownership provides enough individual security to promote 
an economic take off has been substituted by the opposite notion: only communal 
tenure (in areas where it still holds) provides enough security” (Hoekema, 2000: 51). 
Although  this  statement  may  overestimate  the  role  and  function  of  collective 
approaches  to  land  tenure  security,  it  certainly  provides  a  useful  re-thinking  of 
dogmatic ways of land management that overlook the dynamics and conditions of 
land  tenure  system.  In  the  Chinese  context,  obviously  both  individually-  and 
collectively-based approaches have proved to be ineffective in securing land rights of 
the poor. Thus, one cannot take a one-sided view of one tenure system over the 
other. The question remains as to what works for the poor in a given context and 
whose land tenure it is. This question ultimately challenges the trajectory of land 
reform  in  a  given  community  or  a  nation  as  a  whole.  Contrary  to  many  liberal 
economists’ view on simplistic approaches to land tenure reform, it is argued that 
“though ideological arguments on the best ways of organizing agriculture continue, 
no land tenure system can be adjudged best in abstract. Any judgments concerning 
a particular system must take note of the institutional and technological conditions in 
the society and the stage at which that society lies in the transformation from an 
agrarian to an industrial economy. Judgments should also consider what specific 
groups and individuals in the society are attempting to accomplish” (Dorner & Kanel, 
1971: 1). 
 
The preceding judgment is pertinent to the Chinese case where local communities 
are not empowered to decide on their preferred institutional arrangements for the 
use of their land. It is an irony that the collective land ownership assumed to facilitate 
sound land management practices, to a large extent, has failed to ensure land tenure 
security and enhance more efficient sustainable rural development on the whole. 
The  collective  system  has  not  been  a  genuine  institution  for  community-centred 
collective action. Failure to do so has led to many problems as already discussed. 
The government needs to find ways to foster genuine collective action to address 
many critical issues of rural development and land use in particular.  
 
Effective collective action can solve many issues that cannot be dealt with by policy 
and legal institutions. Where land tenure is concerned, it can help identify land rights 
as conditioned by locality, history, changes in resource condition and use economy 
and social relations. And it can respond to changing conditions that affect land use 
and  property  rights.  Property  rights  change  over  time,  and  the  change  occurs 
through the social and power relations and negotiations between different groups. 
This  complexity  means  that  collective  action  provides  the  means  to  respond  to 
changing conditions that affect land use and property rights (Meinzen-Dick et al, 
2004). Thus, collective action is a prerequisite for pro-poor land tenure. For land   22 
tenure to work for the poor, tenure security is just one element. There is no direct 
relationship between land tenure security and sustainable land use. It is interwoven 
with the overall rural development of a given community. Other conditions of rural 
development have an impact on how land ought to be utilized. Thus, a land tenure 
system is contingent upon many economic development factors. Land is just one 
sector. Many other sectors contribute to development as well. The failure to make 
other sectors work for the poor can also trigger land tenure insecurity and challenge 
the existing pattern of a particular land tenure system, as this thesis illuminates. 
Putting it more simply, peasants have to decide on whether they should stick to their 
land in the village or abandon it before migrating to cities. If the village economic and 
livelihood conditions are not conducive to their continued residence in the village, 
they would probably go to cities no matter how secure their land tenure is. The 
outcome would be complex from a rural sustainable development perspective, which 
further  implies  the  inter-connectedness  of  land  tenure  and  sustainable  rural 
development.  
 
4.2  Critique of development 
The process of land reform cannot be understood in isolation from a country’s overall 
development  context.  China’s  development  has  been  marked  by  astonishing 
economic  growth  at  the  cost  of  natural  resources  and  social  equity.  The 
expropriation of land by local government has become a major measure to spur local 
economic  growth.  A  critical  analysis  of  China’s  development  involves  a  holistic, 
comparative  and  contextualized  approach  to  understanding  society  and  state 
interactions.  
 
Development can be interpreted as a social, economic, political and cultural process 
(Grillo & Stirrat, 1997). As part of this process, land reform is inextricably linked with 
social relations at various social strata. An understanding of these complex relations 
in a development context can provide insights into its underlying social and cultural 
issues. From this angle, a critique of development policy and practice will provide 
insightful perspectives on its positive and negative impacts on a given society. By 
doing so,  an inquiry  into the nature  of local power  and  hierarchy,  the  nature  of 
household  and  rural  collectives,  organization  of  local  property  relations  and 
community organizations can be made. And the meanings of diverse discourses of 
dominant actors can be defined (Gardner & Lewis, 1996: 89; Rutherford, 2004).  
 
Therefore, there is a need to look into the wider underpinnings of land tenure—
poverty  and  power  and  focus  more  on  the  local  processes  of  their  interactions.   23 
Moreover,  a  pro-poor  approach  is  used  to  examine  the  changing  relationships 
between land, livelihoods and poverty in the context of rural-urban change and to 
identify the entry points for pro-poor change in land policy reform. By contrast, the 
Western-legal  approach  or  property  rights  approach  to  land  rights  does  not  pay 
ample attention to the embedded social and political relations to address land tenure 
as social contracts in developing countries (Daley & Hobley, 2005). One needs to 
identify  the  preconditions  that  need  to  be  established  appropriately  before  any 
investment on a land management system is made. And secure, flexible and all-
inclusive land tenure, whether customary or statutory, provides the best basis for 
sustainable  rural  development  (Birgegard,  1993).  It  is  a  necessary  condition  for 
equitable rural development that would otherwise be predominated by elite capture 
and the stronghold of the local state.  
 
Thus,  a  pro-poor  land  tenure  system,  as  this  thesis  attempts  to  articulate  and 
develop, ought to be based on the sustainable land use, rural development and rural 
governance needs of a given community, whose understanding of local economic 
and natural resource conditions is inextricably interwoven with social and political 
relations among different stakeholders. Local community must be given an ample 
power in testing out their preferred choices over a particular land tenure system by 
policy-makers.  A  land  tenure  system  can  only  sustain  itself  if  it  contributes  to 
sustainable land use and rural development. A pattern of land use and development 
further complicates the suitability of a particular land tenure system imposed upon 
the local community by policy-makers. In essence, the challenge for the design of a 
pro-poor  land  tenure  system  relates  to  how  to  match  the  divergent  interests  of 
different  stakeholders  especially  the  poor  for  the  sake  of  sustainable  land  use, 
development and governance. 
 
4.3  Pro-poor land institutional change 
As the success of land reform, to a large extent, is contingent upon appropriate 
institutional arrangements, there is a need to develop an understanding of how these 
arrangements can be made and how they function. Institutions are the rules of the 
game in a society or, more formally, they are the humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction. They structure incentives in human exchange, whether 
political, social, or economic (North, 1990: 3). This definition is useful to understand 
how institutions are socially and culturally constructed. One needs to study social 
institutions as a system of patterned expectations about the behaviors of individuals 
fulfilling  their  socially-recognized  roles.  And  institutional  development  should  be 
focused on their working dynamics, discourses and contextual relations (Lewis, 1999;   24 
Cotterrell,  1992).  Institutions  are  negotiated, contested and  filled  with multi-vocal 
discourses that need to be uncovered in a field of contestation (Abram, 1998).  The 
core of this research-the issue of land tenure and property rights approach as an 
institution,  further  contends  that  the  approach  of  exclusive  individual  property 
ownership is essential to agricultural development. The working rules that define 
economic incentives should be the catalyst for successful economic transformation. 
In the case of China, the existence of rural collective control of land may provide 
such working rules that enable peasants to move in and out of their land in response 
to changing economic conditions in the larger economy. There is a need to further 
look  into  these  rules  and  seek  more  appropriate  institutional  arrangements  that 
promote viable and productive agriculture in China (Bromley, 2005). 
 
The juxtaposition of households and collective institutions as social, political and 
economic  units  will  serve  as  the  units  of  analysis,  which  will  provide  an 
understanding  of  peasants’  experiences,  knowledge  and  relations  to  power  and 
agency (Croll, 1994). By doing so, according to Campbell (2004), one can clearly 
specify the underlying mechanisms for a process in which change can occur; in 
particular, any constraints and opportunities for change should be carefully examined. 
I investigate how different actors build and modify the institutions to serve their own 
interests. The study of land tenure and property rights will provide more in-depth 
analysis of their interactions with society and the capacity of the state to create 
appropriate institutions. The starting point to explicate this is through the study of 
relevant  policies,  laws  and  organizations  as  social  phenomena.  Land  institutions 
underlie the social relations in respect of the use of the land as property. These 
complex social relations can only be understood through an in-depth investigation 
into how the Chinese rural society is structured and governed and how the meaning 
of  these  relations  is  constructed  by  the  local  culture  or  the  perceptions  and 
understandings  of  the  property  relations  and  daily  livelihood  practice  of  local 
communities. As Rosen (2006: 1) argues, “the creation of legal meaning takes place 
always through an essentially cultural medium”. Likewise, an institution such as law 
can only be studied as an integral part of the cultural whole; and accordingly, the 
manifestations of law such as abstract rules, patterns of actual behavior of members 
of society and decisions of local authorities can be studied (Pospisil, 1974). 
 
Furthermore, land tenure as an institution embodies a bundle of interactive public 
and  private  rights.  These  rights  coexist  with  several  often  contradictory  and 
regulatory  orders  at  different  layers  of  social  organizations.  These  organizations 
contain  various  bodies  of  cultural  tradition,  ideas  and  ideologies,  normative  and 
regulatory institutions, layers of professional and day-to-day practices and everyday 
social relationships and actors’ interests, which are referred to as legal pluralism.   25 
Legal pluralism poses a challenge to legal centrism which often misleads public 
policy and ignores the social context in which resources and property right regimes 
are embedded (Biezeveld, 2002: 11; Spiertz & Wiber, 1996: 13). To study legal 
plurality,  one  needs  to  understand  the  “living  law”  that  manifests  itself  in  the 
principles abstracted from the actual behavior of the society studied. “What state 
considers  to  be  ‘their  land’  is  often  defined  as  the  land  of  individuals,  families, 
lineages or communities by local or non-state laws” (von Benda-Beckmann, 2006: 
67).  By  studying  the  “living  law”,  the  relationships  between  law  and  extra-legal 
aspects  of  culture  can  be  further  revealed  (Pospisil,  1974).  There  is  a  need  to 
examine  how  the  current  land  law  and  other  institutional  arrangements  work  in 
practice, how exert impacts on the local community and how the community reacts to 
them.  
 
Land institutions should also be responsive to changing social conditions. In respect 
of  legal  development,  as  Nonet  and  Selznick  (1978:  14)  put  it,  law  acts  as  a 
facilitator  of  response  to  social  needs  and  aspirations.  The  Chinese  laws  are 
ambiguous,  fragmented  in  nature  and  sometimes  self-contradictory,  and  are  not 
equipped to cope with the changing needs of the poor (Ho, 2003). To mitigate social 
conflicts over land, the state would need to be more proactive in dealing with the 
current problems. A study of law can be of importance to provide evidence-based 
policy recommendations  on how the  state  apparatus  should  improve  land  policy 
through developing more responsive measures to cope with current constraints and 
to  build  up  a  fully-fledged  legal  system.  It  contributes  to  bringing  about  a 
reintegration of legal, political and social theory and recast jurisprudential issues in a 
social science perspective (Nonent & Selznick, 1978).  
 
Studying  land  law  as  an  institution  in  the  wider  context  enables  one  to  draw 
comparative perspectives on its practicality underpinning different legal systems and 
thus  provide  a  space  for  cross-cultural  critique  on  the  value-laden  conceptions, 
principles and practice of the law in different locations. In respect of the development 
of  the  legal  system  for  land  rights  in  China,  the  issue  of  institutional  ambiguity 
concerning  state,  collective  and  individual  landownership  and  power  struggles 
among these actors should be better understood in a specific context, while at the 
same time one should try to analyze the converging and conflicting perspectives of 
both Western and Chinese jurisprudence. In Western law, there is an exclusive focus 
on individuals and their personal rights and responsibilities without recognition of 
collective  claims,  rights  and  duties.  But  the  principles  and  practice  of  law  as 
developed in the West may be incompatible with other countries. And a systematic, 
reflexive and self-critical approach to the study of land law across different countries 
needs to be deployed (Cotterell, 1992).    26 
 
The development of appropriate land institutions is inextricably linked with the overall 
historical,  social,  economic  and  political  development  conditions.  Thus,  this 
framework can provide both macro and micro level analyses of institutional change 
in the overall development context. Also it can provide evidence-based approaches 
to the establishment of credible land institutions, which are not found in the current 
land management framework. A credible institution can rally sufficient social and 
political support in order to be effective; otherwise, it will exert negative effects on 
social  and  political  actors  (Ho,  2006).  Furthermore,  an  understanding  of  land 
institutional change provides further insights into the actual implementation of land 
policies and laws. Policy implementation is a process that must evolve, and people 
have to be enabled to participate in this process because they have the “know-how” 
(Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973). The study of institutional change from this angle will 
enable  one  to  better  understand  policy  implementation  and  legal  practice  as  a 
culturally contested and socially constructed process. It is in this process that the 
values and perspectives of the social and political actors can exert huge influences 
on the effectiveness of these institutional measures. 
 
5.  Organization of the thesis 
 
To give the reader an integrated and comprehensive overview and critical analysis of 
the issues, debates and findings, this thesis comprises independent or stand-alone 
article-type chapters. Each chapter provides a context for the others and enables the 
reader to find their inter-linkages from a more contextualized and critical point of view. 
In this manner, it tries to be a logical, coherent and integrated whole.  
 
This chapter provides an introduction to the research. Chapter 2 goes back to the 
history of land tenure changes especially since the Ming dynasty to provide a wider 
picture of the nature of China’s land reform and its effects on China’s rural society. It 
demonstrates the importance of power and politics in the reform process and its 
missing link with the rural reality—demands of the poor for the forms of land tenure 
that suit them the best. Chapter 3 provides an up-to-date overview of major land 
policy changes since the market reform took centre stage and their trajectories and 
impact on the livelihoods and social and political relations of the poor. It provides a 
critique of these issues and explicates the policy complexities and suggestions on 
more inclusive approaches to China’s land policy reform rather than the simplistic 
market-oriented approach that overestimates the role of the land market for good 
governance and sustainable rural development.    27 
 
Three cases of local practices in land tenure arrangements are followed. Chapter 4, 
based on fieldwork in Hebei province, presents a case of the current land tenure 
regime—the HRS in agricultural development and natural resource management in a 
poverty-stricken region facing severe environmental challenges. It focuses on the 
concomitant effects on the lack of diversified livelihood strategies of the poor and 
land  degradation.  Moreover,  its  effect  on  fragmentation  of  social  and  political 
relations in the rural community poses a severe challenge to community-centred 
participatory approaches to land tenure. The chapter also shows that land tenure 
system cannot be sustainable if rural development and good village governance are 
not coupled and supportive of its existence. As chapter 5 based on desk research 
demonstrates,  local  practices  have  given  preference  to  land  shareholder 
cooperatives especially in relatively developed areas. It explores the significance of 
the emergence of these institutions, its effects on the peasant land shareholders and 
its  intrinsic  problems  of  poor  governance  and  inappropriate  land  use  and 
management practices. It demonstrates that land tenure system should be treated as 
a dynamic process where local stakeholders continue to formulate and try out the 
system. Chapter 6 based on fieldwork in Guangdong province, shows the unique 
case of a commune village and explains why and how it has managed to survive the 
infiltration of the mainstream market political economy. It further demonstrates the 
role of collective power in deciding on the preferred tenure system of the peasants 
and managing the system in their interests. It is an institutional demonstration at the 
grassroots level of what constitutes a good land tenure system for the poor whose 
interpretations may differ drastically from many land experts and decision-makers. 
Also it is a paradox within the mainstream approach to China’s overall development. 
Its implications are illuminating to the study of China’s transition.  
 
Finally,  chapter  7 reviews the major  theoretical  issues  on  land  tenure, property 
rights,  institutional  change  and  rural  development  informed  by  this  study.  Its 
contribution is a critical framework for the analysis of land tenure reform in China as 
well as a stepping stone towards the development of relevant theories on a wider 
scale.  
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Chapter 2  China’s land reform 1368-1960s: 
Inequality and peasant-state 
struggles 
 
Abstract: 
 
As China has reached a critical stage of development marked by rising inequality, it 
is useful to reassess the trajectory of its reform to understand the lessons learnt from 
its past. Land reform is pivotal to social and political changes. It has been initiated by 
successive regimes whose wishes to cope with peasant rebellions and continue their 
reigns proved futile prior to the Communist rule. The failures of consecutive rulers 
had  much  to  do  with  their  inability  to  address  the  fundamental  issues  of  social 
structures  and  organizations  that  put  the  poor  peasants  on  the  margins  of 
development.  The  stronghold  of  local  power  enmeshed  in  complex  social  and 
political relations was largely reversed by the land revolution led by the Communists 
at great costs in mobilizing mass support, which led to the use of radical measures to 
gain political control in the context of rural destitution and inequality. Land reform by 
the  regimes took  different  forms in the  pursuit of  hegemonic control  rather  than 
meeting  the  interests  of  the  peasantry.  This  chapter  discusses  the  underlying 
challenges of China’s land reform and the issues of poverty, power and institutions 
that continue to constrain peasant choice over the reform trajectory. It posits that the 
creation  of  genuine  peasant-centred  land  institutions  would  be  indispensable  to 
tackle the needed changes in poverty and inequality in the Chinese history.  
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
A  government  which  permits  exploitation  of  the  mass  of  its  fellow 
citizens… may make a brave show, but it is digging its own grave. A 
government which grapples boldly with the land question will have little 
to fear either from foreign imperialism or from domestic disorder. It will 
have as its ally the confidence and good will of half-a-million villages 
(Tawney, 1939, cited in Wong, 1973: xxiv). 
 
Tawney’s  thought-provoking  standpoint  on  China’s  reform  has  far-reaching 
implications  for  understanding  the  role  of  the  land  in  China’s  arduous  history   36 
underpinned by social, economic and political inequality and its associated mass 
struggles  for  economic  and  political  transformation.  Indeed,  as  Tawney  rightly 
predicted,  only  the  Chinese  Communist  Party  was  successful  in  instituting  land 
reform as the feudal land exploitative relations were dismantled to a large extent 
(see Wong, 1973). In defeating the Nationalist government, the Party-led land reform 
played  an  essential  role  in  social  and  political  mobilization  characterized  by 
unprecedented land redistribution, which stood in huge contrast to the land reforms 
undertaken by previous regimes.  
 
Yet,  the  Party-led  land  reform,  according  to  historical  facts,  was  a  rather  mild 
programme in general, contradictory to many claims of its radical features (Wolf, 
1969). This means that land reform has always been inextricably linked with social 
and  political  relations  structured  by  complex  vested  interests  of  different  actors, 
which  can  either  facilitate  or  constrain  any  reform  agenda.  In  other  words,  the 
revolutionary  land  reform  aimed  at  equal  land  distribution  might  not  achieve 
outcomes as envisaged by the reformers, since it was hard to crush the then social 
fabric of the Chinese countryside. Understanding land and society relations from 
historical perspectives in this chapter can help “demystify” the social and political 
underpinnings of the China’s historical land reform measures and assess the extent 
to which that they have served the interests of the Chinese peasantry. This can be 
useful  in  the  explication  of  the  changing  land  policies  and  institutions  in 
contemporary China. As Perry (2008) contends, few of us now take a renewed look 
at the past reforms in relation to today’s problems. 
 
The grand victory of the communist revolution, as the next chapter shows, has not 
led  to  rapid  rural  development  in  the  vast  Chinese  countryside.  As  China  has 
reached  a  critical  stage  of  development  whereby  land  tenure  reform  is  being 
contested by policy-makers and researchers, there is little attention paid to the past. 
Despite some degree of accomplishment, land reform has never been a completed 
mission for the Chinese state. The system of land tenure has not become a major 
impetus for sound solutions to chronic poverty of the country, despite the fact that it 
is crucial to rural development, governance and social equity. The waves of reforms 
have not enabled the poor peasants to efficiently organize themselves to optimize 
their land use.  
 
It is impossible to provide a detailed account of China’s land reform history in this 
chapter. Yet, it is useful to throw light on the major issues concerning the history that 
spans from the Ming Dynasty to the early communist reign. For the first time in 
Chinese history, the Ming and Qing dynasties saw the sprouts of capitalism whereby 
land  was  the  crux  matter.  In  fact,  throughout  Chinese  history  prior  to  the   37 
Communists’ rule, land had been private property that could be easily transacted. 
Distinct from the rest of the world, the Chinese peasants’ access to land was mobile, 
which means that they could climb up the higher social stratum, for instance, to 
become  scholar-gentry  through  the  examination  system.  Moreover,  gentry  and 
peasantry were often linked through kinship, which added complexity to the rural 
social structure (Wolf, 1973). Thus, a renewed look at this period of land and society 
relations  can  reveal  the  linkages  of  varying  land  reform  agenda  designed  by 
successive  regimes,  which  all  had  to  deal  with  the  complex  social  and  political 
structures and relations inherited from previous states.  
 
Starting  from this angle  it  would  be interesting  to discuss the  multi-faceted land 
relations,  peasant  struggles  and  their  linkages  with  the  economic  and  political 
pressures  on  the  land.  Land  distribution,  utilization,  agricultural  production  and 
peasant livelihoods are inextricably linked with unequal land relations and small-
scale farming practices. The study of land tenure reform in the Ming and Qing is an 
attempt to explore the complex relationships and struggles among different actors—
landlords, peasants and the state. It seeks to demonstrate the complex land relations 
and the social and political meanings and implications of the reforms. The stronghold 
of land tenure is attributed to an incomplete economic transformation as the so-
called  feudalism  had  predominated  the  Chinese  society  and  economy.  This 
approach would provide a context for the study of the logic and continuum of land 
reform in contemporary China. And it helps understand the contradictions of the land 
reforms by the Nationalist and Communist governments.  
 
This  chapter  aims at stimulating a  re-thinking of  the China’s land reform  history 
pertaining  to  the  rationale  and  the  institutions  needed  for  the  state  to  gain  its 
legitimacy over the masses. It concludes that land reform is not to be exaggerated 
for its alleviation of chronic rural poverty. Rather, it is the inequality between the 
Chinese peasantry and the dominant rural land elites and the state that perpetuates 
the constraints to the pursuit of more meaningful peasant-centred land tenure reform, 
which is further compounded by the mounting social and economic pressures on the 
peasants  who  rely  on  tiny  land  plots  for  subsistence.  Although  the  start  of  the 
communist revolution was marked by land redistribution for an all-round equitable 
and democratic society, it had far more to accomplish in order to cultivate genuine 
peasant-centred initiatives to address those fundamental constraints to sustainable 
rural development. Overall, land reform serves the state’s need of political control 
and social stability rather than meeting the increasing economic, social and political 
demands of the peasantry. 
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2.  Land  reform  in  the  Ming  (1368-1644)  and  Qing 
(1644-1911) Dynasties 
 
China  has  been  predominantly  agrarian  especially  prior  to  1949.  Land  tenure 
reforms in China dating back to a few centuries prior to the Ming Dynasty explain a 
critical fact that land and labour had been extremely important to peasant livelihoods 
and the rural economy. Since the Ming, the land-labour ratio tended to decrease 
dramatically, which indicates that with population increase, land had become a scare 
resource for man to rely on. The population grew from 65-80 million at the beginning 
of the Ming to 540 million by the middle of the twentieth century (Perkins, 1969: 16, 
cited in Lardy, 1983). The incompatible land and labour relations can be seen as an 
underlying factor for land policy changes throughout Chinese history. In particular, by 
the end of the Ming, the per capita acreage of farmland dropped substantially, and to 
a new record low in the 19th century.  
 
Increased  population  pressures  on  the  land  caused  land  shortages  and  land 
fragmentation. It is argued that land fragmentation had much to do with the process 
of buying and selling land. At the beginning of the 18th century, royal and government 
land accounted for 27 percent of the total land, temple land 14 percent, military 
colonization land  9 percent,  and the rest  was  in  the  hands of  private  holders—
individuals or clan corporations. Rights to private land could be bought and sold. 
Most  peasants  had  access  to  the  land  either  through  inheritance  or  through  a 
complex set of leases and rents (Wolf, 1973: 106). Due to serious shortages of land, 
demand was much stronger than supply, resulting in a sellers’ market in China. In 
the Ming and Qing, land fragmentation became severer than in the past (Chao, 
1986).  It  appeared  that  it  mattered  more  to  the  poor  smallholders  and  tenants; 
whereas to the landlords, it was not a major issue, for they managed to enlarge their 
land holdings by amalgamating those of the smallholders. The latter, in many cases, 
had to give up their land due to various economic pressures including the burden of 
paying taxes. As a result, land fragmentation for the poor and land concentration in 
the hands of the mighty few including the landlords appear to be a major factor for 
peasant-landlordism or peasant-state struggles. Internal rifts among the gentry, rich 
and poor peasants invoked by the changing economic conditions, for instance, the 
injection of capital into the countryside, was a major trigger for repeated peasant 
rebellions  and  periods  of  social  and  geo-political  disintegration  followed  by  new 
cycles of consolidation and integration (Wolf, 1973). 
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2.1  Basic land relations 
In  the  Ming  and  Qing  dynasties,  as  previous  feudalist  regimes,  land  was  the 
economic core of society, which had much to do with ownership and leasehold rights 
between  landowners  and  their  subordinates.  There  were  diverse  types  of 
landownership patterns. Land could be owned by landlords, smallholders, soldiers 
and gentry. The land of the gentry was allocated by the emperor and increasingly 
turned into private land. The landlord group consisted of empire officials or gentry 
and ordinary peasant landlords; the former having more political power and better 
social  status  than  the  latter.  This  type  of  land  tenure  was  coupled  by  land 
reallocations by the emperor, whereby the royal family and favoured officials had the 
privilege of direct enclosure of large parcels of land. After them, came the officials 
and soldiers who were granted land of varying sizes according to their rank (Li, 2007; 
Lin  &  Chen,  1995).  The  definitions  of  the  terms  concerning  land  tenure  in  late 
imperial China are provided in Box 2.1: 
 
Box 2.1 Definitions on land tenure pattern in late imperial China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation, based on Jing Su & Luo Lun 1978, pp 11-13, 23-
24; Eric R. Wolf 1973. 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation, based on Jing Su & Luo Lun 1978, pp 11-13, 23- 
 
 
24; Eric R. Wolf 1973. 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation, based on Jing Su & Luo Lun 1978, pp 11-13, 23-24; Eric R. Wolf 1973. 
 
•  Managerial landlords: Employed 3 or more long-term labourers and directly 
managed part of their estate and sold part of surplus product for profit. Also 
engaged in rural business enterprises, and most of them lent money at high 
interest rates. Many of them rented out parts of their estate. 
•  Rentier  landlords: Managed  none  of their estate  directly  and rented out  at 
least 50 mu to tenants. 
•  Rich  peasants:  Employed  wage  labourers  and  engaged  in  commerce, 
handicrafts and usury, but employed fewer labourers and farmed less land 
than the managerial landlords. 
•  Gentry: An important state group in the scholar-official category. Referred to 
those  who  had  qualified  for  office  in  the  imperial  bureaucracy  by  passing 
imperial examinations. They formed the core of the local elite in each district. 
They were often absentee landlords, but not all were large landowners. And 
not all landowners were gentry. By the end of the 19
th century, together with 
their families, they comprised an estimated 7.5 million people or 2% of the 
total population of the country.  
•  Long-term labourers: Employed by the landlords to work from one month up 
to one year. They frequently owned small plots of land, but sometimes owned 
nothing at all. Wage was their main income—half paid in cash, the other half 
in the form of meals. 
•  Short-term  labourers:  Employed  during  the  busy  seasons  in  special  rural 
labour markets, usually in the local market town. They owned small plots of 
land,  and  income  was  derived  from  their  land  and  wages  as  well  as  from 
secondary  occupations  such  as  being  peddlers,  stone-cutters  and  mat-
weavers, etc. 
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There  were  complex  land  relationships  among  different  groups.  The  landlords 
especially those with close links with the empire had more economic and political 
privileges over the others as they were levied fewer taxes and required to contribute 
little labour to the state. In many cases, these burdens were transferred to the poor 
peasants. The latter were forced to give up their land to the landlord in order to avoid 
the heavy taxes imposed on them. In cases of being indebted to the landlord in 
terms of unpaid loans, they were more likely to become tenants. This even started in 
the pre-Ming era. During the mid-Ming period, the landlord managed to profit from 
amalgamating the land of poor peasants, which had actually adversely affected land 
sales, although land sales had started on a small scale. Those smallholders were 
also affected as they could not sustainably maintain their land and property.  
 
According to Chao (1986), population growth caused more and more peasants to 
become tenants in view of scarce economic opportunities. This means that it was not 
difficult for the landlords to absorb a bigger number of tenants. The tenants’ rights 
and  social  status  gradually  gained  legal  recognition.  As  a  result,  the  leasehold 
system became less unfavourable to the tenants, whereby the landlords increasingly 
lost strong control over their tenants who had gained more freedom to move in and 
out of the land and thus some became relatively free hired labourers. To a certain 
extent, the tenants’ freedom gained was conducive for the sprouting of capitalism 
because of the possibility for them to invest in land for their own interests. Being 
wage labourers meant more savings for their own investments (Li, 2007). 
 
2.2  Circularity of peasant struggles and land reforms 
However, one should not underestimate the harsh land relations and struggles and 
take  for  granted  that  economy  could  do  the  justice  for  the  disadvantaged.  The 
Chinese social structures underpinned by the predominance of the state and its 
associated landlordism and gentry over the masses can be seen as a major factor in 
peasant struggles. The trajectory of land tenure reform from the founding of the 
Chinese empire right through the demise of the Qing Dynasty clearly shows that 
social inequality and injustice between the two major groups posed a threat to social 
and political stability and economic development.  
 
This argument contradicts the claims that land tax systems in both dynasties were 
exploitive oppressive forces against the peasantry, which constituted the primary 
causes for peasant rebellions. China has long been an agrarian society marked by 
intensive farming carried out largely by the peasantry. As the population grew, it was 
extremely difficult for the Chinese peasants to feed themselves on their tiny plots of   41 
land. As a result, they had to expand their cultivated land and enhance grain yields 
substantially at the same time in order to meet their basic needs (Wang, 1973: 6-8). 
As the expansion of land acreage reached a limit and the asymmetry between land 
and population growth persisted, land struggles for subsistence needs became more 
pressing in rural China.  
 
It is important to note that the Chinese imperial regimes’ land tenure reforms were 
partly to compromise peasant appeals for equal land redistribution and exemption of 
varied duties and partly to maintain their power and control over the local landlordism 
and peasantry. Strikingly, all these reforms had one thing in common—redressing 
social and economic inequality through so-called egalitarian principles and methods, 
which were highlighted by streamlining tax and labour obligations of the tenants and 
small-scale land redistribution. To a certain extent, these measures were useful in 
curtaining the exploitive power of the landlords. During Ming’s rule, for instance, the 
“One Whip Law” was a major instrument in synergizing varied taxes and obligations 
and converting them to land-based obligations to the empire. As a result, peasants 
gained more freedom of choice in land investment and business activities (Chinese 
History Textbook Net, 2009) 
 
The outcomes of peasant struggles were prominent, but with the downside that the 
land  was  left by the landlord  unattended. To  address this issue,  the early Qing 
Dynasty  promulgated  relevant  measures  to  redistribute  these  lands  among  the 
peasants with the aim of ensuring tax collection and consolidating its control in the 
countryside. It even issued land certificates to the people who were encouraged to till 
the land on a permanent basis. On the other hand, the land forcefully taken by the 
landlord was now returned to the original owners who were obliged to pay land taxes 
and  their  landownership  was  recognized  by  law.  Interestingly  again,  in  order  to 
guarantee income from tax collection, the empire did not have the intention or it was 
simply impossible to abolish landlordism. Instead, it recognized their legal privileges, 
while  punishing  and  restricting  their illegal  behaviour. Moreover,  the  regime  was 
directly involved in enclosures of the land under their direct jurisdiction and forged 
new privileged landlordism.  
 
When peasant struggles resurfaced, in 1712 the regime promulgated a considerably 
more  relaxed  rural  taxation  system  aimed  at  reducing  the  taxes  based  on  the 
number  of  household  members.  This  meant  that  in  spite  of  an  increase  in  the 
number of household members, the household was no longer required to pay more 
taxes. This policy further led to a combined land and labour taxation system that 
stipulated the levying of land tax that subsumed poll tax and labour corvée. To many 
poor households with little land, it was a relaxation of their burden as they would not   42 
need  to  pay  more  taxes  on  additional  household  members.  Consequently,  they 
gained more freedom and time to spend on other economic activities. This policy 
was seen as a major reform that abolished the population tax imposed by previous 
regimes, which to a certain extent liberated the poor. On the other hand, it put more 
pressure on the landlords to pay land taxes, which set limits to land concentration 
and thus eased social tensions. In a nutshell, it was a further improvement to the 
“One Whip Law” implemented during the mid-Ming period. It is also noted that the 
two systems resulted in the inability of the empires to collect sufficient taxes from the 
landlords and the peasants whose struggles had a negative impact on the national 
economy and land utilization.  
 
Nevertheless,  the  limited  success  of  the  land  reforms  did  not  trigger  a  rapid 
development of more equitable land relations. Prior to the demise of the dynasties, 
land became re-concentrated in the hands of the mighty few, whose exploitation of 
the tenants further deepened their conflicts, obstructed the development of a market 
economy and moreover, weakened the state’s control of the local landlords. History 
repeated itself--no matter what measures were undertaken in the land reforms to 
redress  inequality  in  land  relations,  initial  successes  always  ended  up  with  the 
reappearance of social and economic inequality. To a certain extent, the massive 
protests and the deposition of the Ming were coupled with agricultural development 
as demonstrated by the increases in food production and commercialization. This 
made land reappear as a major form of property, which was sought by those seeking 
to make profits from it. Land sales involved business investors who hardly existed in 
the past. In times of aggravated poverty and natural disasters, they provided high-
interest loans to the peasants who mortgaged their land and had to sell it at lower 
prices  when  they  could  not  repay  the  loans.  Some  of  the  investors  eventually 
became  new  tenants.  As  a  result,  land  titles  frequently  changed  hands,  and 
ownership gradually concentrated among the big buyers who were found to use 
force  to  obtain the land at  times (Li,  2007). This  means  that the series of  land 
reforms did not bring about desired changes to the peasants who became even 
more impoverished. 
 
The Qing Dynasty also saw the re-accumulation of land by the landlords. The latter 
especially represented  by  the  royal family  members  and the gentry  made many 
peasants their tenants in the mid-19th century. Once again, the high tributes paid to 
the landlords by these tenants caused their deep discontent with and hatred for their 
masters. The peasants desired a better life based on equalization of land rights 
distribution and its associated economic obligations within the entire social stratum. 
As a result, it was also during this period that the state encountered the harshest 
peasant protest known as the Heavenly Kingdom Revolutionary Movement or the   43 
Taiping Rebellion (1850-64). This movement promulgated the most comprehensive 
land reform agenda in Chinese history--the Heavenly Kingdom Land Law featuring 
land  equity  for  the  peasantry  including  women  in  1853.  Agriculture  was  to  be 
organized  around  units  of  public  and  private  farms  cultivated  by  the  peasants. 
Moreover, it envisioned a new social order against the rule of the Chinese gentry and 
their ideology and Confucianism. Some of its doctrines were even developed by the 
Chinese Communists. Thus, the Taiping Rebellion is regarded as the forerunner of 
modern movements. However, the movement itself paid less attention in improving 
the lot of the peasantry than organizing it to suit the needs of the new social order, in 
which  the  peasants  would  remain  as  the  main  burden-bearer  of  the  envisaged 
society. As a result, the agrarian reform programme was not realized, for it could not 
count  on  the  loyalty  of  the  peasants  (Michael,  1966).  Despite  the  failure  of  the 
uprising which was brutally suppressed, the recognition of the system’s resistance to 
the feudalist land relations was far-reaching. With a call for comprehensive equitable 
land redistribution, it aimed at building a better society based on egalitarianism. This 
ideology suited the best interests of the peasants at that time. However, it also 
received  considerable  criticism  on  its  idealistic  and  unrealistic  approach  to 
development and social justice. But for Lenin, feudalism was the largest barrier to 
capitalism; thus, dismantling the feudalist land relations was seen as the most crucial 
step towards capitalism (Chinese History Textbook Net, 2009).  
 
Therefore,  land  reforms  were  implemented  by  each  regime  in  a  cycle  of 
reinforcement  rather  than  separate  and  irrelevant  initiatives.  Although  population 
pressure and the rule of economy did count, more attention should be paid to the 
formation of land relations itself and the state reaction to it. It is very difficult to 
delineate  land  relations  due  to  the  lack  of  systematic  analysis  based  on  sound 
historical facts. Yet, it can be argued that peasant land struggles and state-led land 
tenure reforms had always been circular, as history repeated itself. The vortex of 
enmeshed struggles and reforms explains the failure of the two dynasties to adjust 
imbalanced land relations through land distribution and taxation reform, among other 
measures, primarily due to their inclination to economic measures rather than social 
and political mobilization of the peasantry.  
 
2.3  Changes in land relations 
The preceding account of land relations, struggles and reforms illustrates a crucial 
fact—limited  land  concentration  and  social  fragmentation  in  the  two  dynasties. 
Furthermore,  households  and  their  descent  groups  as  social  organizations 
developed their own rules governing land use embedded in the institution of clans   44 
and  provided  support  and  protection  for  its  members.  They  divided  their  lands 
equally among all sons, so their lands were constantly broken up, and family status 
fell rapidly. In addition, traditional Chinese society was fluid. It was difficult for large 
landowners to consolidate their estates over many generations. Land concentration 
was  actually  a slow  and hazardous process. For instance,  to  accumulate  a few 
hundred mu of land could take a household no less than one hundred or a few 
hundred years over many generations. And even big landowners in the process 
could return to the status of small owner-peasants in the face of a rapid succession 
of household divisions coupled with poor land management. By the end of the 19th 
century, few landlords owned more than 10,000 mu (1,700 acres) (Wilkinson, 1978: 
17;  Menzies,  1994). This  relatively low level  of land accumulation was  a further 
indication of the nature of land fragmentation and small-scale farming in general in 
the Chinese countryside as already discussed. For the imperial state, it was easier to 
impose taxes on the small peasant holders than the gentry. The formation of large 
landholdings had always been seen as a potential challenge to state domination in 
the Chinese countryside (Huang, 1985). 
 
Land reforms and economic development had a profound impact on the changes in 
land  relations.  The  collisions  between  land  policy  changes  and  traditional  or 
customary land relations occurred and sometimes, rural communities’ resistance to 
change was prominent. The Qing regime saw the customary land laws resting on 
kinship relations as barriers to the development of land markets. Since they gave 
preferences to priority parties—relatives, neighbours and other close affiliates over 
third parties, this meant that third parties were only allowed to buy the land not 
wanted by the other two groups. This was seen as an impediment to smooth market-
oriented  land  transfers  and  a  major  contributor  to  land  conflicts.  As  land  sales 
increased, their abolishment was put on the empire’s reform agenda. On the one 
hand, the removal of customary laws was aimed at protecting the interests of sellers 
to ensure that they could sell the land at favourable prices. On the other hand, it 
made it easier for landlords to buy the land. But it was seen as a move to make way 
for free land trading. However, the reform also met difficulties as it directly confronted 
the  custom  which  held  land  as  a  symbol  of  close  social  affinities  (Li,  2007).  In 
addition, as traditional household or lineage-based groups became larger and larger, 
more  and  more  divisions  and  resentments  over  inequitable  distribution  of  land-
related benefits further undermined the usefulness of these institutions and the role 
of customary law in community unity and development. Gradually, in many localities, 
these institutions disappeared (Menzies, 1994). The withering of customary law and 
institutions further disaggregated social bondage and mutual help. 
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Moreover, with the intensification of land commercialization, customary land laws 
had ceased to play an essential role in land transfers. The overall development of 
commercial  agriculture  and  manufacturing  contributed  to  the  emergence  of  free 
labour and the transition to agricultural commercialization. However, during the Qing, 
the landlordism associated with the empire had not retreated, although it had less 
power than in the Ming in terms of its ability to seize land from the peasants and 
avoid land taxes. Extensive land was often accumulated in their hands and became 
a major source of their wealth. In addition, they gained lucrative profits through high-
interest loan schemes. Although their relationships with their tenants were not as 
harsh  as  those  found  in  the  Ming,  landlords  maintained  political  and  economic 
privileges as compared with the ordinary small landholders, and thus they controlled 
local politics (Li, 2007). 
 
Land commercialization was firmly entrenched since the late 1700s as was evident 
in the inter-regional land sales. In the 1840s, it was additionally accumulated by the 
merchants who issued high-interest loans to poor peasants. In times of insolvency, 
the latter had no choice but to give up their land. The incentives of the merchants to 
do so also lay in land-induced investments in agriculture. This phenomenon did not 
indicate that individual peasants were worse off. In fact, many peasants became rich, 
so did the landlords. And some landlords even became gentry. With the advent of 
commercialization  of  foodstuff  and  development  of  cash  crops,  further  group 
divisions among the peasants took place. Those poor small landholders became 
tenants, while some rich peasants and small landholders gained more development 
opportunities  than  the  others.  However,  it  is  important  to  note  that  most  small 
landholders were not able to get rich and were unable to keep even tiny plots of land 
in their hands (Li, 2007). 
 
As some small landholders gained more land and managed to make continuous 
profits from their land, even in early Qing, the changes in agricultural production 
relationships between landlords and tenants took place. The social status of tenants 
improved in the Ming and Qing. More and more tenants had become wage labourers 
on the farm. In other words, the landlords had begun to realize that it would be more 
profitable to hire labour directly for agricultural production than having their land 
rented to tenants. With the growth in population and its associated improved labour 
availability, the tenants did not have to tie themselves to the land. At the same time, 
many gentry and landlords associated with the rulers would only consider how to 
expand  their  land  area  to  increase  their  rents  rather  than  improve  agricultural 
efficiency and harvests. Many of them became absentee landlords as they left the 
countryside for the cities. Written contracts between the absentee landlords and the 
tenants began to provide the tenure security for the tenants. In many cases, the   46 
latter even became the owner of the surface of the land he worked and could sell or 
mortgage it at will (Beattie, 1979). 
 
In sum, the changed land relations in the Ming and Qing dynasties reflected the fact 
that the land tenure system gradually shifted from the predominant role of the feudal 
landlords to the increasing control of the peasantry over the land through tenancy 
and wage  labour.  As  a  result, agriculture had  developed  and  contributed  to  the 
economic prosperity especially during the early Qing. Of course, this progress was 
also due to the improved policies of the regimes to give more power to the peasantry. 
However, they did not actually address the fundamental issue of landownership. 
Although the majority of the peasants had gained more political freedom and land 
rights than ever before, land was still controlled by the imperial state and landlordism. 
As the Qing regime represented the minority “Man” ethnic group, its policy measures 
to  weaken  the  majority  “Han”  were  seen  as  a  strategy  to  restore  order  and 
strengthen their own control systems. Thus, it had contributed to the restoration and 
strengthening of the embedded feudal relations. 
 
Change  in  land  relations  and  the  nature  of  landlordism  and  the  stronghold  of 
feudalist productive relations disarrayed the development of land markets and the 
agricultural  economy.  Although  the  overall  trajectory  of  capitalist  production  was 
inevitable  and  even  grew  stronger,  feudalist  landlordism  was  continuously 
reproduced,  which  further  slowed  down  agricultural  development.  The  other 
important factor was the role of the state in safeguarding the interests of landlords 
and their power over the peasantry. The nature of feudalist production or landlordism 
had determined that China did not entre the normal phase of agricultural capitalism 
as in the West. As earlier mentioned, the reinstatement of the power of the landlords, 
gentry and the imperial state over the Chinese peasantry after peasant struggles and 
new  land  policies  put  in  place  further  verified  the  stronghold  of  the  rural  social 
structure and relations in controlling the masses. 
 
To contain rising conflicts between landlordism and the peasantry as well as the 
growing power of the former, the empire, as seen in all dynasties, tried to adjust land 
taxes and other related obligations of the landlords to undermine their power in order 
to  help peasants  gain  certain  equity in  land  rights. This made  it difficult  for the 
landlords to acquire more land and invest in it. The state managed to retain the 
status quo of the landlords in order to limit the power of the land gentry. The latter, 
however, had no interest in investing in land but gaining power from the land in their 
dealings with the state. In the Qing dynasty, the landed gentry never cared about 
how they could maximize land production. On the contrary, they just leased it to the 
tenants who tilled the land  and paid their  rents.  Neither  were  they  interested in   47 
organizational  and  technological  agricultural  production.  Although  wage  labour 
appeared, it played a minor role in land tenure arrangements. This is a major reason 
for the existence of the small landholding system in China. The institution of small 
landholding made the peasants extremely vulnerable to land-induced natural and 
economic risks. This may explain the often frequent peasant protests in Chinese 
history.  All  these  factors  further  indicate  the  complex  land  relations  and  their 
associated slow agricultural development.  
2.4  Land relations as class struggle? 
Although the Ming and Qing dynasties saw landlordism as a major threat to political 
and  social  stability,  the  extent  to  which  landlordism  exerted  its  leverage  is 
questionable. For many historians especially those with the inclination to the Marxist 
view  on  economic  development,  unequal  social  relations  as  a  consequence  of 
intensified class  relations  were the primary  causes for  peasant rebellions,  which 
gathered  the  greatest  momentum  during  the  Qing.  This  claim  is  based  on  the 
identification of some primary landlords during that period (Chao, 1986). However, 
others disagree. The ruling class was claimed to be represented by the Chinese 
gentry,  which  was  a  tiny  and  mobile  group.  This  group  gained  its  wealth  and 
influence  entirely  through  its  possession  of  formal  educational  qualifications  and 
office, thus their status was not based on the holding of large landed estates (Beattie, 
1979). As Chiang (1982) contends, according to the records of land registration in 
several localities12, most land was owned by peasants, and since the mid-Ming, there 
had been a trend towards diversification of landownership. This finding is further 
verified  by  Wilkinson  (1978:  9),  whose  calculation  of  200  villages  in  Shandong 
Province in 1900 shows that owner-peasants counted for 55 percent of the surveyed 
population,  followed  by  17.1  percent  wage  labourers,  16.9  percent  tenants,  4.6 
percent rich peasants, and only 3.8 percent landlords. 
 
If the landlord group only constituted a small group in the Chinese countryside, one 
wonders about the factors that accounted for changes in land tenure. Concentration 
of landownership had much to do with the system of government taxes during this 
period.  Land  taxes,  poll  tax  and  labour  corvée  services  were  levied  on  the 
smallholders whose incomes from their tiny land plots made it extremely hard to 
meet the government’s demands. Instead, they would rather seek tax shelter from 
other large landowners by even donating their lands to the latter. But as already 
discussed, land taxation reforms had a major impact on land concentration, which 
                                                 
12 Farmland was required to be registered in Qing Dynasty. Each landowner had to register his 
land with the local government for tax assessment and ownership identification. A registration 
serial number was assigned to each plot and a survey map was included. See Kang Chao 1986.   48 
was  less  important  for  land  distribution  after  the  15th  century.  Economic  factors 
mattered.  During the Ming and Qing, the  growing commercial  activities  in  urban 
China and low economic returns in farm production had caused many wealthy land 
owners to become less interested in land investments. Many large landlords left their 
homes for cities and left their lands to smallholders. By the early 19th century, the 
Chinese countryside had become predominated by smallholders—peasant owners 
and petty landlords, who owned a little more land than well-off peasants (Elvin, 1973). 
 
Coupled with the exodus of the landlords to the cities was the injection of capital into 
the countryside by the merchants who began to purchase land for their investments. 
The land sellers were those smallholders who failed to earn enough income from 
their lands. Many argue that this phenomenon led to the concentration of land in the 
hands of the merchants. However, some hold that the growth of commerce virtually 
caused many disincentives in landownership among merchants. There was also a 
diversion of capital from rural land markets to the urban sector (Elvin, 1973). There is 
a lack of consensus on whether this trend would have facilitated land concentration. 
But given the nature of land fragmentation and the degree of land smallholdings, it 
can be seen that both commercialization and the inflow of capital into the rural areas 
tended to disperse what would otherwise have been concentrated landownership. 
Farmland in traditional China was gradually owned by increasing numbers of small- 
and medium-sized holders. Furthermore, as land was so dispersed and fragmented, 
direct investment might not be too conducive for the landlords, some of whom would 
rather reserve plots of land for their own purposes and lease the rest to others. As a 
result, tenant farming was prevalent in the 16th century. Chao provides a sample 
case illustrating the fact that landlordism was not a major issue. In his study of two 
villages, in 1862 13.4% of the households had no land; 56.7% had less than 3 mu 
and might have to rent some land to earn an income. About 25% of the households 
that owned 3-15 mu may have been self-sufficient. And only 5.7% had properties 
exceeding 40 mu. None of Chao’s surveyed households was deemed as landlords 
(Chao, 1986: 117). 
 
In short, many claim that over a thousand years or so, the demise of extensive 
landownership by natural forces as already described without much influence from 
various land equalization policies imposed by successive governments. It is incorrect 
to state that the remaining groups could constitute a social class. In fact, those who 
were called landlords in the early 20th century in the Republic era were small- and 
medium-sized holders. Political reasons accounted for that classification. Peasant 
rebellions were never the exclusive work of any one social class or group in Chinese 
society because the peasants were not the only actors in the movements. Other 
groups like the intelligentsia played a key role in organizing the struggles. Although   49 
they might represent peasant interests, most of the movements were not initiated by 
the peasants themselves. Rather, the organizers could be from other social groups, 
who had broader interests than the immediate needs of the peasantry. Thus, it is 
simplistic to view these movements as articulate class struggles. According to Hsiao 
(1967: 511), ordinary Chinese peasants have just one dominant desire--sufficient 
means to keep their families alive by possessing a piece of land and all that it yields. 
Whenever a movement promised them land redistribution, they followed. This salient 
argument refers to the politicized nature of past peasant rebellions. As Hsiao (1967) 
argues, “the phrase ‘peasant revolution’ that has gained favour in some quarters 
may be useful or indispensable to propaganda purposes but it can hardly withstand 
objective historical analysis” (also see Wolf, 1973; Michael, 1966). 
 
The overestimated role of landlords as a social class is further evident in the land 
relations. Although tension and animosity did exist between the landlords and their 
tenants and farm labourers, again such a relationship cannot be exaggerated. Since 
mid-Ming, more and more peasants became tenant-servants and wage labourers 
(many of them were slaves before), whose rights were actually protected by the 
government.  Moreover,  many  were  willing  to  beg  the  landlords  to  accept  them 
sometimes even without payment. As many landlords were gentry themselves, the 
phenomenon  whereby  peasants  submitted  themselves  to  the  gentry  was  called 
“commendation”. The following description is noteworthy: 
 
“There  is  a  common  practice  nowadays  among  elite  families  in  the 
Kiangnan  area.  As  soon  as  one  has  been  appointed  to  an  official 
position, commoners would rush to his door, a practice known as tou 
kao. Sometimes the number of persons can reach several thousands. 
The  same  was  true  in  Honan:  In  Kuang-shan  county,  as  soon  as 
someone  passed  the  provincial  examination  (for  the  civil  service), 
people, in tens and hundreds would come to commend their land and 
ask to be taken as slaves” (Chao, 1986: 155). 
 
This interesting case further underlines the fact that population increase in the Ming 
and Qing contributed to the formation of changing land relations. As more and more 
people entered the labour market, an oversupply of labour could lead to deterioration 
in both wages and legal rights of the farm tenants and workers. With increasing 
population  and  rural  poverty,  it  was  not  uncommon  that  collection  of  taxes  by 
landlords  became  difficult,  which  was  worsened  by  rent  seeking,  corrupt  local 
officials. Chinese rulers and law simply perceived this as an economic phenomenon 
rather  than  class  struggle. Their policy changes,  as  seen  in the  aforementioned 
sections, mainly were reflections of the use of economic tools to address the wider   50 
social, political and development issues. Although the measures were effective to 
some degree, they might not touch on the root problems of social and economic 
inequalities  in  land  relations.  Here,  the  issue  of  class  struggle  needs  some 
clarification. Nevertheless, due to a lack of solid and consistent data, it is hard to 
ascertain the extent to which Chinese society was structured on class relations.  
 
Furthermore, Tawney (1966) cautions the use of the term class. As he points out, the 
Chinese history of peasant riots was not the consequence of the so-called mal-
distribution of landed property. China did not have a powerful landed aristocracy with 
de facto control over the lion’s share of the land; nor was there a huge landless 
peasantry. Rather the basis of their contradictions and conflicts was the fact that the 
peasants  had  nothing  more  than  tiny land  plots  to  cultivate. In  this  sense,  they 
should  be  called  propertied  proletariat.  Their  impoverishment  was  further 
complicated  by  rising  population,  a  lack  of  alternative  opportunities  and  the 
exploitation of the landlords, usurers and speculators as well as the state. All these 
factors contributed to peasant rebellions. 
 
However, Fei (1980) argues that the concept of class is still relevant with the gentry 
and peasantry constituting two distinct classes. The former 20% of the population 
was maintained by owning land and having political access to officialdom. Mobility 
between the two classes was rather limited, as the existence of kinship groups of the 
gentry provided mutual security and protection (also see Ho, 1962). Irrespective of 
whether this finding is true, it can be seen that the formation of a local elite with the 
exclusion  of  poor  peasants  had  a  profound  impact  on  the  livelihoods  and  land 
relations in particular. Land was still perceived by the local elite as an essential form 
of security for wealth accumulation and social mobility (Beattie, 1979). As the rural 
population  was  stratified  into  diverse  groups  with  unequal  political,  social  and 
economic status, understanding the discrepancies of interests between the rulers 
and the masses and thus tackling these fundamental rural development problems 
were not dealt with effectively by the Qing. Failure to do so had contributed partially 
to  its  demise  (Hsiao,  1967).  As  a  result,  the  patterns  of  land  tenure  could  only 
survive to the next stage of the Chinese history—the Republic era. 
 
3.  Landed poverty and failure of land reform in the 
Nationalist era 
 
In the aftermath of the demise of the Qing Dynasty brought about by the Chinese 
Revolutionary Army in 1911 when Sun Yat-Sen was elected the first President of the 
Republic of China, rural China was in a state of destitution. Agricultural development   51 
was impossible due to a lack of capital and the overt reliance on traditional farming 
techniques.  For  instance,  in  1918,  about  50%  of  the  peasants  were  occupying 
owners, 30% were tenants and 20% owned part of their land while renting the rest. 
Land fragmentation and small-scale farming continued. Farming was virtually a kind 
of  gardening  (Tawney,  1966: 34, 46).  Those wealthy landowners might possess 
enough means to provide the capital, but their interests mainly fell within the domain 
of  rent  collection  and tax  evasion.  When  they  had  extra  capital, they  used it  to 
acquire  more  land  rather  than  spending  it  to  improve  farm  conditions  and  the 
livelihoods of the tenants (Hsiao, 1967). Population pressures further deteriorated 
the stagnating agriculture, which was struggling to feed the burgeoning population. 
The Nationalist government realized these problems and passed measures for the 
creation of agricultural banks, credit societies and other cooperative organizations. 
These institutions were deemed necessary to help the peasantry, but they did not 
succeed due to various economic and political constraints (Tawney, 1966). 
 
By  the  1930s  private  ownership  was  the  dominant  feature  of  land  tenure  and 
inequality  in  landownership  was  prominent.  It  is  estimated  that  70%  of  the 
households  owned  less  than  15  mu,  which  constituted  less  than  30%  of  the 
cultivated land. The households that owned more than 50 mu only accounted for 5%, 
which is 34% of the cultivated land. Only 1.75% of the cultivated land was owned by 
households  with  1000  mu  or  more.  Large  regional  variations  in  landownership 
distribution  and  tenancy  were  also  seen  as  a  stumbling  block  to  balanced 
development. Central and southern China had more prevalent land concentration 
and tenancy than the north. In particular, high-level of land tenancy was mostly found 
in the south—the Lower Yangzi and Pearl River Delta, which had the most fertile 
land and commercial areas (Riskin, 1987: 26-29). Simply put, in 1936 in north China, 
landlords who formed 3 to 4% of the population and owned 20-30% of the land. Poor 
peasants formed 60 to 70% of the population and owned less than 20 to 30% of the 
land. This inequality was magnified in south China (Wolf, 1973: 134). For many 
peasants, land tenancy was a better choice than private holding. Many rich peasants 
obtained their land by renting from others and then subletting it. However, as land 
tenancy  often  involved  money  lending,  the  poorer tenants had  to  pay  very  high 
interest rates. As banks and credit institutions were scarce in the countryside, their 
income from the land became insufficient to sustain their livelihoods as only the 
minority managed (Douw, 1991). In addition, it was also in central and southern 
China that the number of absentee landlords grew. They lived in rural townships or in 
district towns and left their land to those bursaries who managed the land for them. 
The absentee landlords charged their tenants fixed rents and did not care much for 
their  tenants’  livelihoods,  which  might  have  triggered  discontentment  among  the 
tenants (Eastman, 1988).    52 
By  the  1930s,  the  extent  of  land  concentration,  tenancy  and  rural  poverty  was 
severer than several decades earlier. Small peasant farming constituted the overall 
rural economy characterized by a low level of labour productivity and agricultural 
technology and declining farm size (Riskin, 1987; Feuerwerker, 1983). Population 
growth made poorer households increasingly rely on their land for subsistence, and 
at the same time they had to hire themselves out as part-time farm workers and 
others engaged in other means of survival. Only a few rich peasants could effectively 
diversify their production and hire poorer labourers. The existence of poor labourers 
might  have  triggered  low  investment  in  technological  improvements.  Managerial 
landlords  preferred  to  invest  in  landlordism,  commercial  and  other  business 
opportunities. The small peasant owners were extremely vulnerable to fluctuating 
market prices, which further exacerbated their production and livelihoods. Thus, all 
these factors were closely related to social inequality in the Chinese countryside and 
had different effects on different social groups (Huang, 1985). 
 
Thus, it can be seen that rural Chinese society in the 1930s was structured into two 
major groups—the rich group of landlords, merchants and usurers, and the poor 
group of tenants, hired farm hands and coolies. It was not dominated by hired labour, 
but the land-holding peasantry. The latter, however, struggled to maintain its grip on 
the  land,  whilst  bearing  the  threats  of  commercialization  from  above  and  the 
likelihood of destitution from below (Wolf, 1973). 
 
The uncertain and complex rural land relations were also complicated by state and 
rural society relations. It is claimed that the latter was caused by heavy state taxes 
imposed on the rural landowners more than landowner-tenant relations. The taxes 
were seen as a way of power expansion of the state into the countryside, which 
negatively affected  state-landowner relations.  The  antagonism between the  state 
and local elite has been claimed as a major cause of rural rebellion (Bianco, 1986; 
Huang, 1985). As a result, the central government had gradually lost effective control 
over the countryside, which was more in the hands of the gentry and warlords, who 
represented an administrative force that could not be ignored by the centre. The 
central government had to depend on them more than in the past in order to contain 
social unrest and maintain peace and order. Gradually, the centre spent the land 
taxes locally to a large extent to appease them and cover the costs of mounting local 
administration (Douw, 1991). 
 
In  the  1930s,  the  Chinese  rural  economy  was  hit  by  the  world  economic  crisis 
coupled  with  its  inherent  constraints,  which  caused  massive  rural  poverty  and 
unbalanced  rural-urban  development.  Unemployment  in  the  urban  sector  denied 
rural labourers of any prospects. The impoverishment of the peasantry was also   53 
exacerbated by the effects of natural disasters, increased banditry, harassment of 
warlord  troops  and  the  exploitation  of  the  state  in  exacting  taxes.  Many  poor 
peasants sold their land, which marked a complex process of land redistribution 
(Eastman, 1988). 
 
The  Nationalist  government  faced  daunting  challenges  of  poverty  and  inequality 
interwoven with other land-related issues. It struggled to find a viable solution to the 
roots of these social illnesses that had been carried over from previous imperial 
regimes in order to avoid the path of entrapped capitalism exemplified by the USA or 
the highly concentrated landownership as seen in the UK (Schiffrin, 1957). President 
Sun was even approached by Lenin for political cooperation shortly after World War I. 
Their cooperation led to the conclusion that communism was unsuitable for China. 
However, the principle of “equalization of land use rights” and Sun’s hope for a free 
democratic China and realization of land reform came to an end as a result of his 
death  in  1925  and  the  war  with  Japan.  The  latter  brought  the  government 
administration to a standstill. Some measures were taken to lessen the burden of 
farm tenants who were forced to pay excessive rents to their landlords, far from 
realizing Sun’s reform agenda. Research has revealed that his agenda focused on 
land  value  taxation  rather  than  the  more  aggressive  means  carried  out  by  the 
Communists in their land reform later on. Sun saw this measure as being more 
suitable to the temperament of the Chinese people, which would avoid bloodshed 
(Wu, 1955).  
 
4.  Revolutionary land reform 
 
It was under the Communist Party led by Mao that most land revolutionary reform 
activities took place in their controlled areas as characterized by forceful confiscation 
of land and redistribution among the landless. It is important to note that Mao’s ideas 
on  land  equity  was  no  difference  from  Sun and  other  ancient regimes, for Mao 
himself even remarked that it was the ideology of all revolutionary democrats and 
that  it  was  not  solely  owned  by  the  Communist  Party.  However,  Mao’s  land 
revolution carried its own implications for social and political movements in China. 
 
Gao (2007) provides a portrayal of the revolution marked by severe political fighting. 
Since  its  inception  in  1921,  the  Communist  Party  had  set  its  goal  of  reforming 
Chinese society, attaching great importance to uniting and organizing the peasants 
in the revolution. This was reflected in the well-known strategy of “encircling the 
cities  from the  rural areas”. In  1926,  the  party-led  peasant movement  started in 
Guangdong and quickly spread into Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi provinces. Its initial   54 
mandate was changed from reducing land rents to more rigorously addressing the 
nature of China’s land problems. In the centre of this movement—Hunan Province—
overthrowing landlordism was put on top of the agenda. Land reform was recognized 
as the key to restoring social order which was in disarray as a consequence of war 
and conflicts between the Nationalist and Communist parties and chronic poverty. 
Peasant  associations  and  armies  were  organized  and  engaged  in  all  activities 
targeted at landlords to punish them in various ways. Many of the landlords including 
small  landlords  and  petty  bourgeoisie  were  severely  beaten  and  killed.  The 
Communist Party, however, criticized the peasants for taking the law into their own 
hands and causing violence to these groups and other innocent farmers. But later on, 
this criticism was reversed by Mao who saw violence as the only true revolution. In 
1927,  the  Communist  claimed  that  it  had  a  totally  different  ideology  from  the 
Nationalists and put the representation of the interests of the poor—peasants and 
industrial workers—on top of its political agenda.  
 
From 1927-1937, the movement reached a new stage of harsher punishment of 
landlords and expropriation of their land. And this was exacerbated by the shift to 
complete  confiscation  of  all  land  and  turning  it  into  state  property  through  land 
nationalization. Violence against the landlords took place on a large scale with their 
houses and land deeds burnt into ashes, and many lives were lost. At the same time, 
the movement against the bourgeoisie was launched. This was in close connection 
with land violence, as land privatization was targeted to stop land transfers and hiring 
of labour. It called for the establishment of collective landownership and production 
in order to implement the most comprehensive socialist policy. This had led to further 
violence  as  looting  and  torching  houses  became  rampant,  for  instance,  in 
Guangdong. In 1928 the policy of expropriation of all land shifted to expropriation of 
the land owned by the landlords. However, the policy of land nationalization and 
killing  of  landlords  continued.  Under  the  influence  of  the  Soviet  revolution,  the 
activists started to target the rich peasants and even called for their downfall (Gao, 
2007). 
 
However, during 1930-1931, the policy was modified and the ban on land transfers 
was  lifted  to  allow  for  land  leasing.  It  also  extended  to  the  formalization  of  the 
peasant land titles. A major reason for this change was the need to appease the 
peasants who had been concerned about land tenure insecurity caused by radical 
land  expropriations.  This  did  not  last  long,  as  in  1931,  the  leftists  gained  more 
momentum in land reform. This time, they put more emphasis on eradication of 
landlordism and attacking the rich and middle peasants. For instance, as the new 
land law disallowed landlords from owning any piece of land, many landlords’ land 
were confiscated and they themselves were sent to the hard labour camp and some   55 
of  them  were  killed.  The land  of the  rich peasants  was  also largely  confiscated 
together with other properties and in turn they were allocated land of poor quality. 
This also had spillover effects on the middle peasants who were treated as the rich 
peasants in many cases under the slogan of equal redistribution of land. These 
cases show that there were no fixed benchmarks for the classification of different 
classes. As a result, the boundaries of the landlords, rich and middle peasants were 
blurred. Inevitably, many were also harshly affected (Gao, 2007). 
 
When the war against Japan broke out after the Long March, the Party reassessed 
its land reform process and acknowledged that it was not a complete success given 
its cruelty against all classes of the peasantry and the severe damage done to the 
Chinese countryside.13 It decided to change its policy of land revolution and forceful 
deposition of the Nationalist regime into joining forces with the Nationalist Party to 
defend the country against the Japanese invasion. Subsequently, the policy shifted 
from confiscation of landlords’ land to reduction of land rents and taxes. Confiscation 
of rich peasants’ land was reversed except for the land that had been leased out. 
And they were allowed to hire labourers and keep their properties intact. Reduction 
of their land rents and taxes became the basic agricultural policy. This was actually 
written in the 1930 Land Law of the Republic of China, but it was the communists 
who managed to implement it (Gao, 2007). 
 
Nevertheless, the implementation of this policy quickly fell into a vicious circle of 
violence. Widespread conflicts among the landlords, rich and middle peasants took 
place. These groups were severely punished with some of their lands confiscated. 
This situation worsened after the defeat of Japan in 1945 and the revival of new 
conflicts between the two political parties. This time, any use of violence to take land 
from the landlords was even encouraged and the protection of their landed property 
rights became non-existent (Gao, 2007). 
 
As  Hinton (1983) clearly  pointed  out  based on  his  fieldwork in the  revolutionary 
bases, the land reform movement had the sole purpose of stopping any possibility 
for the Nationalist Party to form alliance with the landlords and aristocracy. The 
conflicts were so harsh that the peasants of all income levels were afraid of physical 
and  mental  abuse.  Facing  chronic  poverty,  the  poorer  seemed  to  show  their 
dissatisfaction with the movement. This led to the Party’s decision to assess the 
effectiveness of the land reform. Through “speaking bitterness to the landlord”, the 
                                                 
13 The Communist Party had for a long time been under the influence of the Soviets. The Long 
March enabled the Chinese Communists to free themselves from the Soviet influence to a certain 
extent. As a result, the Party started to rethink about the goal and strategy of the revolution, which 
ought to be country-specific rather than being dictated by the Soviets.    56 
latter’s land, properties and even personal lives were more brutally taken. In 1947, 
the  Outline  Land  Law  of  China  was  passed  by  the  Land  Conference  of  the 
Communist Party that highlighted the need to emphasize equal redistribution of land 
to win the civil war, for this was deemed as necessary to meet the demands of the 
poor  and  thus  organize  them  in  the  combat.  For  instance,  some  of  this  law’s 
mandates are shown in Table 2.1.  
 
Table 2.1  1947 Outline Land Law of China 
 
Article 1  To abolish the land system based on feudal and semi-feudal exploitation, and to realize 
the land system of “land to the tillers” 
Article 2  To abolish the landownership rights of all landlords 
Article 3  To abolish the landownership rights of all ancestral spirits, temples, monasteries, 
schools, institutions and organizations 
Article 4  To cancel all debts in the countryside incurred prior to the reform 
Source: Author’s compilation based on John Wong 1973, p 282. 
 
Consequently, land was once again redistributed among many peasants. Yet, land 
redistribution  during  the  civil  war  was  not  full-scale  equal  distribution  as  many 
unexpected. In fact, it proved to be a partial reshuffle of agricultural resources—a 
mere over 40% of the land was involved in redistribution. Furthermore, confiscated 
resources were not equally but differentially distributed among the beneficiaries who 
constituted  approximately  half  the  rural  population,  which  means  that  the 
redistribution agenda had to compromise with the political and economic reality and 
avoid radicalization tendencies. It is important to note that the reform movement 
encountered  huge  difficulties  in  mobilizing  the  peasants  especially  in  the  south, 
where there was a high rate of land tenancy. As conventionally conceived, there 
should be a causal relationship between land tenancy and rural unrest. Yet, in south 
China, it was the opposite. The reasons lie in the fact that successive reforms since 
the Ming and Qing dynasties had done little to alter the structure of local power 
embedded in the hands of local gentry, local bandits and their associates—all tied 
together in  close  clan  relations.  In this context, it was  extremely difficult for  the 
peasantry to play an independent political role (Michael, 1966). Thus, this reform met 
obstacles in balancing the political and social costs of land expropriation and the 
requirements  of  redistribution  for  economic  efficiency  (Wong,  1973).  This  also 
explains the fact that the revolutionary strategy of the Communists went through 
several distinct phases from radical land reform to one that was mild and aimed at 
wining the support of the middle and rich peasantry. 
 
To  understand  the  success  of  the  massive  communist-led  land  movement 
throughout the country, the Nationalist Party is often claimed to be ineffective in 
reforming the Chinese countryside. Yet, according to Gao (2007), it was not that   57 
simple.  He  sees  the  traditional  social  structure  and  organizations  as  the  main 
obstacle to the reform that could not be transformed at both bottom and top societal 
and political levels. This means that one had to seek irrational ways to launch the 
reform, which was exactly what the Communists did. Also it was a process in which 
they managed to learn from the reform practices and gained renewed support of the 
masses. For instance, Hinton (1983) provides an insightful account of the reformed 
villages by the Party. The Party quickly realized after its radical reform that land 
distribution itself was not sufficient at all to build firm support among the peasantry. 
To address this problem, the Communists managed to establish poor peasant units, 
based on which peasant associations and village cooperatives were formed to fill in 
the  political  vacuum  in  the  countryside.  Through  these  organizations,  the  Party 
consolidated its control at the lowest level of the society, which makes it the largest 
political party in the world up to today. The violence used in peasant rebellions 
mentioned  earlier  further  proved  the  power  of  mass  organization  to  change  the 
village society—everyone, even the Party members, had to be brainwashed to gain a 
place in the process of social transformation.  
 
The  revolution  reversed  the  structure  of  Chinese  society  at  the  expense  of 
agricultural productivity. In the beginning of the movement, many people opposed 
the idea of land redistribution for demographic reasons, for this could lead to further 
fragmentation of the farmland. As a result, it could create inequality between the 
capable and incapable labourers. Not only was this opposition unable to withstand 
the mainstream political force underpinned by the call for mobilization of the masses, 
but also it was unable to offer alternatives for agricultural development. For instance, 
in  the  northeastern  region,  in  the  aftermath  of  the  revolution,  land  productivity 
decreased as compared with the past because of three factors. First, landlords and 
rich peasants were severely affected and lost their land to the poorer peasants who 
were allocated the land through redistribution, but the latter group of peasants was 
inexperienced in self-organization and production. Second, as elsewhere, a large 
number of affected rich and middle peasants lacked the incentives to till the land, 
because they were afraid of personal abuse and did not dare to invest more in their 
land. Third, the reform led to the reduction of the labour force as well as livestock. 
Soon after this, the Party realized that it would be important again to reintroduce 
economic incentives for the poor by emphasizing their private land rights, allowing 
for the existence of hired labour and land leasing. As Mao pointed out later on, the 
key task for the Party after the revolution would be the restoration of social order and 
development of agricultural production. This was also driven by the realization of the 
need  for  collectivization  as  it  was  believed  that  land  production  by  individual 
households could not lead to the maximization of economies of scales. 
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After the Community Party took power in 1949, about 700 million mu of land were 
redistributed from landlords to landless peasants and tenants, who totaled more than 
300 million. The state  then took the surpluses  held  by  landlords for  rural  social 
welfare and urban industrial development (Esherick, 1981). At that time, Mao called 
for a peaceful solution to China’s land problems by taking a cautious approach in 
dealing with the landlords in order to stabilize the countryside. He even decided not 
to touch them and leave them alone for some time. However, in reality it proved to 
be the opposite. In northeastern regions, land reform was more peaceful than the 
rest of China. Overall, rich peasants were not brought under protection (Gao, 2007). 
 
From 1953 onwards, Mao initiated the land collectivization programme that reversed 
individual landownership and reinforced Party micro-management (Spence, 1999). 
Under  collective  management,  there  was  a  lack  of  economic  incentives  and 
motivation for the masses as well as for the local bureaucrats, who had no resources 
to  improve  agricultural  efficiency  (Wu  and  Reynolds,  1988).  This  situation  was 
exacerbated by the Great Leap Forward 1958-1961. Aimed at boosting economic 
growth, it created huge centrally managed projects that involved up to 100 million 
peasants  to  open  farmland,  create  people’s  communes  and  develop  industrial 
capacity. With very limited success, it had devastating effects on the livelihoods of 
the poor. It caused a severe decrease in agricultural output, which led to almost 30 
million causalities among peasants who died from starvation. It is widely claimed that 
this movement was driven by economic incentives in terms of prioritizing industrial 
development, and more importantly, the wish to forge a new identity for the Chinese. 
By doing so, the state exerted more political and ideological control of its subjects. 
This was seen as a way to keep the Marxist-Leninist doctrine intact (Spence, 1999). 
 
Huang (2001) argues that the land revolution solved the Party’s concern about mass 
mobilization, and the Party had found a way to extract unlimited human and physical 
resources  needed  for  the  war  against  the  Nationalists.  It  can  be  seen  that  the 
reforms after the revolutionary victory were also the political tactics used to control 
the masses and establish a solid social and political bases of national unity. Through 
the  reform,  the  Party  realized  its  goal  of  overthrowing  the  old  regime  and 
reorganization of the grass-root society, which lay the foundation for modernization. 
According to Mao, China’s revolution has only one form—through struggles to unite 
the peasants and create a united new nation (Gao, 2007). However, it is far too 
simple  to  judge  the  extent  to  which  the  reforms  catered  for  the  peasants’  best 
interests, which may explain the failure of the People’s Commune in 1960s and its 
replacement  by  the  Household  Responsibility  System  (HRS)  in  the  late  1970s. 
Esherick  (1995)  argues  that  the  Chinese  revolution  was  not  liberation  but  the 
replacement of one form of hegemony with another. It had more to do with the   59 
alienation of Chinese society from an increasingly authoritarian state (Friedman et al., 
2005,  cited  in  Perry,  2008).  Nonetheless,  Mao’s  revolutionary  path  had  its  far-
reaching  implications  for  the  Chinese  government’s  current  reform.  As  Chinese 
society is marked by haves and have-nots, few people accepted any assessment of 
Mao’s class struggle as a lasting solution to growing inequalities prevalent in the pre-
revolutionary era but which once again is entrenched in today’s society (Perry, 2008). 
5.  Conclusions 
 
The  study  of  Chinese  land  reform  history  especially  since  the  Ming  and  Qing 
dynasties  period  is  instrumental  to  understand  the  dilemma  facing  China’s  land 
reform of today. History tells us that the trajectory of land reform is the result of long-
term struggle of the state and the peasantry. Land has always been the driver for 
social and political changes. A common political agenda shared by the Ming, Qing 
and Nationalist regimes shared one political agenda—incremental change with focus 
on economic resolutions to poverty—ended with certain failure to reorganize the 
rural society for the poor. In comparison, the road taken by the Communists was 
more  radical  or  complete,  but  also  ended  with  the  failure  to  generate  peasant 
incentives to develop the rural economy.  
 
Social structures and organizations may explain the dilemma of China’s land reform 
and  the  constraints  in  peasant-centred  land  policy  changes.  This  chapter 
demonstrates that land reform in Chinese history is inextricably linked with poverty 
and social inequality embedded in the persistent dominance of state and local elites 
over the mass peasantry. However, it also shows that the social, economic and 
natural determinants of land tenure should be given more attention rather than the 
tenure system itself. This further pinpoints the need for political redressing of the 
fundamental  issues  concerning  the  lack  of  alternatives  to  sustainable  rural 
development and agriculture in particular. This has been ignored by all the regimes, 
although Mao’s People’s Commune model seemed to mark a watershed from the 
past. 
 
Land has never become a catalyst for the creation of social space for poor peasants 
(Zhang, 2005). Rather, it is used by the state to exert stronger control over the 
sluggish economy and increased threat from the local elite. This resulted in the loose 
social structure and organization that cannot foster the collective force that would 
otherwise have been needed. The majority of the peasants continued to feel isolated 
from the mainstream economic and social organization while cultivating their tiny 
plots of land for survival. Furthermore, state-society relations are complicated by the 
interactions of various economic and political actors who pursue their own interests.   60 
This further complicates the way in which peasant interests can be safeguarded and 
relevant policy measures can be engaged.  
 
The overview of the land reform history reveals the indispensable exploration of 
economic and political reforms especially those undertaken by Mao. The demise of 
the Ming and Qing dynasties and the failure of Mao’s commune policy indicate, as 
Hinton convincingly puts it, that the Chinese society still maintains as a realm of 
landlordism. That is why land continues to be controlled by the rural elites and state 
functionaries dynasty after dynasty. Although Mao tried to dismantle this rural social 
fabric by putting communes in place, the commune itself readjusted to the control of 
those in power. The latter, however, embodied the nature of traditional bureaucratic 
centralization, all-powerful and responsible to no one outside its ranks (Hinton, 1983).  
 
Individual  peasants’  vulnerabilities  to  natural  resource  constraints,  market 
fluctuations  and  elite  domination  would  require  concerted  efforts  to  fight  social 
inequality and poverty. This could be achieved through agricultural cooperation as 
Tawney  puts  it  (Tawney,  1966).  Yet,  the  drive  to  create  efficient  peasant 
organizations  can  be  hindered  by  the  power  relationships  between  classes  and 
interest groups. As North (1990) warns, efficient institutions do not come to the fore 
automatically.  Instead,  it  is  determined  by  the  development  path  created  in  the 
previous  stage.  Hinton’s  concern  over  peasants’  lack  of  collective  power  in 
participating  in  economic  development  calls  into  question  the  trajectory  of  land 
reform and rural development as a whole.  
 
In essence, China’s land reform from a historical perspective has failed to create 
genuine institutions to counter the forces of local bureaucracy and political control. 
The latter has managed to take the institutions into its own hands to reestablish 
something  very  close  to  traditional  rule.  It  is  doubtful  “whether  the  breakup  of 
cooperative production, the fragmentation of the fields and the individual contracting 
of  all  the  scattered  fragments—abandoning  in  the  process  of  all  economies  of 
scale—is a viable solution to the problems these failure posed” (Hinton, 1983: 763).  
 
China’s land reform history reveals a crucial truth—land tenure or inequitable land 
distribution was critical for peasant struggle and Mao’s revolution. However, land 
concentration was not as high as research has shown especially not in the same 
order as Mao contended. They were not the only factors for social and political 
changes. Other dimensions of inequality, that is, the non-landownership inequality 
factors such as high land rentals, interest rates, debts and biophysical constraints 
aggravated  the  tensions  between  different  social  groups  and  played  a  more 
important  role  in  social  and  political  struggles.  The  role  of  poverty  in  all  these   61 
struggles  was  critical  to  the  understanding  of  the  structural  nature  of  the  Mao’s 
revolutionary success (Tang, 2006).  
 
The  demise  of  each  dynasty  and  even  the  failure  of  the  People’s  Commune 
underlines the problem of tackling the roots of poverty, which remains a challenge to 
all. This means that land reform is a part of the picture, but not the whole picture 
itself. When other causes of poverty were not well defined and tackled by Mao and 
previous regimes, land became a relatively easy subject to be tackled and used as a 
medium for political gain. They all understood that they would not gain effective 
control had the land not have brought under their control. Mao’s grass-roots-oriented 
strategy of “putting politics in command” worked to serve his own politics, but did not 
stand the test of overcoming the persistent challenges of poverty and inequality—it 
was not just the land (see Burkett & Hart-Landsberg, 2005: 436). This argument 
might also explain  why others  interpret the revolution  as irrational  (Tsou, 2000), 
because  to  them  probably  better  deals  could  have  been  struck  between  the 
revolutionaries and the rulers. However, to Mao, land revolution was the quickest 
way on the road to political control. This may also explain why the Ming’s, Qing’s and 
the Nationalist’s relatively “soft” approaches did not accomplish what Mao had. But in 
short, peasants have been agents of revolution only in the sense of being used as 
political machine to effectuate preconceived political goals of the operators (Moore, 
1967). 
 
As land reform continues, it is important to enshrine the rights of the peasants whose 
organization  and  economic  independence  play  critical  role in  social  and  political 
changes.  It  is  the  challenge  confronting  Chinese  society  to  create  institutional 
alternatives that address the relations of production, society and development that 
benefit the disadvantaged groups. The lessons from Chinese history reveal that any 
change in political ideologies and actual political actions could turn futile if the local 
constituencies are not given choice and power to engage in the reform process. It 
remains crucial to organize collective action to arrive at an accepted definition of the 
situation and a formulated programme for rural development, which has not been the 
case in past reforms (Fei, 1980). Mao’s failure to turn the communes into effective 
instruments of rural development, however, should not preclude the search for more 
peasant-oriented solutions to land tenure reforms.  
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Chapter 3  China’s land tenure in the reform era: 
a critical review 
 
Abstract: 
 
It is claimed that China’s economic success since the inception of the reform has 
impinged on its land tenure reform characterized by granting individual households 
long-term land use rights. However, increasing loss of farmland due to development 
and poor governance has become a thorny political issue in recent years. Policy-
makers and scholars have emphasized the role of the property rights approach in 
averting  farmland  loss  and  accelerating  agricultural  development.  This  chapter 
provides a snapshot of the major debates on this issue and develops a framework 
for understanding the multi-faceted nature of land tenure and its linkages with village 
development  and  governance.  It  ends  by  proposing  a  more  peasant-centred 
approach  to  the  design  of locally-based land  tenure  systems  for  the  purpose  of 
sustainable land use, development and governance-the inseparable components of 
pro-land tenure systems.  
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
This  chapter  focuses  on  China’s  land  tenure  reform  in  the  reform  era,  which  is 
markedly different from the commune system implemented by the government in the 
1950-60s  as  discussed  in  chapter  two.  Through  harsh  class  struggle  and  land 
expropriation, vast areas of rural land were redistributed into the hands of the poor 
peasantry from landlords, rich and middle peasants by the 1950s. The reorganization 
of  the  Chinese  countryside  gained  momentum  with  the  advent  of  the  People’s 
Commune, which was aimed at dramatically increasing agricultural production, social 
equity and political mobilization. In a nutshell, the success and degree of the land 
reform during this period had much to do with the strategy of aligning peasants’ 
economic incentives with politically-motivated class lines. To a certain extent, the 
socialist  policy  transformation  appealed  to  the  self-interest  of  the  majority  of 
peasants. However, at a later stage of the commune, a neglect or misunderstanding 
of  the  non-class-based  social  and  political  cleavages  impeded  progress  towards 
social cooperation. Some incentive systems began to weaken and undermine the 
desired relations of production (Shue, 1980).   68 
Against this backdrop, the Chinese government began to fundamentally change the 
commune  model  into  the  Household  Responsibility  System  (HRS)  that  provides 
individual households with the desired long-term land use rights under collective 
landownership since the late 1970s. The HRS is assumed to be a driving force for 
more  strengthened  land  and  property  rights  of  the  peasants  with  increased 
incentives to adopt more efficient farming practices. Even so, rural poverty continues 
to be a fundamental challenge for socially equitable development, which bears upon 
the issue of how land ought to be better utilized and governed. 
 
This chapter hypothesizes that the study of China’s land tenure system needs to shift 
away from a pure focus on land and property rights to the multi-faceted nature of 
land  tenure  that  impinges  upon  issues  of  poverty,  land  use  and  management, 
development and governance. A failure to understand the interrelationships can only 
obstruct  any  attempt  to  tackle  the  structural  challenges  to  sustainable  rural 
development in China. However, there are few studies available to shed light on this 
complexity particularly from pro-poor perspectives. As China has reached a critical 
stage of development characterized by increasing social inequality, chronic poverty 
and depletion of natural resources, the government has emphasized the importance 
of  scientific  development  for  the  achievement  of  a  prosperous  society  since  the 
beginning of the 21st century. To a large extent, this call bears upon the need to 
address the imbalanced rural-urban economic development, which is failing the poor 
whose meagre available assets such as land is on the path to destruction due to 
urbanization-induced projects.  
 
As pointed out by Xiwen Chen, Director of the Office of Centre Rural Work Leading 
Group,  “all  regions  with  rapid  economic  development  in  China  are  areas  where 
arable  land and  grain  output has  decreased.  It cannot be  considered correct  to 
develop local economies in such ways, because we have yet to figure out the most 
feasible  methods  for  scientific  development,  which  means  a  comprehensive, 
coordinated, and sustainable development of economy and society” (Chen, 2009: 
131).  
 
Chen’s viewpoint clearly indicates the urgency for rethinking the current policy, its 
perverse impacts on local conditions; and moreover, the requirements of the rural 
poor in relation to the so-called scientific development in general and land use and 
governance in particular. Thus, this chapter argues that China’s land tenure reform 
would  require  locally-based  approaches  rather  than  the  one-size-fits-all  and  ill-
founded policy premises. Land reform is a negotiated process whereby the state, 
local communities, business and other stakeholders’ vested interests have to be 
balanced with the maximum benefits to the poor and their natural resources base.   69 
Ultimately, how to make land work for the poor remains a research vacuum in the 
Chinese context.  
 
This  argument  takes  place  against  the  backdrop  of  China’s  economic  transition 
towards more economic freedom for individual citizens. It is on this basis that their 
economic,  social  and  political  rights  are  assumed  to  be  drastically  improved  to 
faciliate  the  development  of  the  market  economy.  Gaining  more  economic  and 
political rights for the Chinese peasantry has become a critical issue for a successful 
transition of the entire society and the goal of development with equity (Li & Bai, 
2005). Where peasant land rights are weak, their capabilities for making the optimal 
use of the land are undermined. Furthermore, weak land rights and poorly developed 
and enforceable laws and regulations contribute to the lack of power of the peasants 
to  defend  their  interests  and  participate  in  policy-making  that  concerns  their 
livelihoods. Although many policies are aimed at giving more rights to the peasants, 
implementation on the ground remains ineffective (Chen, 2009; Van Rooij, 2007). 
This explains why one cannot fully rely on the property rights approach to improve 
the current situation. Rather, the factors constraining effective policy implementation 
are paramount. It is important to note that the current land tenure regime has an 
intrinsic  weakness  as  characterized  by  fragmented  land  relations  among 
smallholders who do not have sufficient social capital and other assets to defend 
themselves  against  any  unfavourable  conditions  imposed  on  them.  The  political 
nature of land tenure further complicates China’s land policy reform agenda. 
 
This chapter focuses on the land tenure-poverty-development-governance linkages 
with a view to explicating the weakness of current land policy directions. First, it 
provides  a  brief  account  of  the  natural  resource  and  agricultural  constraints  on 
poverty alleviation. Second, it provides an overview of the land policy reform since 
the late 1970s to depict the trends and analyze the underlying issues of poor land 
governance and the failure to allow for institutional intervention in land issues. Third, 
it  unpacks  the  key  debates  of  land  tenure  reform  from  social,  cultural,  political 
economic perspectives in order to illustrate their complexity. Fourth, it suggests the 
importance of rethinking market-dominated and state-led approaches to land tenure 
reform in an attempt to explain these linkages. Finally, it explains why policy-makers 
should pay more attention to community-centred approaches to land tenure reform.    70 
2.  Arable land loss, natural resource constraints and 
policy responses 
 
2.1  Arable land loss and natural resource constraints to development 
The cultivation of tiny plots of land is not always conducive to the welfare of the 
peasants who used to pay various kinds of agricultural taxes and fees until their 
abolition in 2006. This major policy change was seen as a watershed and a major 
instrument for easing peasant burdens and poverty reduction. Since then, land has 
become a more valuable asset for the peasants. Their interests in the land were 
further boosted when the government decided to provide subsidies for farming to 
promote grain production. This is coupled with other policies aimed at improving the 
social security of the poor, many of whom find it more meaningful to cultivate their 
land  rather  than  seeking  off-farm  employment  when  social  security  for  them  is 
lacking  in  cities.14 Although  migration  is  taking  place  at  an  unprecedented  rate 
across the country, land remains a basic asset for livelihoods for the majority of the 
poor peasantry. Nevertheless, all the favourable policies have played important roles 
in  stabilizing  the  Chinese  countryside  where  poverty  requires  drastic  policy 
measures. 
 
However,  the  above-mentioned  favourable  agricultural  policies  were  made  in  an 
overall  context  of  farmland  loss  caused  by  urban  expansion,  natural  resource 
constraints  and  chronic  poverty  that  further  obstructed  peasant  incentives  and 
capacities in grain production. In 2000, China’s total arable land area was 128 million 
ha, equivalent to 0.11 ha per capita, which is less than half of the world’s average of 
0.23  ha.  From  1996  to  2005,  farmland  loss  reached  8  million  ha.  In  2004,  the 
average farmland per capita was only 0.09 ha. In the last decade, it was estimated 
that 1.5 million peasants lost their land on an annual basis. In 2005, the number of 
landless or unemployed peasants increased by 3.8 million (Liao, 2007: 163; Tan et al, 
2005,  187-188).  For  instance,  in  Zhejiang  Province  alone,  one  of  the  richest 
provinces in China, from 1999 to March 2002, almost 1.7 million peasants were 
affected by land expropriation. In Shaanxi Province, one of the poorest, 980,000 
peasants  lost  their  land  from  1996  to  2006.  Among  these  landless  people,  35 
percent  remained  in  agriculture;  19  percent  stayed  in  the  village  but  were  not 
involved in farmland production; 19 percent migrated to cities, and 26 percent stayed 
back. The two provinces have seen increasing cases of peasants’ petitions to local 
                                                 
14 Based on personal communication with local government officials during fieldwork in 2008 in 
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governments. These cases all pertain to an unjust land expropriation process in 
which their rights to sustainable livelihoods, due land compensation and distribution 
were denied. (DRC & World Bank, 2006: 16). It was reported that there were 87,000 
mass incidents nation-wide in 2005, an increase of 6.6 percent in 2004 and 50 
percent in 2003--a sign of social instability (People’s Daily, 2007). 
 
Of  the  31  provinces  and  autonomous  zones  in  China,  only  6  provinces  have 
relatively ample farming areas. Over the last ten years, the total amount of reduced 
arable land is equivalent to the total size of the arable land in Shandong, Hebei or 
Henan provinces—the three important areas suitable for grain production (Chen, 
2009: 129). Unemployment has become a major issue for the landless peasants, 
whose levels of incomes have been substantially reduced. This is not to mention 
those in poorer regions, even those in the more developed eastern and southern 
regions  received  an  unfair  level  of  compensation  coupled  with  very  little  social 
security such as the provision of pension. Once they have lost their land, many seek 
employment in cities but they cannot enjoy the same social security benefits as 
urban residents (Li & Bai, 2005: 84). Relentless arable land loss has become a major 
threat  to  food  security,  which  requires  a  minimum  level  of  arable  land  to  be 
maintained. It seems that the government is trying every means to avoid crossing 
this red line. In fact, China has already been unable to feed its 1.3 billion people, of 
whom 900 million are peasants, with limited agricultural resources. The reliance on 
food  imports  has  been  on  the  increase  in  light  of  increasing  population  and 
decreasing arable land. These economic and social costs of arable land loss have 
not been dealt with effectively. 
 
China’s  rapid  economic  growth  also  has  a  huge  cost—natural  resources  and 
environmental degradation and depletion especially in the poor countryside. China is 
one of the countries in the world that has experienced the worst level of water and 
soil erosion. Land desertification is expanding at an unprecedented rate; and by 
1999, it had covered 18.2% of the entire mainland. Loss of vegetation cover in these 
areas due to over-use of the natural resources is a main cause. China is also one of 
the  countries  with  severe  problems  of  water  shortage  and  pollution.  Fourteen 
provinces  and  municipalities’  per  capita  available  water  usage  is  below  the 
international minimum line. About two-thirds of Chinese cities face shortage of water 
(Zheng, 2004: 32). China’s forest coverage by 2008 was 18.2 percent, far below the 
world average of 29.6 percent. Rangeland is also experiencing severe depletion. By 
the end of 2007, one-third of the rangeland had been degraded (Bao, 2009: 137).  
 
These human-induced natural resource constraints reveal an inconvenient fact—the 
northern provinces with a less developed economy than the south have the largest   72 
farming areas in spite of unfavourable climatic and natural conditions such as water 
shortages, soil and wind erosion. The southern provinces, where climatic and natural 
conditions are more suitable for farming, by contrast, have experienced the most 
severe level of arable land loss and decline of agricultural productivity. Agriculture 
has no longer been a priority for most regions along the eastern coastlines (Chen, 
2009).  This  mismatch  between  natural  resource  endowments  and  agriculture 
represents a huge challenge for balanced economic development. 
 
Rural poverty remains an issue of urgency especially at a time of current world 
economic crisis. In 2008, the annual net income per rural capita was US$ 697, and 
compared  with  2007,  its  rate  of  increase  has  slowed  down.  China  remains  a 
developing country as it is becoming more difficult for the peasants to gain further 
income increases in the coming years.15 In particular, it would be demanding to 
maintain the current level of grain production. In general, the Chinese agriculture and 
peasants livelihoods are still vulnerable to the natural environment. Any unexpected 
severe flooding or drought may cause heavy losses of natural assets, which will 
threaten the fragile rural economy (Sheng & Bai, 2009). The urban-rural income ratio 
of 3.22:1 in 2005 pinpoints the increasing social inequality, which is a huge cost paid 
for China’s fast economic growth (Zhu, et al., 2006: 764). 
2.2  Reform policy responses 
The  post-Mao  era  saw  a  reformist  vision  for  China’s  development  led  by  Deng 
Xiaoping.  Seemingly  endorsing  the  neo-liberal  approach,  his  policy  for  land  de-
collectivization  seemed  to  work  in  the  early stage  of  the  reform.  The  HRS  was 
introduced to secure land tenure security of the weak peasants and enhance their 
farming incentives. As a result, increases in agricultural production and improved 
livelihoods of the poor were evident (Oi, 1999). Despite its initial success, the HRS 
has not enabled agriculture to substantially lift the majority of peasants out of poverty. 
Major  land  policy  changes  that  indicate  the  more  liberal  approach  to  land 
governance by the Communist Party are outlined in the accompanying box:  
 
                                                 
15 In the World Bank’s World Development Report 2008, China is listed as a lower middle income 
country. In 2004, 9.9% of the population lived on less than $1 a day, and 34.9% on less than $2 a 
day (World Bank, 2007: 336).   73 
Box 3.1 China’s land policy changes in the reform era 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation, based on relevant laws and policies and Tong & Chen, 2008. 
 
It  can  be  seen  that  the  strengthening  of  land  law  enforcement  and  regulation 
implementation has been characterized as the current government policy focus on 
farmland protection and local governance accountability. The government claims that 
it has in place the world’s most rigid laws to contain arable land loss. The 1998 Land 
Management Law states that only the State Council and provincial government have 
the right to approve land acquisition plans-no other organ below that level. It also 
grants  peasant  households  30-year  land  use  rights  backed  by  written  contracts. 
Again, enforcement of the law and rules have been largely unsuccessful due to local 
government manipulation, which is self-evident in the increasing number of reported 
cases of illegal land acquisition and local officials prosecuted. For instance, a sample 
study indicates that up to 40 percent of the households surveyed did not have the 
contracts in 1999 (Zhu & Prosterman, 2006). That was why the 2002 Rural Land 
Contracting  Law  and  2007  Property  Law  were  promulgated  to  strengthen  and 
provide  a  foundation  for  a  land  market.  One  should  not  be  confused  with  the 
conception of land transfer and land market. In the current context, land sales are 
not  allowed  to  take  place  among  free individuals  in  the  countryside,  contrary  to 
common practices of sales of real property. Farmland can only be transferred if it is 
turned into construction land first in accordance with local land use plans of the local 
•  1978-1986: The Household Responsibility System (HRS) replaced collective farming 
in several regions. Collectives still owned the land, but people were permitted to carry 
out private farming. Land Management Law was drawn up. 
•  1998: China adopted the new Land Management Law, which upholds the limitation to 
rural land subcontracting and transfers. 
•  2002: China adopted the Rural Land Contracting Law to protect the contractual use 
rights of peasant households and open the door to farmland market allowing for land 
use rights lease, exchange and transfers without changing their original uses. Non-
villagers’ involvement was strictly limited.  
•  2007: China adopted the Property Law, the first law to explicitly offer protection for 
private property rights. Farmland remains the property of the village collective. 
•  2008:  Central  Party  Committee  (CPC)  Decision  on  Major  Issues  Concerning  the 
Advancement of Rural Reform and Development: further call for farmland transfer, 
lease, exchange and swap based on market-oriented mechanisms and peasant consent 
and willingness to enhance scaled farming and peasant incomes. Pilots on trading of 
collectively-owned  non-arable  construction  land  without  first  going  through 
government acquisition were given the green light. 
•  2010:  CPC  Opinions  on  Scaling  Up  Integrated  Urban-Rural  Development  (No.  1 
Document): Accelerating contracted land use rights transfers for scaled production; 
strengthening  land  management  through  registration  of  contracted land  use  rights; 
planning to complete registration of collective-owned land within 3 years.   74 
government. The latter acts as both a middle-man and dealer in approving the plans 
and deciding on the value of the land and compensation paid to the peasants. The 
laws  simply  attempt  to  provide  better  protection  of  peasant  land  use  rights  and 
collective  ownership  with  view  to  safeguarding  their  interests  in  any  land  use 
changes  launched  by  the  local  governments  whose  conduct  in  illegal  land 
expropriation is also expected to be contained when the peasants retain more power. 
 
The government seems to believe that more strengthened individual peasant land 
users’ rights would lead to their increased incentives in land investments. As the 
following  figures  show,  there  is  a  strong  correlation  between  the  percentage  of 
household investment in land before and after the 1998 Land Management Law 
which requires the issuance of land use contracts and certificates to the peasant 
land users. Theses figures seem to suggest that land policy changes should reflect 
the government efforts in facilitating China’s transition to a market economy. The 
promulgation of the 2007 Property Law has been claimed to be a landmark for the 
protection of private property since the reform started in late 1970s. With a great 
improvement in the living standards of ordinary Chinese citizens, this kind of law is 
needed to safeguard individual property rights, although it went through substantial 
redrafting  over  at  least  a  14-year  period.  There  was  more  critique  against  its 
potential attack on the nature of socialism. Eventually, the Property Law managed to 
strike a delicate balance between the need to continue the market economy and to 
satisfy those policy-makers who advocate upholding socialist ideals. It is a common 
claim that it is not aligned with the capitalist property system.  
 
 
Table 3.1  Percentage of Households Investing in Land 
   No investment 
Investment(s) 
before 1998 
Investment(s) 
in or after 1998 
Investment(s) 
before 1998 and 
in or after 1998 
Neither contract nor certificate 
issued  78.7%  7.6%  12.5%  1.2% 
Only contract issued  68.8%  11.8%  16.0%  3.5% 
Only certificate issued  82.1%  4.0%  12.6%  1.3% 
Both contract and certificate 
issued  63.5%  7.0%  24.1%  5.4% 
Source: Zhu Keliang and Roy Prosterman 2006 “From land rights to economic boom”, China Business 
Review (online), July-August   75 
Nevertheless, it is proven that the current land tenure systems of varying degrees of 
compulsory  implementation  have  largely  induced  land  tenure  insecurity,  chronic 
poverty and farmland loss. Despite the government’s efforts in enforcing policies and 
providing  more  formal  recognitions  of  land  rights  of  the  peasants  through  more 
decentralized governance at the local level, peasants have gained limited real land 
rights. In essence, all those administrative and legal measures have limited roles in 
curbing corruption in land governance and safeguarding the interests of the poor 
households who often face land evictions (Van Rooij, 2007).  
 
Many Chinese leaders and scholars are concerned that this law may backfire given 
the rising social inequality that strengthened private rights could aggravate. Their 
discontent also shows the hardship of the poor Chinese peasants who are facing 
forced eviction and their land falling into the hands of developers and local officials. 
Apart from the concern about the probability of land privatization that the law could 
ultimately lead to, they also doubt whether the law can actually play a major role in 
reversing  the  trend  of  land  grabbing  due  to  more  intrinsic  and  complicated 
governance  problems.  The  law  contains  explicit  stipulations  on  the  protection  of 
private property rights of urban dwellers, but remains silent on the enforcement of 
peasants’ land rights (Fan, 2007).  
 
To some extent, this new law was followed up by the Central Party Committee’s 
October 2008 rural reform policy to mark China’s 30 years of remarkable success in 
economic reform. It is reported that it is a further step of the Communist Party to 
allow peasants to lease or transfer their land in order to raise rural incomes and 
speed rural-urban migration. It will enable peasants to have substantial decision-
making power over their land assets in the market, which will be set up to allow them 
to subcontract, lease and exchange their rights to use the land.16 This is seen as a 
major step to accelerate those practices that have already taken place but were not 
officially permitted by law. Some economists and rural affairs experts who back this 
change believe that it will facilitate the formation of larger and more efficient farms 
and thus the elimination of those inefficient family farms. However, given its concern 
over the forced transfer of farmland by local government, this policy clearly states 
that all land leases should be based on peasants’ willingness and that adequate 
compensation be paid to them. Moreover, it states that land used for farming should 
not be used for any other purposes given China’s pressing need to ensure food 
security. Like the Property Law, this policy is seen as another attempt to strike a 
                                                 
16 This policy, approved at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 17th Central Party Committee on 12 
October 2008, remains silent on land sales, which keeps the nature of collective ownership of land 
intact to avoid more controversies among policy-makers and experts.    76 
balance between the liberal approach to full property rights for peasants and land 
privatization that could aggravate land losses for farmers (Wong, 2008). 
 
Ineffective law enforcement and policy implementation have contributed to poor rural 
governance, unsustainable natural resource use and poverty. In the land sector with 
its multi-faceted nature, the government may not even have the intention to further 
its land reform but it may be paying lip service in order to balance the conflicting 
interests of all parties. On the one hand, it seeks to give more rights to the poor and 
undermine the power of the local government and businesses, whose resistance 
could raise immense problems for the central government. On the other hand, the 
collective institution is well placed to maintain its political and economic control on 
the ground. Moreover, the Party itself cannot divert its path from socialism to pure 
capitalism characterized by private property rights. Although this policy appears to be 
a  marked  shift  from  total  collective  control  over  land,  its  actual  implementation 
cannot  be  overestimated  given  the  immense  power  of  the  local  government  in 
deciding on ultimate land use plans.  
 
Local government can easily adapt relevant land laws and policies to its own needs 
in the name of economic development, as it exerts overtly control over the whole 
land management process in which laws and policies are not understood or even 
supported  by  the  affected  communities.  For  instance,  according  to  the  Land 
Management Law, it is forbidden to transfer farmland or lease it to other uses unless 
the latter complies with the general land use plans of local government, or the land 
has already been in use by an enterprise that has gone bankrupt or has merged. In 
addition,  the  2002  Rural  Land  Contracting  Law  explicitly  provides peasants  with 
stronger rights to hold onto their contracted land and it guarantees stronger legal 
protection.  The  law  stipulates  that  the landowner  (implicitly  referring  to  the  rural 
collective) shall not take back the contracted land during the contract term. Despite 
all the measures to strengthen land use planning, local government adopts various 
tactics to deal with these measures. This explains why farmland loss is still on the 
increase.  
 
In addition, there is a lack of provision relating to the transfer and lease of use rights 
to housing land, especially in peri-urban areas where houseowners often need to 
either exchange or simply sell their properties to cope with urban employment (Wang, 
2005). However, as the land and home are managed by two different departments—
land  and  housing  respectively,  it  is  cumbersome  to  seek  the  approval  of  both 
departments to receive proper status of registration. This is compounded by the 
levying of high fees on the homeowner. As a result, it is common to find that many 
homeowners without the proper registration certificate as required by law.   77 
A  major  step  to  address  the  lack  of  formal  documentation  of  land  rights  is  the 
promulgation  of  the  Land  Registration  Methods  by  the  Ministry  of  Land  and 
Resources (MLR) in January 2008. Where rural collective land is concerned, it refers 
to the registration of collective ownership of farmland and construction land, while 
leaving aside the registration of farmland contracting rights.17 Registration certificates 
are issued to the collective for its title as an overarching responsible entity that is 
encouraged  to  invest  in  land  shareholding  arrangements.  It  stipulates  that  the 
collective  proprietor  should  submit  the  documentation  for  registration  approval 
without indicating who the collective is. Furthermore, it allows for the registration of 
use rights to farmland by third parties, which makes it ambiguous in terms of the 
difficulty in understanding whether the land is contracted land in the first place. If it is, 
then what would be the relationship between the third party and the original land 
user? Strikingly, this policy puts forward articles on land rights protection allowing for 
transparent land registration process in which registered materials can be openly 
accessed. It was reinforced by the 2010 No. 1 Document that stresses the task of 
completion of collective land registration within three years in order to improve land 
management.    Overall,  it  seems  a  stride  towards  meeting  the  need  for  land 
registration to build up a modern land management system in order to further protect 
peasants’  land  rights.  Nonetheless,  it  is  doubtful  whether  it  will  be  effectively 
implemented given the issues discussed earlier especially regarding landownership, 
lack  of  coordinated  management  between  land  and  other  agencies  as  well  as 
societal  buy-in.  Subject  to  the  societal  choice  in  the  acceptance  of  this  land 
management system, it could become an empty institution that lacks credibility in 
terms of meeting the demands of society and the goals of land management itself 
(Ho,  2005;  Ho,  2003).  Furthermore,  contrary  to  Western  juridical  features,  the 
Chinese  legal  culture  presents  a  blurred  distinction  between  juridical  and 
administrative  powers.  This  is  characterized  by  the  fragmentation  of  law,  the 
dependency of the courts on local government and the subordination of law to policy 
(Dicks, 1996). 
 
In a nutshell, current land laws and policies have not effectively resolved the issue of 
the role of the state in land management processes in which it has abused its power 
in deciding on land transfer in the underdeveloped market. As a result, the state 
manages to take farmland at low prices and transfer it to businesses at a much 
higher value with little compensation given to the poor land users. By doing so, it can 
extract rent from the deals, which is a major factor for urban sprawl coupled with 
corruption.  For  the  evicted  peasants,  the  land  expropriation  process  lacks 
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transparency and fairness. Moreover, the current legal framework does not explicitly 
stipulate  the  conditions  under  which  forced  removal  is  allowed.  This  further 
disadvantages the peasants whose legal awareness and power to exercise their 
legal rights remain extremely weak. These issues all indicate the weakness of the 
current legal framework: first, most institutional arrangements for land acquisitions 
enable  the  local  government  to  take  the  law  into  its  own  hands  to  its  benefit, 
although it does not explicitly contravene the law. Second, local government seems 
trapped in this. On the one hand, it cannot stop land acquisition in the name of 
economic  development.  On  the  other  hand,  it  lacks  the  real  power  and  will  to 
confront its own irregular land behaviour (DRC & World Bank, 2006). The latest land-
related policies seem to grant the village collective more leeway in transferring their 
non-arable  construction  land,  which  might  trigger  more  discontents  of  the  local 
government with the central government as the former’s power can be undermined 
(Tong & Chen, 2008). However, to what extent the local government can bypass or 
adapt to this policy is beyond the scope of this chapter. The issue remains as to what 
social and political parameters can actually shape the outcomes of the current policy 
and  legal  framework;  and  moreover,  under  what  conditions  the  overall  land 
management system can be improved.  
 
Moreover, what impacts these policy developments will exert on the poor, how the 
latter react to the developments, and what other reform measures are needed to 
make land profitable for the poor ought to be researched. Although it is hard to 
predict these issues at the very early stage of policy implementation, one can gain 
insights from the effectiveness of past policy implementation and the extent to which 
that it has an impact on the poor. It is important to understand the issues underlying 
the  constraints  to  effective  policy  implementation,  which  serve  as  the  basis  for 
understanding of the policy improvements needed. The preceding brief account of 
legal and policy changes concerning land tenure indicate that these policy changes 
have paid little attention to the causes of poverty where land is inextricably linked 
with  the  natural  resource  constraints  on  poverty.  A  good  understanding  of  the 
complexity of land use in improving the livelihoods of the poor should be developed. 
Improper  land  use  can  cause  further  natural  resource  degradation  and 
impoverishment of the poor. However, how to make the optimum use of the land 
from the perspectives of sustainable development and peasants’ needs remains to a 
large extent a policy vacuum. 
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3.  Debates on land ownership and property rights 
 
Many policy-makers and  scholars  have  focused  their  discussions on  the  lack  of 
clarity and transferability of rural landownership as the key to the failure in economic 
and sustainable land use and chronic poverty as already discussed. The currently 
predominant ownership of land by the collective is claimed to be the fundamental 
hindrance to scaling up agricultural development in China, since it is ambiguous in 
nature and often leads to local elite rent-seeking and corruption through illegal land 
expropriations. Local and regional land use plans are easily manipulated by the local 
government in pursuit of lucrative deals in land sales. As Wang (2005:73) states, 
“the most practical path for future legal reforms is to focus on who is the real owner. 
How  should  the  owner  exercise  its  ownership  of  land?”  He  sees  the  lack  of 
clarification of landownership as a fundamental issue that conflicts with economic 
growth and social welfare. As a result, the current laws and policies have actually 
tied the peasants to their tiny parcels of land which are nonetheless economically 
unproductive for meeting the possible long-term needs of the country. Yet, Wang 
points out that it would be futile to hold public debates on land privatization which is 
not favoured by the state and many other stakeholders. He proposes that it would be 
more  useful  to  strengthen  land  use  rights  and  downplay  land  ownership,  while 
establishing a transparent and efficient land market for the development of land use 
rights in rural areas.  
 
In  a  similar  vein,  Schwarzwalder  (2001)  argues  that  insecurity  of  land  tenure 
currently represents the greatest obstacle to Chinese peasants’ ability to compete in 
the international agricultural marketplace. As informal land readjustments among the 
peasants take place often to accommodate demographic changes especially in very 
poor areas, conflicts occur among themselves and between the peasants and local 
leaders. Wang (2005) even argues for more political reform in rural democratization 
to allow peasants to choose their own leaders in a better way so that decisions on 
their  land  can  be  made  by  those  who  represent  the  peasants’  own  interests. 
Moreover, these questions all boil down to the fundamental issue of what institutional 
arrangements will provide the proper incentives to encourage farm production from a 
land base that remains under the state or collective property, as land rights are not 
only the result of legal and policy construction, but also of social and economic 
development.  
 
The preceding views on land tenure insecurity resonate with a lack of well-defined 
land  management  structure  that  weakens  policy  implementation  and  good 
governance. In essence, peasant land rights have never been clarified sufficiently. 
The term collective ownership does not delimit the administrative unit in terms of who   80 
really owns the land—natural village, administrative village or township government, 
which are all collective entities. Where individual peasants stand at these levels and 
how they can exercise their rights at what level is left unclear. This ambiguity also 
leads  to  conflicting  policies  of  different  public  sectors  which  find  it  difficult  to 
coordinate themselves and thus produce cohesive policies that can effectuate efforts 
in sustainable land management for the poor. In strict terms, collective ownership is 
not  public  ownership;  rather  it  is  a  type  of  communal  arrangement.  Thus,  this 
ambiguity is made intentional to avoid political sensitivity towards private ownership. 
To  use  Ho’s  term,  this  is  “deliberate  institutional  ambiguity”.  As  a  result,  local 
governments see it as a perfect fix to facilitate urban and spatial planning. When 
land disputes between collectives and local governments occur, courts face a lack of 
legal rules rather than administrative measures of unclear legal status which hinder 
sound judicial judgment (Ho, 2003; 2005). In such situations, it is tempting to be 
guided by the concerns over the loss of the dormant political ideology, which holds 
nobody responsible for their actions. Thus, there is a need for more clarity on land 
rights structures that enshrine property rights for individual peasants, who should be 
given the ultimate decision over the type of land rights they prefer over time and 
space (CBR, 2007). 
 
To deal with the landownership issue, some scholars made explicit calls for land 
privatization, which is deemed necessary for substantial agricultural improvement. 
According to the China Newsweek (2007), an influential public policy magazine, land 
reform in China is at a cross-roads which has to be tackled swiftly. This will allow 
peasants to extend their land rights to buy and sell land freely, which will help to 
combat illegal land seizures and build an orderly land market under the rule of law. 
Economists are concerned about a lack of impetus of rapid agricultural growth under 
the current land law and policy which limit technological advances in agriculture by 
preventing peasants from accumulating land. To improve agricultural productivity, it 
is necessary to entrust the peasants with the rights to sell, subcontract or merge their 
land with others in shareholding companies. These views resonate well with that of 
De Soto who believes that private ownership is essential to economic development. 
The state ought to protect property rights in a formal system where ownership and 
transactions are clearly recorded. This reflects the view that capitalism must give 
greater  independence  for  individuals  to  protect  their  assets  from  community 
arrangements (De Soto, 2000). As Zhu and Prosterman (2006: 834) assert, “China 
should  consider  going  beyond  a  tenure  system  of  thirty-year  rights  by  either 
providing  farmers  with  full  private  ownership  rights  to  land,  or  nationalizing 
agricultural land and giving farmers perpetual use rights”. Pieke (2005: 107) further 
affirms that the one-size-fits-all land policy is not suitable for China, especially for 
those  relatively  developed  regions  where  agriculture  plays  a  minor  role  in  rural   81 
development.  As  many  peasants  are  not  allowed  to  dispose  of  their  land,  they 
continue  to  keep  their  land  under  grain  rather  than  other  uses.  This  economic 
inefficiency  in  land  use  contributes  to  the  developmental  stalemate  currently 
confronting  regional  agriculture.  Alternatively,  Pieke  suggests  that  the  peasants 
should be allowed to freely mortgage or sell their land use rights to raise money for 
commercial ventures or other purposes. 
 
There is no doubt that safeguarding and strengthening individual peasants’ land and 
property rights represent the elements of good land governance in China. However, 
this does not necessarily lead to either land nationalization or privatization. In fact, 
many  peasants  across  the  country  oppose  privatization  or  even  extended  land 
tenure  because  they  enjoy  overall  income  security  under  the  current  form  of 
collective landownership. Moreover, local peasants have developed heterogeneous 
ways of land management, which means that policy-makers are not the final arbiters 
in  land  management  (Rozell  et  al.,  2005;  Qiao,  1997).  Were  land  to  be  re-
nationalized as in the case of the era under planned economy, the market economy 
that China has adopted would be pointless. If land were to be privatized, one should 
not overestimate its potential advantages. According to Wang and Xu (1996: 202-
203), in the Chinese context, land privatization would have its inherent problems. 
First,  it  would  not  drive  agricultural  modernization,  since  it  would  tie  individual 
peasants to their fragmented land that hinders large-scale farming. Second, it could 
lead to changes in the existing rural land relations in such a way that landlords and 
tenants could reemerge. This would lead to poverty and deprivation of the majority of 
peasants. Only under public ownership can the majority of peasants be protected 
from exploitation, and can social equity be realized to ensure common prosperity. 
Therefore,  Wang  and  Xu  hold  the  view that  land  tenure  reform must  guarantee 
peasant rights under the current household responsibility system (HRS). In order to 
improve  land  productivity  and  agricultural  growth,  there  is  a  need  to  realize 
economies of scale in agricultural production through collective means instead of 
land privatization. And social equity must be ensured for all peasants. No group 
should be better off at the expense of others.  
 
Given the international experiences in the failure of agrarian reform, the issue of 
landownership  and  property  rights  never  ceases  to  lose  importance.  De  Soto’s 
theory relying on the standard economic assumption that human nature is universal, 
excludes the fact that different cultures have developed their own legal and political 
systems. In Asia, like the case of China, personal relationships and family ties have 
helped foster rapid economic growth, security and trust in economic relationships. 
This implies that economic growth can be accelerated without a well- developed 
commercial legal system like that of the West (Harrison & Huntington, 2001). In the   82 
case  of  China,  exclusive  individual landownership is  not  essential  to  agricultural 
development. Instead, village organizations  and property  relations  should  ensure 
economic benefits for the poor. Collective landownership provides the conditions that 
enable  peasants  to  move  back  and  forth  to  their  land  in  response  to  changing 
conditions in the wider economy (Bromley, 2008). 
 
Moreover, it is argued that the root of the problem has nothing to do with either land 
privatization or public ownership but to the realization of peasants’ collective rights. 
The  law  makes  clear  stipulations  on  land  rights,  but  lacks  details  on  how  the 
peasants can actually exercise their rights and how they can protect their rights. 
Although land is collectively-owned, it is managed by individual households. But it is 
hard to assess the extent to which peasants are able to exercise their land use rights. 
This  actually  makes  the  land  difficult  to  put  on  the  land  market,  which  is 
predominantly controlled by the government. The crux of the matter is that the issues 
of how to restrain the abuse of power of government and how to deal with the 
powerful groups with vested interests in land remain a challenge (CBR, 2007). It is 
obvious that local governments can use the latest land policy on land transfers to 
satisfy their need for land enclosures in the name of the pursuit of scale-farming to 
accelerate rural development.   
 
Two additional factors have not been given enough attention in the current debates. 
It is a simple fact that China’s small-scale farming and its associated low efficiency is 
a  major  hindrance  to  the  achievement  of  economies  of  scales  in  agricultural 
production. Farming for most rural residents means subsistence more than making 
profits through large-scale production, which is impossible under current institutional 
arrangements. When other economic opportunities arise, peasants may probably 
forgo their land to pursue better rewards. With little land in their hands, leaving the 
land to the local government and businesses in return for compensation is not a bad 
deal  sometimes,  especially  for  young  people  who  are  more  likely  to  invest  the 
compensation money in local businesses. With few alternative opportunities except 
farming, most peasants are in a desperate position to pursue efforts in search of a 
quick relief from poverty whenever they are available. All these factors are actually 
conducive to the local government’s attempt to acquire land for profit-seeking non-
agricultural purposes. In developed regions in particular, because finding off-farm 
employment is easier, peasants are more inclined to give up their land as long as 
compensation and social security are paid to them.  
 
The other factor is the HRS as a direct determinant in this pattern of agricultural 
production,  as  land  is  about  equally  distributed  to  individual  households.  Some 
contend that the improvement in the HRS is needed to develop rural land rental   83 
markets in order to facilitate land use efficiency and migration, which are essential to 
meet the changing needs of the economy. The healthy development of this market 
would require more secure peasant land rights and further reduction in the scope for 
discretionary intervention by local officials. This will lay a basis of scale farming in the 
future  (Benjamin  &  Brandt  2002;  Deininger  &  Jin,  2005).  However,  large-scale 
agriculture based on the current HRS may not suit the Chinese context in which a 
large population relies on very limited land. Even taking migration into account, it will 
not  help  much  as  the  Chinese  cities  are  already  over-populated.  Building  small 
towns adjacent to rural areas remains a challenge as mentioned in the so-called 
integrated rural-urban development to address the rural-urban gap. However, Chen 
(2009) does not believe that the HRS should be blamed, because the fact of the 900 
million  rural  population  living  on  extremely  limited  arable  land  is  the  root  of  the 
problems. And any attempt to instigate large-scale agriculture is unrealistic because 
all of the peasants simply need a piece of land in order to survive. Furthermore, he 
warns  that  the  call  for  free  land  rentals  and  sales  can  most  likely  trigger  land 
concentration as Chinese history shows. Land concentration is seen as a major 
factor for  social  inequality  and instability.  Even  so,  the  HRS  has  a  fundamental 
weakness as compared with the People’s Commune in the 1960s, which has not 
received attention. As the rest of the chapters show, the HRS fragments social, 
political and economic rural relations, which weakens the power of the peasants to 
claim their rights and cooperate in farming and marketing their produce. Confronting 
land expropriation, their power to collectively defend their common interests remains 
very  limited.  Moreover,  the  departure  from  collective  action  has  led  to  more 
vulnerability  of  the  poor  to  the  weakening  condition  of  natural  resources,  which 
require more community-level decision-making and action. To Chen, the solution 
would be simulate the experiences of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan by trying out 
specialized  cooperative  organizations  on  the  basis  of  the  HRS.  By  organizing 
peasants in agricultural production and marketing, the cooperative is seen as a more 
effective  institution  to  achieve  the  goals  of  scaled  agriculture  than  simply  the 
realization of land privatization.  
 
4.  Economic, social and political dimensions of land 
tenure reform 
 
The current development policy has a strong focus on rural development, that is, 
modernization  of  agriculture,  which  is  deemed  necessary  for  the  overall 
modernization of Chinese society. This is reflected by Premier Wen Jiabao’s recent 
article on the imminent problem of food supply. He points out that current agriculture 
has reached a difficult stage, at which rural social and economic development still   84 
lags far behind. This is further compounded by the danger of a food shortage, which 
is critical to economic development and social stability. Wen states that food security 
should be put on top of the political agenda and the resolution would be subject to 
ensuring  stable  agricultural  growth  in  order  to  substantially  increase  peasant 
incomes.  Unavoidably,  all  these  issues  relate  to  how  to  deal  with  the  land.  He 
indicates that it is necessary to deepen the rural reform. In this reform, various kinds 
of land operation and management to achieve economies of scale are allowed, but 
these must be carried out on the basis of peasants’ willingness under the rule of law. 
It is forbidden to force them to partake in it, and caution must be taken to guard 
against arrangements such as land shareholding and long-term leasing practices. As 
long as their contracted land is kept intact, at least they will have minimum guarantee 
of the land on their return from the cities. Premier Wen simply sends a signal that 
great caution should be taken in implementing the Party’s policy that encourages 
land transfers as described earlier. It may be confusing to many, but it becomes 
clear when he mentions the importance of comprehensive rural reform that prioritizes 
the basic completion of township reform by 2012 to greatly improve the role of the 
township government in social management and public service delivery (Wen, 2008). 
He actually indicates the social and political challenges for rural development in 
which  land  rights  are  interwoven.  Essentially,  political  reform  must  be  geared 
towards the realization of social equity and balanced rural-urban development. It is 
these two goals that have spurred the concerns of Wen and other leaders who are 
afraid of any negative consequences of the land reform policy.  
 
The establishment of land shareholding cooperatives can be seen as an apparently 
durable solution to the reality of small landholdings in China.18 This institution reflects 
a policy compromise between pro-market and pro-socialist advocates. On the one 
hand, it is assumed that it would facilitate the operation of the market in land use and 
management to boost land use efficiency and large-scale agricultural production. On 
the  other  hand, it  would  ensure  that  the  village  collective  and  local government 
continue to play a dominant role in managing and controlling this institution. Land 
cooperatives  would  further  facilitate  land  consolidation  and  mechanization  from 
economic perspectives as well as the activation of land rental and sales markets, 
which  could  trigger  increases  in  land  inequality  and  landlessness.  But  it  could 
eventually lead to accelerated rural-urban migration, which is important for averting 
the trend of declining farm sizes and facilitating non-farm economic development 
(World Bank, 2007).  
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However, there has not been any pro-poor model that provides the right incentives 
for  all  actors  to  conserve  the  scarce  land  resources  and  substantially  improve 
peasants’ socio-economic and political rights that can lead to poverty alleviation. The 
so-called land cooperative model can be easily manipulated by the local elite and 
may lead to further farmland loss due to the weak voice of the poor and the lack of 
representative institutions for the poor. Furthermore, it is important to unravel the 
underlying  social  and political complexities that  shape land rights structures and 
peasants’ choices of land management and rural development as a whole.  
 
In remote poor areas in particular, land is primarily used for subsistence by the 
majority  of  peasants,  which  requires  its  equal  distribution  to  accommodate 
demographic changes. Land readjustment is a common practice to this end, despite 
the restriction by law to avoid induced conflicts. In fact, peasants in these areas may 
not  show  great  concerns  about  their  land  rights  in  terms  of  obtaining  land  use 
contracts, or in investing in the land. They are more concerned about how to make 
the land meet their basic needs rather than seeking their economic and political 
rights embedded in their land. To a certain extent, land is not always seen as a 
lucrative  asset,  as  peasants  did  not  want  to  bear  land-reduced  taxes  and  fees 
imposed on them especially before 2006. Obviously, the current legal framework has 
not been effective in dealing with this issue. Although it aims to ensure security of 
tenure through limiting this kind of informal land rights exchanges and swaps, its 
simplified dictations cannot tackle the social complexities inherent in land relations 
(Zhao, 2008). 
 
The  village  administrative  allocation  of  land  has  been  strongly  criticized  for  its 
negative impact on peasant incentives in land investment. Thus, more secure land 
rights through the registration of peasant land rights is strongly advocated (Zhu and 
Prosterman,  2006).  However,  this  simplistic  approach  characterized  by  the 
formalization of land rights underestimates the complexity of village governance. The 
marginalization of the peasantry by the local elite further deters peasant incentives in 
land investment. And lack of social capital and access to various economic and 
political resources contribute to their inclination to maintain their low economic, social 
and political profiles. As a result, they are unable to forge alliance in their daily 
struggles against poverty. Neither would they be much interested in participating in 
village governance, which has shown an increased tendency of reduced peasant 
support for either government policy or development programmes (Zhao, 2008). 
 
For indigenous communities, property rights carry a different meaning as compared 
to  that  found  in  “modern”  communities.  Some  indigenous  groups  value  their 
communities  as  defined  by  collective  resources,  communal  land  projects  and   86 
equitable distribution of resources. Unlike the common connotation of property as 
something reflecting a relationship between people and things, it is a relationship 
between people, embedded in a cultural and moral framework and their own vision 
of  community  (Hann,  1998).  For  instance,  for  pastoralists  in  Inner  Mongolia, 
rangeland is managed in line with communal rules developed over the course of their 
history, which does not lie in the delimitation of the land each household uses as 
mandated in the HRS. It is found that the latter does not mitigate the “tragedy of the 
commons”; instead, it has exacerbated rangeland degradation. It demonstrates the 
fact that new policies for land tenure security to promote agricultural production may 
conflict with the systems of the vulnerable communities and these policies have 
triggered fragmentation of community cohesion and land degradation. A collective 
treatment is needed so that the indigenous communities can be given the right to 
utilize  their  resources  in  ways  that  best  suit  their  own  interests  through  the 
establishment of small-scale collective property systems, which government should 
foster and protect (Li et al, 2007; Sturgeon, 2004; Yang, 2007) 
 
Furthermore,  taking  China’s  land  reform  as  a  revolutionary  movement,  it  is 
necessary to understanding how Chinese society has evolved. This necessitates the 
development  of  insights  into  how  peasants’  traditional  cultures  have  changed  in 
relation to land, how the logic of political culture has shifted, and why and how the 
state and peasants have colluded in political movements time after time. As Zhang 
points out, the land reform itself as reflected in the process of collectivization, the 
formation  of  People’s  Communes,  the  Four  Clean-ups  Movement  and  de-
collectivization, and so forth, were not what peasants themselves had expected or 
would have chosen. Rather, they were in part imposed on villages by the Party and 
its political power (Zhang, 2004). Given the fact that the majority of peasants are in 
favour  of  the  current  practice  of  land  contracting  and  the  improbability  of  land 
privatization, the rural collective ownership of land will remain the major element of 
socialism (Ho & Lin, 2003). 
 
The underlying economic, social and political dimensions of land tenure schemes are 
critical for sustainable land use, rural development and governance. Although the 
current HRS grants the peasants strengthened land use rights, it has its intrinsic 
weakness in facilitating people-centred approaches to land use and management. 
To certain extent, it contributes to chronic poverty, poor rural governance and loss of 
natural resource bases, as fragmented land relations constrain peasant organization 
and  participation  in  farming,  natural  resource  management  and  politics.  The 
inseparable social and political factors for land tenure reflect how state and society 
interacts. It is important to explore the changing contexts, relationships and rights to 
land and examine the changing relationships between land and poverty and how   87 
people cope with rural-urban change. In this respect, the links between land rights, 
social processes and structures and political and economic organizations deserve 
further attention. The study of land laws and policies can shed light on issues of 
social differentiation and inequality. This would require a re-thinking of the formalized 
approaches to land governance centred upon land titling and registration, which has 
not  brought about the  expected  changes  in agricultural  development  as  seen  in 
many transitional economies. In order to understand the factors that limit the ability 
of the poor to pursue their own rights, a pro-poor approach can be explored to 
investigate the changing role of land in peasant livelihoods and local social and 
political relations, which can reveal more practical ways of dealing with poverty and 
power (DFID, 2007). 
 
5.  Land tenure and village governance reform 
 
To use the pro-poor approach in land policy, there is a need to understand the 
linkages  between  land  and  sustainable  development  and  how  institutional 
arrangements  can  be  made  to  foster  and  stimulate  development  initiatives  that 
benefit  the  poor.  As  many  scholars  have  argued,  the  basic  problem  of  China’s 
development is population growth and its associated substantial decrease in natural 
resources including the land. Industrial and urban development could contribute to 
rural development in terms of reducing human pressure on the resources (Tawney, 
1966; Fei, 2006). Over the past decades, development policies remain bi-polar in 
terms of the co-existing and unsupportive elements of subsistence agriculture and 
national food grain self-sufficiency on the one hand, and the commercialization of 
agriculture, industrialization and urbanization on the other (Pieke, 2005).  
 
China’s land reform is part of its economic transition marked by market-oriented 
approaches with a Chinese character, although the latter has never been clearly 
defined by the government. Collective landownership can be seen as socialist and 
will not change its nature in the foreseeable future no matter how developed the 
market economy becomes. This trajectory also explains why the institution of the 
land cooperative has been proposed, and this underscores the socialist and market 
mechanisms in agricultural and land management. Thus, land reform is led by a 
mixture of state and market-led approaches and the predominance of the state in 
land  governance.  However,  the  strong  presence  of  the  state  in  the  Chinese 
countryside and the tensions between the central and local levels over conflicting 
interests  in  land  utilization  have  undermined  the  effectiveness  of  policy 
implementation in meeting sustainable rural development goals. 
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As seen in other transitional economies, the introduction of private property rights 
has brought about the breakdown of the earlier cohesion of village life with its often 
elaborate, though informal, structure of rights and obligations (Myrdal, 1968; Todaro, 
2000).  The  current  HRS  in  China  has  effectuated  land  fragmentation  and  a 
dismantling  of the interwoven  village relations.  The loosening  of intra-community 
relations has certainly affected collectively-organized economic activities as seen in 
the  pre-reform  era.  This  also  indicates  that  the  current  village  collective  can  no 
longer act as a genuine entity representing the interests of the whole village. Thus, 
the role of the HRS in facilitating market-oriented approaches to land tenure reform 
and sustainable rural development cannot be overestimated. It serves much more 
the interests of the local government rather than those of the peasants. This also 
explains why village governance is so poorly developed and fails to bring rigorous 
sustainable  development  solutions.  China’s  rural  land  tenure  structure  gives 
immense power to the village collective and local government in de facto terms. In 
this sense, China shares the same experiences as other developing countries. As 
Todaro contends, “the ultimate impoverishment of the peasantry was the inevitable 
consequence of this process of fragmentation, economic vulnerability, and loss of 
land to rich and powerful landlords” (Todaro, 2000: 377). Thus, “a more democratic, 
or at least accountable, land planning regime in China could potentially provide a 
way  out  of  the  bureaucratic  infighting  and  stalemates  that  have  characterized 
China’s land policies for so long” (Pieke, 2005: 100). 
 
How to make land contribute to sustainable rural development and an improvement 
in the livelihoods of the poor presents an ultimate challenge for land governance. As 
the  Chinese  peasants  lack  a  voice  in  land  use  and  management,  promoting 
inclusiveness is important to induce their participation in this process. This can foster 
the  creation  of  village-based  institutional  arrangements  for  pro-poor  land 
management  in  the  overall  context  of  rural  development  (World  Bank,  2003). 
However, the issues remain as to whether there is a need to create new institutions 
or to improve the current institutions that can drastically represent peasants’ land 
rights  and  benefits.  In  any  case, institutional  development  can  provide  ways  for 
people to say what they think and need, support the implementation of policies that 
meet  the  needs  of  the  poor,  provide  public  services  that  reduce  discrimination 
against vulnerable groups, and offer peasants the opportunities to question the laws 
and policies that affect their decisions on land use and management (DFID, 2006). 
 
The dilemma facing institutional development in rural China can be seen from the 
limited progress made in village governance—village elections that are aimed at 
enhancing peasants’ political, economic and social rights. Although it has exerted an 
impact on improving political accountability, it has few effects on the empowerment   89 
of the poor in the face of the political monopoly of the village collective and local 
government. Party manipulation of the elections has failed the village collective in 
providing  a  significant  counterweight  to  officialdom.  Furthermore,  lack  of internal 
conditions such as democratic rules, procedures and capacity of the peasants are 
hindering the entire village governance process (Lee & Selden, 2007; Van Rooij, 
2007; Xu, 2003; Zhao, 2008). Although the current institutional framework provides 
the  space  for  institutional  innovation  such  as  the  creation  of  peasant  economic 
cooperative  organizations,  water  users’  associations  and  so  forth,  these 
organizations can hardly exert a major influence on village governance. This means 
that  further  improvement  in  land  law  and  policy  ought  to  take  this  institutional 
dilemma  as  a  major  point  of  departure  in  order  to  foster  more  genuine  local 
institutions that represent the interests of the poor.  
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
This chapter illustrates the rural development challenges underpinned by various 
landed  factors  such  as  natural  resource  constraints  and  land  tenure,  and  the 
progress  made  and challenges for  improvement in land law  and  policy that  can 
benefit the poor. The current land tenure regime has to a large extent not favoured 
the poor in terms of chronic poverty and weak rural governance. This is exacerbated 
by rising population pressures, natural resource degradation and small landholdings. 
This issue is explored from a wide range of perspectives that take land rights as 
multi-dimensional  complexities,  where  the  solution  does  not  lie  in  simply 
emphasizing the need to strengthen law and policy to clarify landownership and 
implementing relevant reforms to facilitate scale farming. It is important to note that it 
is  not  an  issue  of  whether  scale-farming  is  needed.  Rather,  it  is  about  what 
institutional arrangements can be made for what patterns of agricultural development. 
In  this  respect,  the  forms  of  land  management  through  nationalization,  village 
collectivization and privatization all have their advantages and disadvantages in the 
Chinese  context,  in  which  local  economic,  political  and  social  conditions  differ. 
Obviously,  there  are  no  one-size-fits-all  solutions  (Huang,  2008).  The  market 
approach  can  also  be as costly  as the  state-led  approach. To  deal  with it, it is 
necessary to effectively coordinate the actors involved in the land reform process 
through decentralized and demand-driven implementation (Hall, 2008). In this sense, 
it is more helpful for policy-makers to identify and foster approaches from the angle 
of local initiatives. 
 
Land institutional design in China can be tested with a greater attempt to revitalize 
the overall agricultural sector through peasant innovation in order to put in place their   90 
own institutions that work better than the existing ones. This requires a rethinking of 
the role of the collective in land management and rural development. It is important 
to note that this does not refer to the strengthening of the existing village committees, 
although  their more effective  functioning is  needed. Neither  does  this indicate a 
return to the commune, which failed not only in China, but also elsewhere. The new 
approach to land collectives would ensure peasant voluntary action groups. They 
would  be  established  by  relatively  socio-economically  homogenous  groups  of 
peasants who would be willing to participate in decision-making to ensure that labour 
and  benefits  would  be  shared  equally  among  themselves.  In  this  way,  “these 
collectives  would  be  built  on  very  different  principles  from  the  failed  historical 
examples,  and  would  also  offer  an  alternative  to  atomized/individual  private 
enterprises” (Agarwal, 2008: 2). 
 
Although this proposed approach presents a challenge to current institutions, it is not 
a total departure from them. It can contribute to the ongoing decentralization process 
that is aimed at enhancing government accountability. It can provide a new impetus 
for  peasant  participation  in  land  policy-making  and  management  processes  to 
improve their more equitable land use. And it could revitalize the village relations for 
the formation of truly democratic local institutions. Therefore, it contributes to overall 
rural  sustainable  development.  It  would  deepen  the  current  debates  on 
landownership and its importance to land management by providing the feasibility of 
more  inclusive  arrangements  for  land  titling  that  reflects  the  willingness  of  and 
creates the incentives for peasants to design their own programmes. In this respect, 
future land laws and policies may need to give due attention to peasant participation 
in decision-making and actively support their initiatives in determining the types of 
land rights they need for a specific type of land use and management. Even so, the 
stranglehold of local elites may hinder this approach. The solution would be to align 
peasants with the wider public in promoting their land development agenda. First, 
there  is  a  need  to  understand  local  development  dynamics  that  pose  both 
opportunities and constraints to sustainable land management. Second, peasants’ 
perspectives and cultures should be taken into account in land use planning and 
policy-making processes to ensure that they are supportive of any policy changes. 
Third, civil societies should be encouraged and empowered to participate in this 
process  and  given  more  space  for  advocacy  and  supporting  peasant-centred 
approaches to land use and rural development as a whole. The realization of the 
three approaches will allow for more incentives for peasant participation, which will 
hold  the  government  and  businesses  more  accountable  for  sustainable  land 
management. China will continue to struggle with the complex relations between 
state, market and community before participatory, people-led and state-supported 
land reform can really take shape.   91 
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Chapter 4  Individual land tenure and the 
challenges of sustainable land use 
and management 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
Despite its positive developmental effects, the current focus of Chinese development 
policy on individual land tenure has its inherent weaknesses. Its linkages with rural 
poverty and natural resources management issues have gradually manifested its 
limitations to organized peasant determination in landed resource governance. Its 
association with land and social fragmentation has further undermined the collective 
power of the peasantry, whilst privileging the powerful local government to use it to 
meet their development mandates set from above. This research is based on an 
environmentally fragile and poor county in North China to examine the linkages of 
land tenure, poverty and natural resource governance. It emphasizes how the local 
peasantry perceive these issues and contest land use for their livelihoods. It argues 
that land tenure security can only possibly be achieved by tackling the fragmented 
nature  of  individual  tenure  and  exploring  the  mechanisms  for  genuine  peasant 
collective action towards sustainable rural development. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
This  chapter  discusses  the  recurrent  issue  of  land  tenure—the  household 
responsibility  system  (HRS)  and  ongoing  reforms  of  collective  natural  resource 
tenure and their linkages with sustainable natural resource management and rural 
development.  China’s  remarkable  development  since  the  1980s  hinges  on 
decentralized agriculture or the HRS in particular. The HRS grants individual farming 
households long-term land use rights in order to ensure their sustained interests in 
farming and its related investments. To a certain extent, it has stimulated peasants’ 
incentives in production and thus agricultural development. As a result, until the mid-
1980s, total agricultural output grew by no less than 7.4 percent per year (Huang, 
1998). Chinese peasants had enjoyed greater freedom to sell surpluses after fulfilling 
obligatory grain quotas as compared with the commune era.  
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However, since 1985 agricultural growth has slowed down by 3.8 percent per year. 
And rural environmental degradation and depletion of natural resources have made 
many  poor  people  fall  back  to  poverty  (Li  et  al,  2005).  Many  scholars  hold  the 
assumption that retarded growth and continuing poverty are caused by the lack of 
clear-cut  private  titles  to  land  as  farmland  ownership  remains  with  the  village 
collective. Such a form of ownership is often viewed as ambiguous in light of the 
mounting evidence of illegal land expropriation, land conflicts and more importantly, 
unsustainable  land  use  and  management.  Furthermore,  collective  ownership 
obstructs the development of a healthy rural land market, which is the key to the 
realization of economies of scales in agricultural production and poverty reduction. 
This two-tiered rural land system that combines public ownership with private land 
use rights is also prone to corruption and rent seeking of local elites. To capitalize on 
the  advantages  of  the  current  HRS,  China  would  need  a  more  individualistic 
institution  that facilitates  the  development  of  tradable land  rights  or  a  rural  land 
market under the rule of law (Lai, 1995; Cai, 2003; Chin, 2005; also see Ho, 2005; 
Szirmai, 2005).  
 
To a certain degree, China’s land policy reform shows little difference from the rest of 
the world where modernization of agriculture through individualization of land titles 
and  establishment  of  land  and  agricultural  markets  prevail.  Since  collective 
landownership is seen as a structural constraint on these institutions, individualized 
private property is considered as more developed in terms of the capitalization of 
landed capital, land tenure security and rapid agricultural growth (see Feder & Feeny, 
1991; Migot-Adholla et al, 1991; Whitehead & Tsikata, 2003). Even so, land titling 
projects  in  many  developing  countries  involve  high  risks  that  are  detrimental  to 
socially embedded rights and thus exacerbate existing social, political and economic 
inequalities rather than serving the mechanisms for its redress. Far from being viable 
for efficient agriculture for smallholders, the pervasive mechanisms are not geared to 
tackle the more fundamental structural dimensions of land tenure (Toulmin & Quan, 
2000; Fortin, 2005).  
 
Bramall  (2004) argues that  one  should not overestimate the  role of  HRS in the 
Chinese  agriculture.  Rather,  government  intervention,  technological  advancement 
and natural conditions have played a more important role. The current small-size 
household farming system has caused major problems. These include fragmentation 
of  land, land  lost to  paths and  boundaries  and  conflict  over  access to  irrigation 
systems  among  village  groups.  Furthermore,  it  makes  large-scale  agricultural 
production extremely difficult. Access to land has not been the basis for China’s 
agricultural  prosperity.  Land  is  valuable  because  of  price  support  for  agriculture 
rather than the greater efficiency of small-scale farms.    99 
Transforming the HRS into more individualistic land tenure may not provide a viable 
solution.  As  Hu  (1997:  175)  points  out,  the  current  land  tenure  system  has 
encouraged short-sighted decisions and irresponsible use of land resources by the 
peasants. Peasants pursue immediate and short-term gains, and this is exacerbated 
by land fragmentation. The latter hampers irrigation and drainage and leads to the 
degradation  of  China’s  agro-ecological  environment.  Local  governments  do  not 
function  effectively  in  organizing  agricultural  production  and  overall  rural 
development due to a lack of resources and democratic governance. On the one 
hand,  the  lack  of  resources  and  good  governance  has  hindered  their  role  in 
sustainable rural development. On the other hand, slow agricultural development has 
generated insufficient resources for local governments to deliver basic rural services 
and thus win the support of the peasantry. Moreover, the Chinese peasantry, to a 
large extent, has not been organized in a way that their land can be better utilized 
and managed. As a result, they have not managed to gain substantial benefits from 
their land except for the purpose of subsistence.  
 
The  interactions  between  the  state  and  the  peasantry  over  land  use  and 
management deserve further investigation. It is important to cast local government in 
the  lead  role  of  the  development  process  (Oi,  1999).  The  HRS  is  aimed  at 
strengthening individual peasants’ rights and improving land use efficiency, but this 
has not been complementary to effective village governance—the foundation and 
driving force for peasant-centred development. Discourses on land tenure reform as 
already mentioned treat land relations as embedded within the complex social and 
political domains, which make the reform perplexingly insufficient or inefficient in 
addressing the structural problems of power and agency. Even so, such discourses 
provide  insufficient  analysis  of  how  a  specific  land  tenure  regime  actually 
complicates  or  even  reconstructs  rural  societal,  political,  economic  and  even 
environmental relations. 
 
The case of China provides a unique angle to deconstruct the causes of complex 
land-society interactions in relation to livelihoods, governance and rural development. 
This  complexity,  to  a  certain  degree,  is  determined  by  the  HRS  as  land 
fragmentation underscores the issue around the lack of rural social cohesiveness 
and mutual groupings in farming, development and governance processes. A lack of 
effective  social  organization  is  conducive  to  poor  governance  of  both  natural 
resources and village affairs. As a result, more individualistic land tenure may be 
further attributable to enlarging rural inequalities especially between the peasantry 
and local state actors.   
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Drawing on the case study of a nationally designated poverty area—Guyuan County, 
Hebei  Province  in  North  China,  this  chapter  explores  the  major  constraints  to 
sustainable  land  use,  poverty  and  environmental  degradation  to  explicate  the 
underlying social, political and economic factors that impinge upon peasant and local 
state  interactions.  In  this  context,  it  introduces  the  changing  property  rights 
institutions and discusses the major pitfalls of individualistic institutions governing the 
use of natural resources by the poor whose livelihoods are contingent upon the 
increasing  degradation  of  these  resources.  It  manifests  the  linkages  of  peasant 
livelihoods,  land-induced  conflicting  interests  among  different  actors  and  their 
contestations  over  farmland  rights  and  utilization.  It  ends  by  discussing  the 
institutional  constraints  of  the  current  land  tenure  to  peasants’  collective  action 
towards  sustainable  land  use  and  poverty  reduction  in  environmentally  fragile 
regions in China.  
 
2.  Poverty and natural resource linkages and policy 
responses 
 
This  case  study  is  based  on  the  fieldwork  conducted  in  Guyuan  County,  Hebei 
Province,  in  2008.  The  research  methods  were  mainly  qualitative,  given  the 
challenges of the research topic. Almost 30 informal interviews with government staff 
at county and township levels and local peasants from a number of villages were 
conducted.  Focus  group  discussions  were  also  held  with  county  and  township 
government  officials  from  the  major  departments.  The  field  results  were 
supplemented  by  government  published  and  unpublished  reports  and  policy 
documents.19  
 
The mountainous Guyuan County has a total area of 3,654 square kilometres and a 
population of 230,000. It is situated to the northwest of Beijing—the capital of China 
(just 400 kilometres apart), and in the southeast of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous 
region (see Map). It also falls within the ecologically-strategic region called the Three 
North Preventative Forests Belt—a large and long-term national forest plantation 
programme that covers the northeast, northwest and north of China. The progamme 
is aimed at increasing forest coverage and preventing sand storms from entering the 
inner regions such as Beijing. With endowed natural resources in the mountains and 
large tracts of grassland and forests, it features a combined economy of cultivated 
farming, animal husbandry and tourism. However, the shortage of water is a major 
                                                 
19 Exact names of interviewees, villages and local government departments are omitted due to 
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threat to farming. Hebei, together with other provinces in North China, produces 
almost 25 percent of China’s total agricultural output, although it has at its disposal 
only  5  percent  of  the  county’s  water  resources.  Irrigation  is  extensively  used  in 
agriculture (Kahrl et al., 2005: 13).  
 
 
 
Map 4.1   Guyuan County, Hebei Province, China 
 
 
Guyuan is highly prone to natural disasters. Drought occurs almost every year, which 
causes much damage to the farmland. An average of 30 percent of the farmland is 
affected  by  natural  disasters,  leading  to  severe  reduction  of  farm  produce.  This 
damage is exacerbated by the continuous reduction of annual precipitation rate; as a 
result, the local peasants have to increase their reliance on irrigation for farming. 
Rampant economic development has caused the increasing loss of farmland, land 
degradation, loss of grassland and forests. Accordingly, the natural resource base 
especially soil fertility and groundwater level has declined dramatically. Guyuan’s 
local  economy  is  constrained  by  unsustainable  natural  resources  use  and 
management.  Poor  access  to  public  infrastructure  and  technical  services  has 
precluded many peasants’ pursuit of better farming and marketing of their produce 
(Guyuan County Government, 2003: 97). 
 
With  an  average  of  0.43  ha  of  arable  land  per  capita,  it  has  been  a  nationally 
designated priority poor county since 1994. A total of 124 villages with a population 
of 93,069 are targeted for poverty reduction. Despite the progress made especially in 
the promotion of large-scale vegetable farming since 1998, there are still 78,600 
people living on an average annual net income in the region of 100 US$. Poverty 
reduction continues to be a major task of the county government (Guyuan County 
Poverty Alleviation Office, 2007). 
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To  address  poverty,  since  1998,  the  county  government  has  spearheaded  the 
development of agribusiness enterprises on the assumption that this trajectory would 
enable different villages to develop their economies of scales. Animal husbandry and 
vegetable farming have been promoted as the two most important enterprises for 
poverty reduction. It has become a well-known region for supplying milk, beef and 
vegetables to other parts of the country, especially the North. In 2007, for example, 
80 percent of the villages or 40 percent of the population were involved in vegetable 
farming, which occupied 15 percent of the arable land. Till now, this sector has 
remained the most important sector in agricultural development (Guyuan County 
Poverty Alleviation Office, 2007). 
 
Essentially,  Guyuan  County  offers  incentives  for  business  investments  in  the 
agricultural  sector  to  encourage  for  the  setting  up  of  large  enterprises  through 
policies that employ the “dragon head (longtou qiye)” approach. 20 These enterprises 
are expected to play a leading role in organizing the peasants in production and 
being responsible for the marketing of produce. The peasants are allowed to join 
these enterprises through land and labour shareholding arrangements. Thus they 
are expected to earn profits from their shares. It is not the purpose of this chapter to 
explain the outcomes of these arrangements, but it is important to note that the 
organization of the peasantry is problematic, as these organizations exist in small 
numbers and most of them operate ineffectively; and in most cases, they only remain 
in name.21 Some even take advantage of the peasants by monopolizing the prices of 
the produce. It is far too early to predict the effectiveness of this type of agricultural 
organization in combating poverty and environmental degradation. In general, small-
holder farming constitutes the major agricultural pattern as seen in most parts of 
rural China.   
 
However,  before  1998  cash  crop  farming  in  the  county  was  not  mainstreamed. 
Instead, traditional crops such as oats and flax were widely planted for both domestic 
use and the market, although profits for the peasants were minimal. These crops are 
still  planted  today  on  relatively  small  scales,  but  they  are  not  as  profitable  as 
vegetable farming. Paradoxically, they are more drought resistant than vegetables. 
The introduction of vegetable farming by the local government as an alternative was 
assumed to be a quick fix to prolonged poverty, yet the extent to which poverty has 
been  reduced  is  limited.  While  peasants  shifted  their  traditional  farming  to  the 
“modern” forms, the majority of them have not benefited from this switch. Natural 
                                                 
20 This type of agribusiness has been emphasized nationwide by consecutive agricultural policies, 
see Chapter 3. 
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disasters, water shortage and a lack of collective organization of farming constrain 
peasants’  efforts  in  maximizing  farming  efficiency  and  market  access.  Both  the 
county  government  and  the  peasants  have  voiced  their  concerns  about  the 
sustainability of the current farming methods in light of these challenges. Above all, 
peasants’ lack of information on the market, choice over farming and off-farming 
employment opportunities has further complicated their difficult livelihoods.  
The case of Guyuan County exemplifies the experiences of many other Chinese 
regions where peasants’ livelihoods are constrained by unsustainable land use and 
management, natural resource degradation and ineffective policy response to the 
poverty and environment linkages. Nevertheless, land tenure has not been given 
attention in explaining the ongoing constraints to sustainable rural development.  
 
3.  Changing land relations: From mutual help to 
conflicts 
 
Before 1949, most agricultural land in Guyuan County was owned by landlords, rich 
peasants and merchants. Ordinary peasants owned little or no land at all. Only a 
small number of poor peasants managed to become smallholders after many years 
of hard work and savings. The ratio of land occupation between the rich and poor 
was nearly 8:1—an indicator of a high level of social and economic inequality. The 
majority of the peasants maintained their livelihoods through renting the land of the 
landlords and other rich peasants. And land transactions took different forms which 
included land leases, sales, mortgages and the hiring of farm labourers by some 
landowners.  
 
The  land  revolution  led  by  the  Communist  Party  called  for  the  abolition  of  the 
exploitive feudal land relations with a view to uniting the poor peasantry to overthrow 
the Nationalist government. Many landlords’ landed properties were confiscated and 
redistributed to the poor peasants. The victory of this revolution faced an immediate 
challenge for agricultural development, since it was a drastic process of severing the 
old productive relations. The peasants with redistributed land could hardly cope with 
the shortage of labour, livestock and machinery, which were all essential to efficient 
farming.  Peasant  cooperation  became  a  necessary  institution  to  deal  with these 
problems. After 1950, many temporary and year-round mutual help groups were 
established based on voluntary principles. These groups with varying numbers of 
participant households played an important role in offsetting the shortage of human 
and  technical  capital  through  the  exchange  of  labour,  livestock  and  machinery. 
During this period the number of the mutual help groups increased substantially. For   104 
instance, in 1950, only 2.8 percent of the households were involved; but in 1954, this 
number reached 81.7 percent (Guyuan County Government, 2003: 197). 
 
The establishment of peasant production organizations would not have been easy 
without government dominance and intervention. Their transformation went through 
three  stages.  At  the  first  stage,  in  1952,  primary  agricultural  cooperatives  were 
piloted and rolled out to the whole county. Individual households remained as the 
landowners, but also as cooperative members who received the benefits based on 
their labour contribution. Land use, management and agricultural production were all 
arranged  by the  cooperatives.  At the  second  stage started in  1956, the  primary 
cooperatives  and  earlier  established  mutual  help  groups  were  transformed  into 
advanced  agricultural  cooperatives.  Collective  landownership  replaced  the  old 
private ownership. All peasant households automatically became members of the 
cooperatives, which arranged farming and distributed production materials to the 
members. At the third stage, these cooperatives were transformed into communes, a 
larger  institution  that  displayed  more  features  of  collective  ownership  of  landed 
resources than the previous regimes. Underscored by a high-level of planning and 
bureaucracy, it quickly showed its ineffectiveness in farming organization and rural 
development. The local government attempted to improve its efficiency, but it did not 
provide  incentives  to  the  members  to  stimulate  agricultural  production.  Yet,  this 
failure did not fully lie in the commune itself. The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) as 
characterized by fierce political struggles contributed to the destruction of social and 
economic relations at all levels, which obstructed and did not leave space for further 
development of the communes (Guyuan County Government, 2003). 
 
The  land  reform  agenda  led  by  the  Communist  Party  across  China  marked  a 
fundamental  shift  from  private  landownership  to  collective  ownership  that  is 
continued to this day. The egalitarian principle remains, and this is why land was 
redistributed to the poor landless peasants in the first place. One can probably argue 
that the collective institution is the only difference that distinguishes the Communist 
Party from the Nationalist regime. As Wong (1973) points out, when the Communist 
Party  came  to  power,  its  1950  Agrarian  Reform  Law  contained  no  major  policy 
innovation  because  all  the  important  issues  had  already  been  tried  out  by  its 
predecessor, especially the founder of the Nationalist Party—Sun Yat-sen. Sun’s 
overall programme for “equalization of land ownership and the control of capital” was 
followed by the communists with the mechanisms of the commune as a collective 
representation of equity.  
 
In Guyuan County, the HRS was first introduced in 1979 in pilot villages with great 
difficulties. Like the realization of the previous policies on the models of cooperatives   105 
and communes, its adoption was through politically strong administrative measures, 
without full peasant consent. Land, labour, livestock and machinery were allocated to 
individual households that were given the responsibility to meet production and other 
economic quota and tax set by the local government, while keeping the residue for 
themselves. On the assumption that the HRS would provide the peasants with more 
incentives to cultivate their land, its outcome has not been prominent in light of 
poverty  and  natural  resources  degradation.  Moreover,  the  HRS  from  the  very 
beginning cultivated the seeds of inequality, as large farms were leased to the so-
called capable households. During the 1970s and 1980s, these farms were run with 
a huge loss of profits and property due to mismanagement and weak governance. 
They were returned to the management of the collective. In 1993, the whole county 
followed  the  call  of  the  central  government  to  stabilize  and  improve  farmland 
contracting relations by granting 30 years of land use rights to the households. And 
in 1997, a second round of farmland leasing was carried out with a view to clarifying 
and documenting land contracting rights and improving land tenure security. The 
latter was assumed to be important to stabilize land relations and encourage land 
use rights transfers among the households, as some of them would prefer leasing 
their  land  to  others  while  undertaking  off-farm  employment  (Guyuan  County 
Government,  2003).  In  short,  the  egalitarian  principle  and  practice  concerning 
agriculture gradually receded with the introduction of the HRS whose alignment with 
state policies on agricultural output to be met by individual households contradicted 
peasants’ needs for livelihoods and social services (Chang, 1994). 
 
The practice of farmland leasing quickly triggered land conflicts among contractors, 
village  collectives  and  local  government  after  1997.  Affected  peasants  lack  the 
power to hold the local government accountable and to negotiate terms of conditions 
with it. Village collectives are often accused of corruption in village governance. Their 
abuse of power also lies in the unequal allocation of farmland to different contractors. 
Those  households  with  close  relationships  with  the  village  leaders  sometimes 
receive more and better quality land than the others and even do not fully comply 
with their contractual terms. In some cases, the land of those who have migrated to 
cities is intentionally kept and redistributed to others, which contravenes the 2002 
Rural Land Contracting Law. The latter provides a rigid stance on upholding land 
tenure security and equity (Guyuan County Disciplinary Inspection Bureau, 2005). 
But, when the migrants wanted to return to their homes when they were unable to 
find a permanent stay in the cities, they discovered that their land had been taken   106 
away. This is the most critical factor for disputes and conflicts between peasants and 
village leaders.22 
How to manage appropriate land use for the benefit of the poor presents a daunting 
governance  challenge  to  the  local  government.  This  challenge  also  exhibits  the 
weakness of the HRS in securing peasants’ land use rights and stimulating good 
governance.  To a  certain  extent,  the  HRS  has  even  facilitated  poor governance 
characterized by rent-seeking and corruption of the village and local government 
leadership,  among  other  issues.  The  brief  history  of  land  reform  in  this  county 
demonstrates that none of the land tenure policies have worked effectively. Rather, 
they  are  interwoven  with  many  social  and  political  issues,  which  undermine  the 
power of the poor and lead to rising social instability in the countryside.  
 
4.  Fallacies of natural resource management law and 
policy 
 
4.1  Grassland preservation 
Given its unique geographical location, Guyuan County has been included in the 
provincial and national ecological protection plan. Under immense pressure from the 
central and provincial governments, the county government’s environmental policy 
has focused on the preservation of its endowed resources. The 2002 Grassland Law 
of China stipulates that the grassland belongs to the state which can assign use 
rights to the village collective. The latter is allowed to contract the land to individual 
households. With respect to grassland preservation, Article 33 of the law states the 
following: 
 
Contractors  for  grassland  management  shall  make  rational  use  of  the 
grasslands, and they may not exceed the stock-carrying capacity verified by 
the competent administrative department for grasslands; and they shall take 
such measures as growing and reserving forage grass and fodder…in order 
to keep the balance between grass yield and the number of livestock raised 
(Government of China, 2002: 7). 
 
                                                 
22 Rural outmigration may not contribute to rural development to a large extent given the fact that 
enormous urban employment creation is needed to accommodate the migrants. However, it is 
never an easy task. For rural development to take off substantially, 75 percent of the peasants 
have to leave the countryside, and this is almost unrealistic (see Kahrl et al, 2005). Information on 
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In essence, this law displays no difference from the 2002 Rural Land Contracting 
Law in terms of granting land use rights to individual households. Thus, large part of 
the grassland in Guyuan has been partly contracted out to individual households that 
are required to sign their use rights contracts with the county Agricultural and Animal 
Husbandry Bureau. This measure is assumed to be useful to land preservation, as 
the peasant users should be made responsible. In parallel, some is kept in the hands 
of  the  collective  purely  for  the  purpose  of  nature  conservation.  This  part  of  the 
grassland is fenced off for rehabilitation, as either it had been exploited to almost 
extinction  or  it  is  prone  to  further  degradation.  Apart  from  the  contracted  and 
preserved  grassland,  there  is  only  a  small  proportion  of  the  land  left  open  to 
communal use for grazing. The rationale for the grassland management is based on 
the calculation of its carrying capacity. Accordingly, the number of livestock allowed 
for grazing was set first. However, the administration of grassland protection is too 
costly and difficult to manage, since the peasants can still find ways to cut the fence 
and enter the land. The grassland contract management has not succeeded in fully 
registering the peasants, some of whom have not applied for the contract certificate 
as stipulated in the law. For those who have the certificates, they are only allowed to 
graze appropriate numbers of livestock; but in practice, one can hardly tell whether 
these numbers have been followed.23 
 
The ineffectiveness of the law in the view of the local bureau is due to peasants’ lack 
of “modern knowledge” of livestock rearing and grazing. As a result, over-grazing 
caused  grassland  degradation.  The  bureau  further  attempted  to  introduce  new 
methods to prevent the peasants from grazing outside their homes. However, as 
they require improvements in the use of fodder and the selection of livestock species, 
this was too costly for the peasants to follow. The peasants have continued to ignore 
these calls and managed to avoid the inspection of the local bureau staff regarding 
the use of the grassland. Some rehabilitated sites, despite being well protected for 
some  time,  have  now  become  degraded  again  due  to  a  peasant  “invasion”. 
According to a news report, some large parcels of grassland contracted out were 
found to be used for cropping, grazing and other functions, which were not allowed 
by law. With the implementation of the 2003 Decree of Grazing Prohibition by the 
local government, access to grazing has become more and more difficult for the 
peasants who receive less and less income from it. They reported that their income 
from  farmland  cultivation  was  so  limited  that  they  had  to  rely  on  grazing  to 
supplement it. The lack of adequate access to grassland further contributes to their 
vulnerable livelihoods (Xinhua Net, 2006). 
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The widespread grassland degradation indicates that relevant grassland laws and 
policies  place  overt  emphasis  on  management  issues  rather  than  linking  it  with 
viable options for peasant livelihoods. To the peasants, the traditional method of 
grazing has certain cost-effective advantages, including easy management of the 
livestock. As their own grazing rules are not considered by the government, they do 
not believe that the “exotic” method of fencing off the grazing area is in their best 
interests. Furthermore, when there is not much leeway for them to use even their 
own contracted grassland as it is small in size, grazing on the preserved grassland 
becomes unavoidable. For instance, 95 percent of the informants acknowledged that 
they knew what was happening, but did not know how to deal with it. The rest simply 
did not believe that they themselves should be blamed. Above all, they saw livestock 
husbandry as a better way to fight poverty than other practices such as vegetable 
farming. And when they saw the immediate benefits from it, they did not care about 
the  grassland  anymore.  This  may  also  explain  the  dilemma  of  grassland 
management  due  to  the  fuzziness  of  the  heterogeneous  and  hybrid  property 
relations, where village collectives and even local governments have more power to 
determine  land  uses  than  the  peasants,  and  where  lines  of  responsibility  of 
grassland management are not clearly demarcated among different state and non-
state actors (see Yeh, 2004). 
 
When grassland preservation programmes aimed at sustainable use of the land are 
not coupled with appropriate poverty alleviation strategies, they are doomed to fail. 
Furthermore, no community-based land management models based on household 
tenure are found (see Banks et al, 2003). In the case of Guyuan, grazing remains as 
the most profitable means of livelihoods for the majority poor, as they cannot rely 
upon  farmland  production  due  to  environmental  and  economic  constraints.  They 
showed discontent over the county government’s grassland reclamation policy which 
caused an increase in poverty and rising social conflicts in the village (Xinhua Net, 
2006). Their views on and participation in grassland use and management have not 
been at the top of the development agenda of the local government. As a result, their 
pursuit  of  economic  returns  from  grazing  on  the  supposedly  publicly-preserved 
grassland reflects the reality where no one cares for the land as no one is really 
responsible for it (see Hinton, 1990; Yeh, 2004). 
 
Furthermore, poor grassland governance by the local government has had a direct 
impact on the perceptions of the peasants regarding grassland use. The Ministry of 
Agriculture issued a circular to all levels of local governments across the country in 
2006 on its decision to penalize the misconduct of Guyuan local government staff   109 
and land contractors in grassland use.24 It was reported that the county government 
and a village committee had contracted the land owned by the government and 
village collective respectively to local businessman and peasants without transparent 
procedures made known to the local community. The latter group had no idea of how 
local government line agencies played a key role or were involved. This led to the 
conversion of large pieces of the grassland into other land usages. According to the 
2002 Grassland Law of China, land contractors must maintain the original status of 
the land. In the two reported cases they managed to cover up their purposes by 
stating that they wanted the land for eco-tourism development and would take care 
of  the  land  without  changing  its  uses.  Only  at  a  very  late  stage  did  the  local 
community find out that they had changed large plots of land into cropland and 
fenced this part of the land off from the rest of the community. In fact, the two 
contractors  even  got  the  land  before  the  local  bureaus  formally  approved  their 
applications.  This  incurred  the  anger  of  the  local  community  and  the  central 
government, given the harm done to the integrity of the grassland law and policy 
(Ministry  of  Agriculture,  2006).  This  means  that  the  current  tenure  system  has 
favoured the powerful groups in their use of the land for their own benefits. 
 
4.2  Forest preservation 
The county government has made the forest a fundamental natural resource to be 
preserved and to be free from illegal logging. Tree plantation and preservation are 
regarded  as  crucial  to  ecological  restoration.  The  county  government  has 
established forest protection teams for each township to prevent illegal logging. To a 
large extent, their measures have been effective. But the peasants are not offered 
strong incentives in any of the forest programmes. For instance, the most prominent 
land conversion or “green for grain” programme aimed at dramatically increasing 
forest coverage to combat soil erosion and flooding25, as in the other parts of the 
country, has proved to be unsuccessful due to many factors. For this county, the 
main factor is a lack of linkages between tree plantating and direct benefits from it. 
For  instance,  peasants  received  only  RMB160  annually  per  mu  of  their  land 
converted to forest land. And this included both compensation and a subsidy from 
                                                 
24 According to the Grassland Monitoring and Supervision Centre of the Ministry of Agriculture, this 
circular sends a clear message to corrupt officials involved that the Grassland Law must be upheld. 
For the details of the cases, see 
http://www.grassland.gov.cn/grasslandweb/Article/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=103 
 
25 Officially started in 2002, this programme has been the largest programme in the Chinese 
ecological protection history that covered 25 provinces, 1,897 counties and 97 million peasants 
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the local government. They thought that this amount was just too little to maintain 
their livelihoods when their land was devoted to forests. Given the climatic conditions 
in the region, it takes approximately 15 years for the trees to grow. Also, the planted 
trees had not been well cared for, and some even died off a few years later. In the 
end, this programme was suspended. Furthermore, as reflected by the local bureau 
staff26, peasants’ lack of ownership over the trees put the sustainability of the forest 
programme at risk. This also applies to those trees under the direct management of 
the village collective. Obviously, balancing the interests of state and peasants in this 
sector poses a difficult challenge to decision-makers (see Strauss, 2009). 
 
To address disincentives and to encourage the peasants to take an interest in the 
forest land, the local forestry bureau follows the example of the collective forestry 
tenure reform in southern China, where cases of success are documented.27 In fact, 
the reform initiative adopted elsewhere was taken up by the State Council, which 
promulgated  the  2008  Opinions  on  Compressive  Collective  Forest  Land  Tenure 
Reform.  Essentially,  this  policy  is  to  emulate  the  HRS  in  the  management  of 
collective forestry land and peasants’ ownership of wood across the country. It is 
seen as a major measure to boost the enthusiasm of the peasants, increase their 
incomes  and  make  forestry  sustainable.  It  stipulates  that  production  and 
management of forestry should be entrusted to peasants by issuing extendable 70-
year forest land use contracts, while the nature of collective ownership should be 
maintained. Furthermore, it calls for ensuring equal access to peasants’ forestry land 
rights and guaranteeing their rights to know and participate in any decision-making 
process  affecting  their  land  rights.  Peasants  are  allowed  to  transfer,  lease  or 
mortgage the forest land use rights within the tenure period. To facilitate this, local 
government  is  asked  to  extend  financial  institutional  services  to  the  needy  and 
establish forestry insurance to protect the peasants from natural disasters. The 2008 
reform  also  makes  an  explicit  call  for  strengthening  public  services  to  support 
forestry  cooperatives  and  enterprises,  which  can  play  a  leading  role  in  forest 
management and production to promote economies of scale. This reform is set to be 
completed over a 5-year period, during which forest land rights certificates should be 
issued to the individual households based on the registration of their contracted 
forest land (Government of China, 2008; Xinhua News Agency, 2008). However, this 
decree does not differ from other laws on the issue of the abuse of power by the 
village  collective  as  the  latter  retains  the  most  power  in  decision  making.  What 
                                                 
26 Interview in July 2008. 
27 Since 2003, collective forestry reform had been piloted in Fujian, Jiangxi, Liaoning and Zhejiang 
provinces. China has 2.55 billion mu of forest land (equivalent to 60 percent of the country’s total) 
under collective ownership with more than half of the population living in these areas (Xinhua News 
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mechanisms  should  be  established  to  empower  the  peasants  to  keep  the  local 
cadres in check remain unclear. As a result, “the leadership of the rural collective, 
including the Party secretary, the village head and other village committee members, 
may co-operate and pursue personals interests as a collective” (Cai, 2003: 668). 
 
In fact, long before the promulgation of the above policy, the local bureau had tried to 
use similar measures to undertake collective forestry reform, but, with very limited 
success.  The  slogan  of  strengthening  individual  household  awareness  and 
ownership of management over the forest was used to rationalize the policy and to 
motivate the peasants. However, the latter did not perceive this as something new to 
their  livelihoods,  as  the  forest  had  already  been  under  the  management  of  the 
collective. Granting them with long-term use rights meant more obligations imposed 
on them, since the forest products are not as marketable as in the past. Moreover, 
as the deputy chief technician in the forestry bureau remarked,  
 
The collective forestry reform here cannot be compared with the South, where 
the peasants can simultaneously plant other economic crops with the forest. 
Here, the climate just does not allow this. That is why it is not attractive to the 
peasants. So, we may not be able to continue the reform later on.28  
 
This  remark  underscores  the  important  fact  that  the  inter-relationships  between 
forest tenure reform, poverty and environmental have not been addressed in an 
integrated manner by the county government. On the one hand, peasants’ poverty 
and  lack  of  economic  opportunities  derived  from  the  forest  land  have  caused 
overgrazing in the forest area and subsequently the degradation of the trees and 
land.  On  the  other  hand,  the  degraded  natural  conditions  further  constrain  the 
development of viable economic opportunities from forestry.  
 
Whilst the use rights for a large proportion of the collective forests were said to be 
granted to individual households, possession of use rights certificates was widely 
ignored by the peasants. How to divide and redistribute the collective forests to 
individual households is never an easy task for the local bureau. To a large extent, 
the  forest  land is  supposed  to  be  redistributed  to  the  peasants  on  the  basis  of 
equitable conditions in terms of the quality of the land and the number of household 
members. In cases where the land with poor quality cannot be redistributed easily, it 
should be done through lease, tender and auction to the needy. When this cannot be 
realized, it rests with the village collective. All these steps require sound planning 
and participation of the community in deciding on how the forest land can best be 
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used  and  managed.  Moreover,  the  peasants  need  to  know  whether  the  forests 
contracted to them are of economic value to them. Otherwise, they will lose interest 
in it (Bai, 2007). The lessons from this county and other regions indicate that in most 
cases, the local government only pays lip service to the concept of collective efforts 
(Miao & West, 2004). 
 
Furthermore, the lack of capacity of the bureau to control inappropriate forest land 
use overshadows its overall forestry reform agenda. Some staff blamed grazing as 
the number one threat to forestry and emphasized the need to put a complete stop to 
it by severely  penalizing  those responsible especially the households  with  a big 
number of livestock. This simply indicates the incompetence of other bureaus which 
are  ineffective  in  their  policy  implementations.  Obviously,  a  lack  of  coordination 
between  different  line  agencies  further  constrains  any  conceived  efforts  in 
sustainable forest land management. These factors are further compounded by the 
latest  reform  agenda  and  the  ongoing  process  of  forest  decentralization  (see 
Lampton, 1992; Lieberthal, 1992). 
 
In  short,  policies  of  grassland  and  forest  protection  and  utilization  have  further 
marginalized the role that agriculture plays in rural development, since the policies of 
these sectors have been mutually exclusive. The local peasants could only resort to 
short-term  gains  in  farming  and  utilization  of  the  grassland  and  forest  land, 
sometimes at the cost of these resources (Cui & Wang, 2006). A lack of coordination 
in land use planning and management contributes to the failure of the programmes 
in which the peasants are caught in a vortex of uncertainty regarding the changes in 
land use directly imposed by the government. The tenure reform in natural resource 
management  shows a simplistic  approach  to addressing  the  social,  political and 
economic  constraints.  Its  inducement  of  land  fragmentation  and  absent  peasant 
collective  action  further  contributes  to  the  lack  of  peasant  collective  solutions  to 
address poverty and improve natural resource governance (see Liu, 2003). 
 
5.  Farmland use, conflicting interests and peasant 
contestations 
 
5.1  Farmland for livelihoods 
Rural development for the local peasants is nothing more than the maximization of 
the utilization of the available resources in the pursuit of quick results in the reduction 
of poverty reduction. Their attachment to land, pasture, forests and other resources   113 
embodies their pragmatic attitudes towards their livelihoods. Yet, peasant relations 
have become less dynamic than the commune period in the 1960s and those found 
in traditional ethnic minority groups. With the market-oriented policies infiltrating their 
communities, individual interests override the mechanisms of collective choice and 
decision-making on the use of the resources for the benefit of all.  
The HRS has brought about frequent land subcontracting among the local peasants 
fuelled by rural-urban migration. Land subcontracting takes informal forms, because 
land  lease  agreements  are  unregistered  as  can  be  seen  in  other  transitional 
economies  (Sikor  et  al,  2009;  Verdery,  2003).  This  does  not  indicate  a  sound 
solution to poverty, since the amount of money transferred to the village by the 
migrants are minimal as the land rents collected. Moreover, what is common in land 
use is that the peasants reply heavily on vegetable growing as the most important 
source of income. This is found mostly in areas where soil conditions allow vegetable 
growing,  although  the  increasing  scarcity  of  water  is  becoming  a  problem.  The 
varieties of vegetables grown are limited across the county, and this unavoidably 
leads to competition over sales and marketing outlets. Only those households with 
relatively larger sizes of land manage to gain reasonable profits. However, this type 
of farming is seasonal, as winter temperatures can drop below -30 degrees Celsius. 
Thus, extensive farming is carried out in other seasons as well.  
 
Vegetable farming requires reasonable capital inputs in terms of time spent in the 
field, use of water, chemical fertilizers and seeds. Where there is a lack of technical 
and funding services provided by the local government, the growers are vulnerable 
to various natural and economic risks. Unpredictable natural disasters can cause 
damage  to  the  crop.  Due  to  a  lack  of  technical  knowledge  and  support  from 
agricultural extension services, the growers are incapable of effectively dealing with 
these risks. Since they have no other ways to sell their produce than relying on the 
middlemen from other provinces to collect it, quite often they are in a weak position 
to bargain over the prices offered.  
 
With the introduction of the HRS, random growing of cash crops such as vegetables 
for the peasants to gain high economic returns has replaced traditional cropping to a 
large  extent;  as  a  result,  grain  production  has  reduced  substantially.  In  China, 
between 1995 and 2001, the production of vegetables nearly doubled (Lichtenberg & 
Ding, 2008). Although the HRS has stimulated agriculture and promoted peasants’ 
incentives  in  and  choice  over  farming,  in  Guyuan,  farmland  fragmentation  has 
reduced the efficiency of farming. Vegetable farming as carried out by the peasants 
is akin to “digging the soil and land without caring about the kind of resources they 
will leave for the future” (Hu, 1997; Zen, 1991: 79). 
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Village life presently is unlike that in the past when unity and mutual help played an 
essential role in organizing the peasants, which is partly due to fragmented land 
relations. “Everyone is helping himself. We do not know about the future—we just try 
to  make  ends  meet  anyway.  Nobody  will  help  us”,  as  some  peasants  claimed. 
Similar remarks were also made by the local government staff.29 Despite the HRS’s 
partial success in poverty reduction, it displays an increasing weakness in uniting the 
poor as land becomes fragmented. The peasants have less space for the social 
organization  of  agricultural  production.  And  when  the  village  collective  mostly 
represents the interests of the local state, the role of the peasants in voicing their 
concerns over land use and agricultural development becomes minimal. As a result, 
land is nothing but a means of livelihoods for the peasants. All the informants agreed 
that they were not sure whether the land belonged to them. When their land use 
contracts expire in around 30 years, they are worried that their land rights will be 
altered  by  the  local  government.  Facing  uncertainty  over  land  use  and  other 
associated rights and a lack of support from all sectors of society, many viewed the 
Chinese peasantry as the most vulnerable group in the country.30 
 
5.2  Conflicting interests in farmland use 
Fragmented farmland use embodies complex peasant-local state relations as both 
have different or even conflicting interests in the land. As the value of the land 
increases with the local government gaining increasing control over it, local peasants 
see their land as their last resort to maintain their way of life and exert power over 
the predominance of the local state. 
 
The national policy on farmland protection places strict conditions on farmland use 
and  prohibits  its  conversion  into  non-agricultural  uses.  Accordingly,  the  local 
government set the mandates for the village collective to demolish all the buildings 
such as pigpens in the field. And peasants’ ignorance of this call would lead to forced 
demolition of their property. However, when the peasants built their houses years 
ago, they were not informed of whether it would contravene any government policies. 
In fact, their ideas were even approved by the village collective. As these households 
are small in scale and only occupy the tiny plots unsuitable for cropping, they simply 
did not understand the rationale of this policy. Seeking the support of the village 
committees was futile. As many of them are women, children and the elderly left 
behind in the village, they could not form a unified force against land evictions. They 
                                                 
29 Interviews in July 2008. 
30 Interviews with local peasants representing different ages, gender and occupational groups in 
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also knew that the peasants’ weakness had led to the eviction of many of them as 
new land development takes place on a regular basis.31 
 
Land use planning and management has never been an easy task for the local 
government which has been under mounting pressure to both preserve and utilize 
the land to promote economic development. The county does not have any foreign 
companies operating in it at the moment. To attract business development, when 
conditions  allow,  the  local  government  must  provide  the  necessary  basic 
infrastructure, and this requires a huge amount of funds to be put aside. However, 
this is extremely difficult for a nationally-designated poor county like Guyuan. In the 
end, the acquisition and consolidation of land has become a necessity in favour of 
corporations  and  real estate developers.  The  local government  has encountered 
increasing difficulty in reaching agreements with the peasants. 
 
The county government line agencies are trapped on the path towards economies of 
scale  in  agricultural  production,  making  the  maximization  of  land  use  and  land 
acquisition unavoidably difficult for them. They all seemed to agree that the county 
had no other options but to introduce the “dragon head” type of agribusiness (longtou 
qiye) to take the lead in organizing scaled production. They bluntly complained about 
the  peasants’  backwardness  of  ideas,  knowledge  and  skills  in  adjusting  to  the 
demands of the market economy. However, for the peasants, the lack of secure land 
rights  and  the  mechanisms  for  transparent  and  effective  partnership  with 
agribusinesses could only make them cast doubt on every arrangement concerning 
the use of their land, grassland and forests and so forth. As the local government 
has  the  mandate  to  push  further  ahead  economic  development,  its  conflicting 
interests with the peasants can only increase indefinitely.  
 
The dilemma for sustainable rural development may indicate the need to reorganize 
the peasants who can collectively decide on how their land and other resources can 
be used properly. This is also a prerequisite for the healthy growth of agribusinesses. 
Like those pilot schemes taking place in southern China, the county line agencies 
staff pointed out that they should allow the peasants to become land shareholders 
and benefit from agribusinesses.32 Thus, the village collective should play a bigger 
role  in  uniting  the  peasants  and  assuring  them  better  economic  returns  on 
agricultural  production.  Ultimately,  this  requires  the  establishment  of  specialized 
                                                 
31 Interviews with local peasant households in July 2008. 
32 However, shareholding cooperatives have their limitations, since the mechanisms for mutual 
supervision and self-restraints are often inadequate, representation of the vulnerable poor is not 
strong, and the interests of capital may predominate (see Clegg, 1998: 81). More discussions are 
seen in Chapter 5.   116 
business-oriented  peasant  associations.  However,  the  current  policy  on  these 
organizations  requires  a  substantial  amount  of  capital  to  be  registered,  and  this 
would simply mean that for the poor peasants it is impossible. Moreover, the rural 
societal structure is fragmented and it is extremely difficult to bring the peasants 
together. This also demonstrates the failure of the village collective and government 
policy in revitalizing the social and political dynamics of the Chinese countryside 
since the market reform of the late 1970s. Nearly 50 percent of the local government 
staff held the view that the trend of the rural economic reform should reverse the 
HRS into genuine collective land use and management. And this was thought to be a 
way to revitalize the Chinese countryside and help the peasants cope with their 
vulnerabilities to various social, political, economic and natural risks associated with 
land use. However, how to convince the peasants and give them an incentive to form 
relevant  agribusiness  groups  or  associations  remains  a  challenge  for  the  local 
government.  The  mounting  conflicting  interests  and  disputes  between  different 
actors further compound the fragmented social and political structures. 
 
5.3  Peasants’ contestations of farmland use 
The scale of peasants’ self-organization of economic, social and political activities is 
rather limited due to the institutional constraints as already mentioned. But they are 
not  passive  recipients  of  government  laws  and  policies.  Changes  in  the  central 
government policy that favours agriculture, on the one hand, have created more 
incentives for the peasants to care about their land; on the other hand, they also spur 
local conflicts. Land-induced conflicts between the peasants and local cadres have 
become the most serious matter for the local state to handle. The tension between 
peasants and local cardres over land use is mainly due to contestations of land 
rights between return migrants and current users. Village collectives and township 
governments are often accused of purposely reallocating the land when the original 
legal users migrate to the cities. In this case, Guyuan resembles the rest of the 
country, where large numbers of impoverished rural people have become migrants 
as part of the “floating population” of 200 million to seek temporary work in cities 
(Solinger, 2002; Zhang, 2001; Muldavin, 2006: 2). To the township government, the 
land left by these migrants should be redistributed to accommodate the needs of 
other  groups.  Paradoxically,  this  act  is  no  longer  permitted  by  law  that  aims  to 
ensure land tenure security and explicitly calls for an end to land readjustments.33 As 
one member of the local township government staff remarked,  
                                                 
33 Article 27 of the 2002 Rural Land Contracting Law states that land adjustment is prohibited 
during the contract period. Even so, Article 28 states that land adjustment should be done on the 
land returned by the contracted households to accommodate newly increased households. Thus, it   117 
 
The current land law and policy do not really take into account the local 
conditions  seriously.  And  it  is  sometimes  contradictory  in  terms.  For 
instance, it enshrines women’s land rights. But if land readjustments are not 
allowed, how can we give land to the women who marry men in our villages? 
Besides  this,  the  recent  favourable  agricultural  policies  have  actually 
extended the invitation to the migrants who want to come back to farm. 
When they migrated to cities, they left their land idle and let us manage it. 
We then leased it to others who could farm the land. How can we return this 
land to them when it is in others’ hands? Their discontent with us has led to 
skyrocketing cases of petitions, but we find it hard to meet their demands.34 
 
These conflicts do not indicate that the local peasants have more systemic concerns 
over how their land can best be utilized from a sustainable development perspective. 
Yet  these  conflicts  show  the  peasants’  growing  concerns  about  their  rights, 
livelihoods  and  ineffective  policies  in  the  context  of  widening  social  inequality 
between different groups. As a result, land readjustments may privilege some while 
marginalizing others due to the practice of personalism, clientelism and networking 
tactics carried out by the dominant group (see Nonini, 2008). Moreover, peasants’ 
struggles for land use are sporadic and seldom organized systematically in terms of 
the  creation  of  unions  and  associations  that  can  maximize  their  influence  and 
collective force. This may indicate that the current HRS is inextricably linked to this, 
with its nature of fragmentation of agricultural production as well as social cohesion. 
Paradoxically, 90 percent of the interviewees indicated that they would keep the 
HRS rather than return to the village collective, as they did not trust the latter. The 
rest either preferred the old commune system or simply had no preferences. But they 
all thought that development policies and laws concerning their land rights should be 
strengthened.  Some  even  expressed  their  inclination  towards  land  privatization, 
which would ideally enshrine more secure rights for the peasants. But all of them 
expressed  their  concerns  about  the  absence  of  viable  property  relations  for 
sustainable land use and management and the alleviation of poverty as a whole.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
leaves space for ambiguous local interpretation, as it is hard to tell which land belongs to the 
returned migrants. Land reallocation are sometimes made after the original users leave the land for 
the cities. For the local government, it is their responsibility to manage the land when it is not used 
by the peasants. 
34 Interview in July 2008.  
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6.  Conclusions 
 
This study indicates that the conventional individualistic approach to land and natural 
resource  tenure  has  not  brought  about  viable  solutions  to  address  the  complex 
issues surrounding rural poverty. Relying on market-oriented development models, 
China’s  economic  success  has  incurred  severe  social  and  environmental  costs 
(Muldavin, 2006). To a certain extent, the replacement of the collective institution 
such as commune has exacerbated its developmental dilemma. The serious flaws of 
this approach and the rhetoric of development policies are not responsive to local 
social, political and economic realities (Gupta, 1998). One can hardly see what social 
constructs  local  communities  create  and  how  they  are  embedded  in  their  daily 
struggles for livelihoods. But it can be seen that the current land tenure system sets 
limits on the choice of the peasant collective and its power over natural resource 
management. In practice, collective land ownership by law entails ownership by a 
few powerful village members and the local state, whilst use rights are allocated to 
individual peasant users. 
 
Critical studies of development have, to a large extent, focused on the discourse of 
development in reference to the reality of local communities (Escobar, 1991). This 
case study shows, however, that the discourses of development as interpreted by 
different  stakeholders  do  not  stand  in  great  contrast  to  each  other,  and  all 
stakeholders  expressed  their  pragmatic  views  of  poverty,  development  and  the 
environment.  When  individual  land  tenure  is  prominent,  it  is  hard  to  posit  any 
alternatives that may be more appropriate to the local conditions. For this reason, 
this study sheds light on the analysis of institutional apparatus, the links to power 
and a critique of modernist or market-oriented constructs (Herzfeld, 2001). 
 
A lack of collective peasant action further undermines the effectiveness of relevant 
government laws and policies where local peasants’ traditional knowledge, culture 
and identity ought to be considered by policy-makers (Fairhead and Leach, 1996). 
The failure of the local community to come to terms with their preferred paths to 
development explains the dominance of the local state in policy making (Fairhead 
and  Leach,  2003).  This  study  casts  doubt  on  Durkheim’s  theory  of  collective 
consciousness that the individuals were only partly unique beings and to a large 
extent formed by the social values and ideas that they have internalized. They had 
the moral obligations to feel guilty if they do not conform to the majority (Durkheim, 
1933). His view seems more applicable to small-scale social groups in traditional 
societies rather than complex societies (Galanter, 1989). In a complex society such 
as this case study illustrates, it is hard to identify the collective consciousness as a 
determinating factor for collective action. Thus the understanding of individualism or   119 
absence of mutual help is important for the study of China’s land reform and its 
underlying social and political constructs.  
 
The  HRS  as  an  embodiment  of  modern  management  knowledge  has  been  a 
contributing factor for the fragmentation of social relations and is an example of the 
lack of responsibility of the local state in local development. The local state puts 
overt  emphasis  on  meeting  higher-level  state  demands  rather  than  serving  the 
community  needs  first  (Kung,  et  al,  2009; Christiansen  &  Zhang,  1998).  This  is 
reinforced by the HRS whereby communities are marginalized in land use planning 
and broader-level of village governance. In the context of rising social inequality 
across the country, it becomes more difficult for the state to organize the peasantry. 
The fact that some peasants support the HRS actually implies that they mistrust 
other possible measures imposed upon them by the state. In other words, they are 
not given the space to explore other better systems of land tenure by the state. 
 
The social fabric of the rural society is not simple. It is important to understand how 
mechanisms of power have been able to function within the society and between 
society and state in order to investigate the agents responsible for social constructs 
(Foucault, 1986). In this sense, this case study shows that although mechanisms for 
peasants’ collective action remain unclear and even weak, their daily struggles and 
resistance are omnipresent in their disorganized and silent contestations. However, 
their resistance is not “genuine” in the sense of being organized with clear motives 
and  goals  as  defined  by  Scott  (1985).  This  individually-based,  and  seemingly 
passive resistance to the land use institutions superimposed on them by the local 
state reveals the dilemma for sustainable rural development in China. The absence 
of  the  mechanisms for  genuine peasant  participation  in  policy-making  processes 
concerning their land use and governance remains unaddressed by policy-makers.  
 
Government  rural  reform  policies  have  not  produced  substantial  sustainable 
development  outcomes  but  have  brought  about  changing  relations  between  the 
peasants and states and among each group, as compared with the pre-reform era 
when the peasants were organized by the commune and collective power played a 
key role in organizing social and economic activities. The underlying state power has 
played an important role in undermining the collective power of the peasantry. This 
finding certainly stands in contrast to Kelliher (1992) and Zhou (1996), who argue 
that the peasants have been a strong and irresistible power to which the Chinese 
state  has  yielded.  In  fact,  “they  (the  peasants)  can  react  only  to  their  different 
realities, indifferent to and oblivious of the proclaimed policies of the state, and only 
occasionally respond to them if they intrude into the village reality, or they can bend 
or break the rules imposed from the outside” (Christiansen & Zhang, 1998: 1).    120 
Furthermore, as the relations between the peasants and the local state become 
more  murky  and  complex,  and  social  dynamics  among  different  social  groups 
become more intractable, the peasants have relied heavily upon their own networks 
such  as  kinship  ties  to  counter  the  harsh  realities  of  the  rural  marketplace  and 
natural endowment (Huang, 1992). How to revitalize the Chinese countryside by 
making the complex social, political and economic relationships work for the goal of 
sustainable land use and rural development remains an ultimate challenge for policy-
makers, who need to rethink their current institutions governing farmland use and 
natural resource management. It is essential to tackle the structural barriers to law 
and policy-making mechanisms  that put constraints  on  the  representation  of  the 
peasants  whose  need  to  participate  in  the  process  should  be  nurtured  and 
empowered (Cai, 2003; Li, et al, 2004). A new form of land tenure that caters for the 
local economic, environmental, political and social situations should be explored and 
tested by policy-makers. The case of HRS in this chapter is representative of the 
vast Chinese rural areas where agriculture remains a basic form of economy that is 
constrained  by  those  institutional  factors  for  sustainable  land  use  and  poverty 
alleviation.  
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Chapter 5  Land shareholding cooperatives for 
scaled development: an economic fix 
or marginalization of the poor? 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
This chapter presents an analytical account of the so-called institutional innovation in 
China’s  land  tenure  reform  characterized  by  the  land  shareholding  cooperatives 
described in chapter 4. This institutional experimentation is aimed at addressing the 
fundamental constraints on scaled agricultural production and the marketability of 
rural land, which is seen as a last resort to resolve the issue of land fragmentation 
and facilitate integrated rural-urban development. Many cases demonstrate that the 
positive outcomes are minimal, as these organizations mainly serve the interests of 
the  village  leaders,  businesses  and  local  states  rather  than  the  peasantry.  This 
chapter critically examines the key policy developments and cases of local practices 
and discusses land tenure structure and village governance issues to unravel their 
inextricable links. It also presents the major debates on land tenure reform. It ends 
by  arguing  for  more  inclusive  approaches  to  address  peasant  shareholders’ 
incentives and participation in land governance processes as well as the urgency to 
improve village governance. Failure to do so will lead to further degradation of the 
livelihoods of the poor, no matter whether land in vast rural areas is privatized or 
remains collectivized.  
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
China’s  land  reform  is  at  a  crossroads  where  drastic  institutional  changes  are 
needed to incorporate local communities into land use and management regimes. 
Existing  institutions  have  provided  ineffective  mechanisms  for  peasant-centred 
decision-making processes,  which is  essential to  the identification of  appropriate 
forms of land tenure arrangements—critical for a win-win strategy for all stakeholders. 
The Household Responsibility System (HRS) is seen as a stumbling block to the 
realization of economies of scale due to its nature of farmland fragmentation. As   128 
smallholders lack adequate access to inputs, technology, information and markets, 
their produce can hardly meet the demands of final consumers (Hu et al., 2007).  
 
In parallel with the HRS, since 1980s, country-wide grass-roots experimentation in 
land use and management is exemplary of the increasing role of collectivization in 
community-land relations as seen in the burgeoning land shareholding cooperatives 
especially in the relatively developed eastern and southern regions. This is led by the 
entrenched market reform in the countryside, where land value has been on the rise. 
In this system, through contracts or agreements made between peasant households 
and the village administrative committee, the peasant households actually transfer 
their  land  use  rights  to  the  village  administrative  committee  that  is  in  charge  of 
improving land use, and in particular, deriving more benefits from the land. As such, 
the  peasant  households  become  land  shareholders  in  the  village  administrative 
committee’s  businesses  which  are  managed  on  behalf  of  the  shareholders  and 
guided by the assumption that the appropriate scale of land operation utilized (Sun, 
2008). Thus, from the very beginning, this institution bears the characteristics of the 
dominating presence of the local state and village collectives.  
 
Land shareholding cooperatives have been promoted as an innovative fix to radically 
achieve  optimal  land  use,  scaled  agricultural  production,  rural  development  and 
collective  decision-making.  Despite  the  fact  that  they  have  had  some  positive 
impacts on land use and peasant livelihoods, one cannot overestimate their roles in 
promoting  rapid  agricultural  development  without  taking  account  of  the  complex 
linkages of land and village governance, which are essential to the sustainability of 
this  institution.  The  reason  for  a  lack  of  built-in  mechanisms  for  community 
participation in the Chinese countryside in particular clearly resonates with the slow 
progress  made  in  village  democratic  governance,  as  a  precondition  for  properly 
functioning  cooperatives.  These  cooperatives  are  interwoven  with  the  complex 
relationships between the people and the state, the particularities of a centralized 
system of governance, and the burden of a history underpinned by collective action 
and  mobilization  (Plummer,  2004).  However,  Plummer  does  not  suggest  that 
collectivized  governance  is  a  hindrance  to  village  democracy.  Rather,  state-
dominated  collectives  actually  obstruct  peasant  power  and  choice  over  village 
governance. Moreover, the embeddings of institutions, that is, informal rules of the 
game, customs, traditions, norms and even religion further complicate the formal 
institutions such as bureaucracy, policy and the judiciary (Williamson, 2000). The 
issue remains as to whose collective it is. As a result, China’s land reform has 
perpetuated a form of state domination that puts the vulnerable poor in the margins 
of  policy,  law  and  the  rural  development  reality.  Although  land  shareholding 
cooperatives have received a major policy boost as the market reform sets in further,   129 
they are far from effective and hardly resemble pro-poor institutions for sustainable 
rural development.  
 
Land shareholding cooperatives are political in nature and ideologically earmarked 
as the last means of striking a balance between socialism and capitalism, or land 
nationalization and privatization. In other words, they embody the so-called unique 
feature  of  Chinese  economy  and  society,  that  is,  socialism  with  Chinese 
characteristics. On the one hand, they facilitate the establishment of land markets 
characterized by local state domination in land transfers. On the other hand, they 
pool  the  land  resources  of  individual  households  together  under  cooperative 
operation and management, which exhibits the socialist feature of collective action. 
In this way, they are inherently ambiguous in terms of the roles and responsibilities 
of the state, the village collective, corporations and peasant shareholders. It is this 
ambiguity that facilitates the development of the quasi-land market, which serves the 
state’s interest to exert sufficient control over the cooperatives. Although relevant 
laws  and  policies  seem  to  promote  greater  autonomy  of  these  organizations, 
peasant shareholders’ rights are not automatically improved due to the unbalanced 
power  of  different  stakeholders.  This  means  that  the  actual  effects  of  these 
organizations on sustainable rural development are far from certain. 
 
Policy-makers see the land shareholding cooperatives as a compromised system 
that combines the mechanisms of both land nationalization and privatization. Yet, as 
already mentioned, this system can only complicate the existing ambiguous land 
tenure structure. In this sense, the institutional ambiguity of land collective ownership 
has served the purpose of this arrangement. This seems to contradict the theory of 
property rights that deems collective landownership as one that inhibits agricultural 
modernization (see Kung, 2003). By a similar token, many scholars perceive the 
abuse of power by the village administrative committee and higher-level government 
in controlling land operation and governance as a threat to the ongoing reform (Xu, 
1998; Cai, 2003; Ho, 2001; Guo, 2001). Addressing this issue is never an easy task 
in view of the multi-functional nature of land tenure interwoven with complex social, 
political and economic relations. Although market reform is inextricably linked with 
clarified and strengthened individual property rights, this does not necessarily mean 
that collective action or collectively defined property rights is irrelevant. Therefore, 
land shareholding system is not inherently unworkable if it is based on the free will of 
the peasant shareholders. Essentially, it is all about how it serves the interests of the 
poor  whose  land  ought  to  be  utilized  and  managed  optimally  so  as  to  achieve 
sustainable development. 
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This chapter demonstrates that China’s land issues are not solely contingent upon 
who owns what, but more about who decides on what. What matters is governance, 
which  ought  to  give  full  play  to  peasant  participation.  Peasant  participation  in 
sustainable land use and management can only be meaningful if it is coupled with 
village  democratization.  Without  empowering  the  poor  in  land  shareholding 
arrangements,  farmland  loss  and  poverty  can  even  be  exacerbated  by  the 
cooperatives.  The  chapter  aims  to  shed  light  on  the  implications  for  institutional 
change for sustainable land use and management and village democratization. By 
so doing, it intends to reveal the complex constraints to China’s land reform as well 
as sustainable rural development that hinges upon village democratization which is 
still struggling to become an effective institution that can leverage community support 
for  land  reform.  This  chapter  also  links  village  democratization  with  the  broader 
issues  of  poverty,  constraints  to  land  use  and  management  and  the  need  for 
innovation  in  institutional  design  that  collectively  reflect  the  Chinese  reality—
increasing demand for land, decreasing available land and the need for appropriate 
institutional changes. 
 
This chapter provides a critical lens for the study of land institutional change by 
focusing on the interactions of market forces, land tenure arrangement and their 
effects on sustainable land use and village democratization. It investigates the key 
challenges for peasants’ self-initiated reform patterns, which are crucial for both the 
market economy and peasants’ sustained livelihoods that largely depend on how 
land is governed. It further sheds light on the role of the state in coming to terms with 
these challenges. 
 
2.  Policy developments for land commercialization 
 
2.1  Rationale and policy environment 
China’s  land  law  and  policy  developments  have  been  oriented  towards  land 
commercialization as the market value of land drastically increased in the reform era. 
However, land remains the property of the state and rural collective and its sale is 
forbidden.  Only  under  state  requisition  can  the  farmland  be  converted  into  non-
agricultural purposes.35 According to the 2004 Land Management Act, any plans for 
such  a  conversion  must  undergo  a  government’s  approval  process.  But  this 
stipulation excludes the cases where rural collective land can be legally acquired for 
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the development of village enterprises, housing and infrastructure. This provides the 
local government and village collective with ample space for direct manipulation of 
land use. Although there is no formal rural land market, in regions where there is a 
high demand for land, the village collectives developed various tactics to transfer or 
lease the collective land to outsiders for non-agricultural use in the informal market. 
In  fact,  land  shareholding  cooperatives  facilitate  this  informal  land  market.  To  a 
certain  extent,  a  land  shareholding  cooperative  is  the  invention  of  the  alliance 
between business enterprises, local governments and village collectives to sidestep 
the  existing legal and policy  barriers that inhibits the formation of a formal land 
market.  In  serving  the  economic  needs  of  this  alliance,  it  is  an  institutional 
experiment in the redefinition of rural property relations in terms of strengthening 
individual  household  shareholders’  rights  in  the  cooperatives.  It  is  seen  as  an 
individualized approach to the improvement of the system of rural land collective 
ownership. This form of ownership is often viewed as ambiguous and a cause of 
land conflicts and corruption in the course of land expropriation.  
 
Through the shareholding cooperatives the village collectives and local state can 
relatively easily lease land to businesses. These businesses normally bypass the 
individual peasant households and directly engage the village collectives and local 
government, which are assumed to be able to strike a deal with the peasants. Land 
shareholding  arrangements  facilitate  this  process  because  they  carry  the  village 
collective entity. In the name of granting the shareholders more equitable economic 
benefits accrued from such arrangements, village collectives often use shareholding 
as  a  better  excuse  to  acquire  land.  In  this  way,  an  informal  market  is  created, 
whereby land prices and economic compensation paid to the affected households 
are dictated by little peasant participation. In fact, many local governments have 
legalized it to facilitate urbanization and industrialization. For instance, in Dongguan, 
Guangdong Province, in  2004  the local  government  drew  up  a strategic plan  to 
complete rural shareholding reform in three years and transform all peasants into 
urbanites within five years. In Kunshan, Jiangsu Province, by 2004, 142 cooperatives 
accounting for one-tenth of the province’s rural population were established with 
each household receiving at least 10 per cent of the value of their shares (Po, 2008: 
1615).  
 
Rapid development of the land shareholding cooperatives stems from the central 
government’s push  for economic  reform dating  back to  the  early 1980s. Certain 
regions were targeted as demonstration pilots for market-oriented economic reform. 
Recently,  the  central  government  designated  Chongqing  Municipality  as  a 
demonstration pilot for integrated rural-urban development. Rural land is central to 
the integrated approach and it is assumed that rural land transfers would facilitate   132 
optimal land use for the purpose of scaled modern agricultural production. As such, 
peasants  are  allowed  to  exchange  their  land  contractual  rights  for  shares  in 
specialized peasant cooperatives (Hu, 2009). 
 
The  central  government  has  conceded  considerable  flexibility  to  the  local 
governments to experiment with innovative practices in rural and urban development. 
Given their geographical advantages and economically preferential treatment by the 
central government, these regions have moved far ahead of the inner regions in 
economic  development.  Deng  Xiaoping’s  visit  to  Guangdong  Province  in  1992 
significantly boosted bolder economic reforms in the region, which set an example 
for the rest of the country. His visit complemented the government’s vision of modern 
specialized peasant collective organizations as the second step towards agricultural 
leapfrogging, with the HRS as the first step (Zhang & Donaldson, 2008). After Deng’s 
visit,  local  governments  felt  the  urgency  to  drastically  accelerate  economic 
development on large scale in the pursuit of growth at all costs. As a result, large 
tracts of farmland were taken from the peasants for many purposes, among which 
included agricultural modernization (Zweig, 2000). Land shareholding cooperatives 
were created as a means to reorganize rural resources including land. To date, this 
system  is  seen  by  many  policy-makers  and  scholars  as  a  major  institutional 
innovation  that  significantly  improves  agricultural  commercialization  and 
competitiveness through the promotion of economies of scale in production, modern 
management and creating more incentives for the peasants to invest in their land. 
Turning  the  peasants into  land  shareholders  is  seen  as  a  major  reform  step  to 
guarantee  their  long-term  land  rights  to  reap  their  benefits  (Zhongguo  Nongye 
Xinxiwang, 2005). 
 
2.2  Policy gaps in defining land shareholders’ rights 
Local  practices  in  land  shareholding  cooperatives  have  gone  far  ahead  of  the 
promulgation  of  relevant  laws  and  policies  that  promote  and  facilitate  the 
development of the land market. Besides the developments in significant laws and 
policies  since  2007,  the  Ministry  of  Land  Resources  (MLR)’s  latest  policy  in 
November 2009 gives further attention to the issue of collective land rights. It calls 
for  the  continuation  of market-oriented land  tenure reform.  As  such, collectively- 
owned rural construction land is allowed to entre the land market.36 In particular, 
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Zhejiang Province has been chosen as a pilot region to carry out the promotion of 
rural collective construction land transfer. This act is seen as a major step towards 
equalization of rural and urban land rights, which means that rural land should be 
allowed  to  be  transferred  in  the  same  way  as  urban  land,  although  this  is  not 
equivalent  to  land  privatization.  It  is  expected  that  this  policy  would  provide 
favourable conditions for those who can invest in this sector to bring about improved 
land  use  efficiency  (MLR,  2009).  However,  such  an  innovation  does  not  mean 
anything new, since many regions especially those in eastern and southern China, 
have  already  piloted  this  practice.  Moreover,  land  transfers  in  the  form  of  land 
shareholding cooperatives have already taken shape throughout the country; and in 
many cases, this takes the form of business arrangements whereby peasants put 
their land to any type of land use such as real estate development in return for profit. 
In  other  cases,  their  land  is  reorganized  by  the  local  state  for  the  purpose  of 
collective farming aimed at enhancing large-scale agricultural production. So, this 
new  policy  is  seen  as  a  reaffirmation  of  the  unstoppable  trends  towards  land 
commercialization. 
 
According to Guo Shutian, the former director-general of the Policy, Institutional and 
Legal Reform Department of the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture, the land contractual 
use and operational rights are no longer vague, but landownership remains an empty 
shell. Opposing divergent views on land ownership—privatization, nationalization or 
perpetual land use rights, Guo is of the opinion that it is time to propose common 
landownership among peasants through land shareholding arrangements to ensure 
that they can decide on land use just as real landowners. This means that they 
should be encouraged to become shareholders and turn their shares into profits in 
local  enterprises.  By  doing  so,  it  is  envisaged  that  they  will  be  able  to  more 
effectively exercise their economic and political rights concerning their land. Thus, 
the land shareholding system is seen as a potentially efficient in safeguarding their 
rights and preventing their land from expropriation (Li, 2008). In fact, Guo’s viewpoint 
exactly conforms to the policy developments of the central government.  
 
To some, land titling is necessary for the clarification of land rights and provision of 
solutions to land-induced conflicts. To others, land institutional change can only be a 
protracted process in which societal choices and timing will ultimately determine 
what suits the peasantry the best (Ho, 2001 & 2005). This contention seems to imply 
the role that the market actually facilitates institutional change; and in the Chinese 
context, land use and management must cater for the needs of the market. In doing 
                                                                                                                                                 
construction land first before its transfer can take place. And the government must approve such a 
land use plan first.   134 
so, the Chinese peasants can become real owners of the land and have exclusive 
rights to their land and agricultural produce. Getting institutions right is taken as a 
prerequisite to  sound  land  management  (see  De  Soto,  2001).  Yet,  getting  what 
institutions  rights  remains  unaddressed  or  difficult  to  predict  or  prescribe.  The 
institution of the land shareholding cooperative has become the last resort for the 
Chinese  decision-makers.  Ironically,  the  ambiguous  nature  of  collective 
landownership pertaining to the land shareholding cooperatives in particular, if not 
handled properly, can lead to varying degrees of poor governance, conflicts and 
marginalization of the majority of the poor peasant shareholders.  
 
In fact, the cooperative system is nothing new to China. In the 1960s, the prevalent 
commune  system  was  even  a  higher-level  cooperative  organization  in  terms  of 
scaled  operation  across  villages  and  townships.  The  government  managed  to 
transform the majority of traditional marketing and supply organizations into the so-
called  modern  cooperatives.  However, these  hastily-established  institutions  failed 
because of gross inadequacies in the facilities, resources, skills and experience of 
the government, among many other factors (Skinner, 1965). What differentiates the 
commune from the current cooperative system is the organization of agricultural 
production. In the first system, the state and the commune played a dominant role, 
whereas individual households joined the commune as members, not shareholders. 
But in this sense, landownership and use rights were clearer than the current case. 
Although the current land shareholding system is based on the HRS which allows 
individual  households  to  own  land  shares,  it  may  exacerbate  the  ambiguity  of 
collective ownership of land. The roles of household shareholders in the governance 
of the cooperatives can be more difficult to define than in the case of the commune. 
Any neglect of this dimension in policy-making would lead to various issues of poor 
governance.  A  simple approach  to  land commercialization  would  not  necessarily 
help the poor. The following section describes the land shareholding system in brief 
and gives more attention to its institutional dimensions that concern this argument. 
 
3.  Local practices and critics 
3.1  Demonstration pilots 
Experimentation in the land shareholding cooperatives was started in major coastal 
regions. Zhejiang Province was chosen by the Ministry of Agriculture to pilot peasant 
specialized cooperative organizations in the 1990s. By 2004, the number of these 
organizations reached 554,000 and the total number of peasant households involved 
reached 2,029,500 (Hu et al., 2007: 444). In response to the government’s call for   135 
specialized  zoning  development  for  agriculture,  this  province  has  put  ample 
emphasis  on  developing  priority  enterprises  through  fostering  “specialized 
households, specialized villages, specialized townships and specialized markets”. 
Wenling City has pioneered these initiatives and become the so-called “hometown of 
oranges, sugar cane, water melons and grapes”. Grown in ecological demonstration 
sites,  these  cash  crops  are  perceived  to  be  crucial  to  scaled  agricultural 
development, as more and more specialized large households can acquire land with 
the  support  of  the  government  and  then  cultivate  these  crops.  Simply  put,  land 
transfer is greatly encouraged by the local government. It comes in varying forms 
and degrees, such as sub-contracting, leasing, shareholding, swapping and so forth. 
Land  transfer  service  centres  were  also  established  to  facilitate  land  transfer 
processes.  As  a  result,  currently  41.4  percent  of  the  contracted  farmland  has 
undergone  transfers.  And  25.5 percent  of  the farmland  has  been brought  under 
scaled production (Wenling City Agro-forestry Bureau, 2009). 
  
In the arrangements for land transfers, the households that lack skills, funds and 
access  to the market are encouraged to  transfer  their land  to  those  bigger-size 
households and enterprises which have various advantages over the former. To 
facilitate this process, some village administrative committees bundle the contracted 
farmland from the households and then unilaterally re-contract the land to the big 
households or enterprises. Those who lose their contracted land receive annual rent 
from  the  village  administrative  committee.  This  model  is  called  “reversed  sub-
contracting” (fanzu zhuanbao). Normally, this model is aimed at the formation of land 
shareholding cooperatives, where the households tender their land use rights for 
shares.  Yet,  this  has  never  been  an  easy  process,  since  many  peasants  are 
concerned about losing their rights completely after joining the cooperatives. A lack 
of secure rights further deters their incentives in becoming shareholders given the 
fact  that  many  households  in  China  do  not  own  certified  farmland  contracts. 
Moreover, great concerns about whether they would receive adequate compensation 
and social benefits for land transfers remain a major obstacle for the government 
(Zhu & Chen, 2008). 
 
Promoting the adoption of the industrial mode of development in scaled agricultural 
production by the “dragon-head enterprises” (longtou qiye), the local government 
assumed that this institutional arrangement would efficiently pool together economic, 
technical and market resources and overcome the disadvantages of the HRS. On 
the  assumption  that  these  enterprises  can  effectively  organize  the  fragmented 
peasant  households,  they  are  expected  to  play  a  leading  role  in  establishing 
agricultural  shareholding  cooperatives.  In  2006,  the  first  provincial-level  peasant 
specialized  cooperative  federation  was  established  to  help  the  local  agricultural   136 
economy  become  a  player  in  the  national  arena.  By  2007,  there  were  96 
cooperatives of varying forms and sizes (Wenling City Agro-forestry Bureau, 2009). 
  
In  the  early  1990s  Guangdong  Province  introduced  its  land  shareholding 
cooperatives even in remote poor areas. By 2008 almost 20% of the farmland had 
been transferred through means of sub-contracting, mortgaging and reversed sub-
contracting. The last mentioned was treated as an innovative arrangement for the 
purpose  of  consolidating  the  fragmented  land  for  scaled  farming.  These 
arrangements  paved  the  way  for  the  creation  of  the  land  shareholding  system 
(Dongfang Zaobao, 2008). Similarly, in Jiangsu province, till 2008 there were nearly 
12,000  peasant  specialized  cooperatives  of  all  kinds  involving  more  than  5,000 
households or 35 percent of the rural population. In particular, the experimentation in 
land shareholding cooperatives in Yangzhou City has been widely acclaimed as a 
major achievement in stabilizing and improving the current land use rights structure, 
enhancing  high  efficiency  in  large-scale  agricultural  production,  raising  peasants’ 
incomes and promoting the government’s latest development agenda—building the 
new  socialist  countryside.  The  advocates  of  this  model  are  hopeful  that  the 
functioning of  these organizations  will  speed  up  village  democracy,  since village 
politics will eventually be shaped by the three relatively independent institutions—
village party committee, village administrative committee and collective economic 
organizations. Such a model is regarded as an innovation that perpetuates social 
stability and boosts rural economic development (Li, 2008). 
 
3.2  The Nanhai Model 
A prominent case of land shareholding cooperatives is the Nanhai model, exemplary 
of many cases of land development supported by the central government. Nanhai 
district is under the jurisdiction of Fuoshan Municipality, Guangdong Province. Rural 
economic reform was started in 1987, when the State Council designated Nanhai as 
one  of  the  major  sites  for  reform  demonstration  pilots  in  large-scale  agricultural 
production whereby land transfer was permitted. At that time, the HRS had gradually 
become  a  major  constraint  on  organized  farming  due  to  its  nature  of  land 
fragmentation. Land size for the average household remained minimal. Coupled with 
structural  changes  in  agriculture  where  farming  was  no  longer  appealing  to  the 
peasants,  rural-urban  migration  was  phenomenal.  More  than  two-thirds  of  the 
peasants  sought  employment  in  cities  and  left  their  land  either  idle  or  semi-
unattended. Agricultural production had slowed down substantially and could not be 
boosted, because the peasants’ incentives were low and there was a shortage of 
labour. Initially, this reform turned out to be a failure, because many peasants had   137 
left their land to seek economic opportunities in urban areas. It was difficult to induce 
them to participate in the process (Wang & Xu, 1996).  
 
Rapid  urbanization  also  produced  a  high  demand  for  farmland.  In  turn,  land 
expropriation to facilitate urbanization caused mounting peasants’ discontent over 
inadequate  compensation  and  its  negative  impact  on  their  livelihoods.  Under  all 
these economic pressures, in 1986, the Nanhai government began to reform its 
agricultural sector. In fact, Nanhai was listed as one of few major comprehensive 
reform demonstration pilots in the country. To the Nanhai government, the reform 
was  nothing  more than  agricultural  modernization  through  land  concentration,  or 
outright land amalgamation. Basically, peasants’ entitlement to their contracted land 
had to be readjusted. Those peasants, to a large extent, the migrants who did not 
rely on land for their livelihoods were not allowed to keep the land. Even those who 
possessed land use rights certificates were asked to surrender their land to tender 
arrangements through which land was concentrated in the hands of the “mighty few”. 
The latter could be large-size households with more capital and skills in agricultural 
production,  or  those  small  businesses  that  had  vested  interests  in  the  land.  In 
essence, all the peasant households were encouraged to transfer or give up their 
land to others which were backed by the local government’s promise to provide 
social security such as subsistence and employment conditions. And large-scale 
land transfers were encouraged to make land available for mass production. Village 
administrative  committees  acted  as  administrative  units  of  the  cooperative 
responsible for converting the collective land and assets into land shares for non-
agricultural purposes such as building factories (Wang & Xu, 1996; Jiang & Liu, 
2004).   
 
Although this storm of land reform measures created favourable conditions for large-
scale  agricultural  production,  the  local  government  felt  that  it  had  not  met  their 
expectations. They believed that the speed of the land amalgamation process was 
still slow, which had not fundamentally changed the situation when small-scale and 
fragmented  farming  existed.  This  was  demonstrated  by  the  large  number  of 
peasants  who  wanted  to  remain  in  the  villages  for  farming.  With  rapid  rural 
population  growth, the average  size  of  households  declined substantially. At  the 
same time, peasants’ awareness of the increasing potential values also increased. 
Although they did not rely on their land to meet their subsistence needs, they were 
still inclined to hold on to their land for future use—increased land value for potential 
economic returns (Wang & Xu, 1996). 
 
When the local government started the second phase of the reform, it decided to 
create a peasant-centred institution to cope with their unwillingness to vacate the   138 
land. No longer believing in land privatization and nationalization, they decided to 
establish the so-called socialist cooperative economic institution, that is, peasant 
shareholding cooperatives. Contrary to the old commune system in the 1960s, this 
institution was aimed at scaling up agricultural production through reasonable land 
and farm labour transfers. On this basis comprehensive rural economic development 
could be realized. In 1992, a demonstration pilot was started to enable the peasants 
to become land shareholders by granting them economic and operational rights in 
different  shareholding  arrangements.  Then  the  local  government  managed  to 
consolidate and accumulate the fragmented land and put it to different uses such as 
the establishment of agricultural protection zones, industrial development zones and 
public  apartment  building  zones,  all  of  which  were  under  the  overall  planning, 
management and operation of the local government and businesses. By 1995, a 
total of 1,869 rural shareholding organizations had been established, 80% of which 
were at the village level (Zhao, 2007: 40).  It is important to note that the local state 
played a crucial role in initiating and managing the cooperatives. In most cases, 
these  cooperatives  were  transformed  into  agricultural  development  shareholding 
corporations under the control of the local state. The state, through its policy and 
funding support for the cooperatives, provided ample space for their development. 
As rural development required collective action, to a certain extent, the local state-
peasants-business alliance was important in overcoming many difficulties in farming 
and marketing of agricultural produce (Wang & Xu, 1996). In addition, being the 
holders of 50 percent of the cooperative shares, village collectives play an essential 
role  in  guaranteeing  public  service  delivery  and  social  welfare  provision  for  the 
village (Jiang & Liu, 2004). 
 
Generally, to enable the peasants to join the cooperatives, each peasant in Nanhai 
received an equal number of land shares. In some cases, other types of shares 
based  on  labour  contribution  and  land  use  period  were  also  created  to  further 
stimulate peasant incentives. Three different models were developed to cater for 
local circumstances in three townships. For instance, the Lihai model stipulated that 
the  peasants’  shareholding  rights  were  decided  by  the  land  and  other  assets 
contributed and could be transferred, mortgaged, inherited and given out as gifts 
within the organization. In contrast, the Guicheng and Pingzhou models did not allow 
for trading of shares except for inheritance purposes. But in all these models, the 
distribution of dividends was decided by the shareholders’ assembly, which was held 
regularly with the participation of the majority of the shareholders. All management 
information especially those related to financial management of the enterprises was 
supposed to be released to the shareholders who had the exclusive rights to judge 
whether there were issues related to lack of transparency, fairness and operational 
efficiency.  Around  40  percent  of  the  annual  revenues  were  distributed  to   139 
shareholders as dividends, whilst the other 60 percent was kept in the cooperative 
for public use and enterprise redevelopment. It is claimed that these institutional 
arrangements provided the peasants with the incentives to invest in their land, which 
was  useful  to  land  use  planning,  acquisition  and  peasant  land  rights  protection 
(Huang, 2005; Zhao, 2007). 
 
Despite the proclamations of success by the local government, the developmental 
effects  of  the  Nanhai  model  are  not  as  far-reaching  as  expected.  Due  to  the 
continuous  shortage  of  natural  resources  such  as  water  and  farmland,  how  to 
maximize the utilization of these resources to suit the need of development has 
posed a challenge for the local government. Moreover, agricultural development has 
been slow due to the lack of the so-called dragon-head agricultural enterprises which 
could have played a key role in mobilizing resources to realize economies of scale in 
production. This is further constrained by the weakness of the peasants in organizing 
themselves  to  join  more  effective  land  shareholding  cooperatives  (Nanhai 
Agricultural Bureau, 2007). According to the 2003 statistics, the average per capita 
revenue of shareholders was only RMB 1,180. Revenue distribution also proved to 
be unequal, contrary to the charters of the cooperatives. In south-eastern areas of 
the municipality where industrial enterprises were predominant, the average revenue 
per  capita  was  almost  ten  times  higher—RMB15,000  than  other  locations.  For 
instance, in western areas where agricultural enterprises (approximately 33 percent 
of  the  total  land  shareholding  cooperatives)  were  the  majority,  the  peasant 
shareholders had not received any of the profits distributed. Poverty continues to 
constrain  peasants’  livelihoods  aggravated  by  resource  shortage  and  depletion 
(Huang, 2005). 
 
3.3  Critics of the land shareholding cooperative system 
3.31  Land rights and governance 
These bold reform initiatives have received much criticism right from start. They are 
thought  to  fundamentally  contradict  the  merits  of  the  HRS,  since  they  actually 
capture the financial and democratic power of the peasants enshrined in their land 
away. The crux of the matter is that the reform measures have disempowered the 
poor shareholders rather than empowered them as originally designed and claimed 
(Kung,  2003).  Yet,  many  government  officials  believe  that the  initiatives  are  not 
aimed at changing the nature of the HRS and replacing it. Rather, they are the 
modification of the system that suits the trajectory of economic reform. The HRS is 
seen as a bottleneck to rapid rural economic development because it puts too many   140 
people on too little land, which can only obstruct China’s path to rural modernization 
and integrated rural-urban development. To the government, the cooperative system 
is an innovation that provides a paradigm shift to reforming the land rights structure. 
It enables the peasants to have more rights to their land by becoming shareholders 
with economic and de facto ownership rights. In practice, however, the role of this 
institution  in  agricultural  development  should  not  be  overstated,  as  agricultural 
development relies upon comprehensive support of the government which has to 
deal with structural limitations of agriculture, not the so-called scaled production. One 
of its major risks concerns the loss of land of the poor whose migration to cities can 
terminate the guarantee of land as a basic means of social security especially when 
their rights and access to social security are not provided in the cities (Hu, 2009). In 
essence, it is far from clear whether this institutional change can practically ensure 
good governance that safeguards the best interests of the peasant shareholders, as 
many cases of corruption illustrate the huge costs exacted on the poor.  
 
In  the  case  of  Nanhai,  the  views  of  many  local  officials  and  peasants  revealed 
perplexing  attitudes  towards  the  model.  The  local  officials  were  not  able  to 
differentiate it from the HRS, which does not pose a problem because it serves the 
interests  of  the  local  government  and  peasants.  By  contrast,  many  peasants 
complained about the frequency of government policy changes. When the HRS was 
implemented, the local government talked about its merits in safeguarding the long-
term  rights  and  interests  of  the  poor.  Then  they  confused  them  by  saying  how 
profitable the land shareholding system would be through scaled production. But the 
peasants showed their discontent over the fact that they had lost their land to the 
cooperatives,  whilst  under  the  HRS  at  least  they  had  some  land  to  meet  their 
subsistence needs. Once the land had gone, they worried that they would lose the 
safety  net  that  came  with  it,  because  their  benefits  from  the  cooperatives  were 
uncertain. They simply doubted that the cooperatives would be managed well by the 
leaders, most of whom were village party cadres themselves. They were unsure 
about  whether  the  land  should  be  distributed  to  individual  peasants  or  re-
collectivized in the hands of the so-called peasant-business-local state alliance, but 
they had to listen to what they were told from the top (Wang & Xu, 1996). 
 
The Nanhai government attributes the ineffectiveness of the agricultural reform to the 
incompleteness of the reform itself. Thus, its latest policy has focused on how to 
deepen the reform by continuing reorganization of rural economic institutions and 
creating more space for larger-scale agricultural development. As a consequence, 
more  profitable  sectors  such  as  vegetable  and  flower  growing  businesses  are 
targeted with a view to developing a modern urban agricultural sector. However, as 
these agribusinesses have huge demand for farmland, food security is put at risk.   141 
Although  the  local  government  seems  aware  of  this  fact  and  even  calls  for 
maintaining the current level of food supply, it realizes the need to open some land 
for these sectors. In particular, it encourages the dragon-head businesses to play a 
leading role in these developments by offering various preferential policies related to 
land, taxation, loans and so forth (Nanhai Agricultural Bureau, 2007). As large-scale 
agricultural  production  dominated  by  large  agribusinesses  have  pre-empted  the 
overall  development  thinking  of  these  decision-makers,  the  land  shareholding 
institutions are seen as effective means to trigger agricultural modernization. 
 
In addition, the inefficiency of the Nanhai model has been criticized for its inflexibility 
in allowing the peasants to trade their land rights freely in the market. As their land 
shares are administered at the village level, it is questionable whether the village 
administrative committee can be economically efficient in maximizing profits for their 
constituents. By contrast, other regions of China have tried to adapt the Nanhai 
model to deepen market-oriented mechanisms, among which is the experimentation 
on  complete  separation  of  peasants’  land  use  rights  from  the  village  collective 
landownership.  This  means  that  they  try  to  avoid  the  involvement  of  the  village 
administrative  committee  by  putting  more  emphasis  on  empowering  the 
shareholders in more direct land share management, as the village committee is 
often found to be corrupt in land governance. For instance, in Wanfeng Village, 
Baoshan District of Shenzhen Municipality, soon after the market reform was started, 
the local government realized that the HRS had its inherent shortcomings, one of 
which  was  the  difficulty  to  organize  their  production  and  participation  in  local 
administrative affairs. Farming efficiency was low, which was a major incubator of 
chronic  poverty.  Constrained  by  a  lack  of  revenue  from  agriculture,  the  local 
government could not deliver the social service as it was supposed to. All these 
factors prompted the local government to come up with a new slogan “building a 
socialist  industrial  village  through  common  property  ownership”.  In  essence,  this 
institution was about shareholding arrangements based on the land and production 
materials of the peasants. But it provided more mechanisms for building equity in 
terms of complete coverage of peasants who were free to choose their preferred 
means of investments in the shareholding corporation. Even for those who were 
unable to contribute in cash, the corporation covered their shares and allowed them 
to enjoy the benefits as shareholders. As a result, the shareholders had equal rights 
and opportunities concerning the development of the corporation, since they were 
considered to be the more genuine property owners of the cooperative corporation 
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3.32  Complex power relations and ineffective developmental outcomes 
In many cases, the organization of land shareholding cooperatives in China is based 
on informal institutions or peasant relations in the process of their development and 
operation. These rural social relations feature some kinship and market rules, which 
make governance of these organizations complicated. In many cases, membership 
is closed in the cooperatives despite the stipulation of the charter on the policy of 
“free entry and free exit”. Membership is carefully vetted by the leaders to ensure 
that  the  members  meet  physical  and  technical  requirements.  Sometimes,  the 
members are not allowed to leave when the cooperative is experiencing losses. 
Share purchase is extended to each member who has links with the cooperative 
leaders who act as their patrons. The numbers of shares one can purchase also 
depends  on  various  factors,  which  in turn  determine  the  shareholders’  power  in 
decision-making. In case of transfer of property rights, it can only be done within the 
cooperative, not outside it. And it is the board of directors that have the power to 
decide on such transfers. This means that the shareholders’ rights cannot be easily 
equated with sole ownership or exclusive personal rights. Thus, the ownership title is 
a hybrid form between individual and collective titles for Chinese-style cooperatives 
(Hu et al, 2007: 449). 
 
It  is  important  to  note  that  the  heterogeneity  of  the  cooperative  membership  is 
complex, since those with more shares have more decision-making power than the 
others. This means that the majority poor shareholders cannot exert much influence 
over  governance.  They  have  to  give  up  their  decision  rights  to  the  cooperative 
leaders—board  of  directors  most  of  whom  are  village  leaders  and  business 
enterprises representatives. These unequal relationships between contract peasants 
and companies or middlemen and so forth, disadvantage the peasants. For instance, 
the general director can be a large shareholder, whose share counts for even 20 
percent of all shares in some cases. As a result, the normal shareholders cannot 
decide  on  the  major  issues  of  cooperative  governance  even  if  they  attend  the 
assembly (Hu et al., 2007; Zhang & Donaldson, 2008). 
 
It  can  be  seen  that  land  shareholding  institutions  play  an  important  role  in 
reorganizing the Chinese peasantry in agricultural production and village industrial 
development. And it is noted that these institutions take full advantage of the market 
and business opportunities for peasant investments in their properties such as land. 
When this occurs, pure land farming gives way to agribusinesses and non-farming 
sectoral development, which involves high stakes for the shareholders to manage 
benefits  and  losses.  The  effects  on  poverty  alleviation  and  rural  sustainable 
development are far from clear due to a lack of in-depth studies. But it is obvious that   143 
these institutions, albeit successful to a certain extent, have not yielded benefits to 
the peasants as originally promised.  
 
To  a  large  extent,  the  economic  returns  to  the  peasants  are low.  Moreover,  as 
shareholders  it  also  means  loss  of  their  land  and  properties  to  businesses  and 
subsequently, loss of other economic opportunities. The real extent of loss is beyond 
the scope of this chapter. But these institutions reflect the fact that the Chinese 
peasantry especially in relatively developed regions has become more flexible in 
choosing the type of agricultural and rural development that suits their needs. To a 
large extent, it also explains the weakness of the current institutions, for instance, the 
HRS in organizing collective action to address the constraints to development. The 
local state actually continues to play an essential role in organizing the peasants to 
explore adapted  models of  development. This  further explains  the fact that  land 
reform aimed at enhancing individual’s rights does not conform with local reality 
where  the  village committee and  local  state can  determine  peasants’  rights and 
course of development. 
 
4.  Debates on land rights and implications for village 
governance 
 
Land  shareholding  cooperatives  require  the  transfer  of  land  rights  among 
households and between households and other shareholders such as enterprises 
and  local  states.  Quite  often,  these  transfers  involve  cases  of  infringement  of 
peasants’ rights, lack of legal stipulation on the protection of their rights, waste of 
resources  and  weak  oversight  of  cooperative  governance  (Lingdao  Juece  Xinxi, 
2005). The local state and village leaders play a major role in accountable and 
transparent management practices. As with other transition economies, China is no 
exception in the sense that state representatives may be unable to abstain from the 
use of power for private gains (Hoff & Stiglitz, 2004). According to Zhang (2009), the 
institution of the land shareholding cooperatives has little to do with the so-called 
private and collective landownership. Rather, it is all about transferring peasants’ 
land to large land shareholders. For the peasants, landlessness becomes the reality. 
In the case of rural-urban migration, they become pure migrant labourers, who do 
not enjoy the same social rights as urban citizens. In this context, it conceals the 
state use of political force to create a space for land expropriation for the large 
shareholders  or  local  elites.  It  would  be  unrealistic  to  think  that  the  peasant 
shareholders can fully enjoy their rights as shareholders, for their limited land shares 
mean minimal real rights in the cooperatives. Or simply put, the cooperative is an 
effective institution that exploits peasants’ land and their rights. Given the evidence   144 
of  land  loss  and  conflicts  arising  from  the  operation  of  these  organizations,  the 
government is trapped in its effort to transform the rural economy. This is inextricably 
linked with the process in which village democratization takes place in China. It is in 
this process that the rights of the peasants are being renegotiated and the struggles 
for power between the peasants and their leaders occur in silent and non-silent 
forms.  
 
The development of land shareholding cooperatives reveals a dilemma for China’s 
land reform and rural development underpinned by the transition to more market-
oriented institutions for the Chinese peasantry. On the one hand, the land laws and 
policies attempt to strengthen individual peasants’ rights such as the right to transfer 
land within the limits of collective landownership. On the other hand, local practice 
reveals that individual peasant  rights  are  not  necessarily  strengthened.  Although 
many of them have become land shareholders, this does not mean that they have 
the ultimate power to decide on how their land ought to be utilized, and how the 
benefits from the land can be distributed to them accordingly. Similar to the issue of 
the  village  collective,  questions  remain  as  to  who  exactly  represents  the 
cooperatives, how individual shareholders can exercise their rights, how they reap 
the benefits, and to what extent they can have their say in management. In the 
absence of shareholder participation, it is hard to tell how the cooperatives have 
served the best interests of the peasant shareholders. Lucrative deals can be made 
between village cadres and corporations in land management behind closed doors 
(Cai, 2003; Po,  2008).  Thus, one  naturally  questions the  usefulness  of  the land 
shareholding cooperatives and its implications for China’s goal of sustainable rural 
development. Again, the basic question is whether or not the peasants should be 
given their exclusive land titles which grant them the freedom to decide on their land 
use as is the case with genuine shareholders in the West. Another issue is about the 
most suitable role of the collectives in land rights restructuring.  
4.1  Individual choice over land rights 
Qin (2006) strongly argues that landownership should be assigned to the peasants, 
which is crucial to democratic village governance. Disagreeing with many scholars 
who are concerned about the possible effects of land concentration in the hands of a 
mighty few as is evident in many developing countries, he contends that the most 
important factor is the unconstrained autocratic power of the state and business 
alliance that severely undermines the rights of the peasants. In this respect, land 
privatization  characterized  by  free  land  trading  does  not  necessarily  cause 
landlessness of the poor and concomitant peasant unrests. Paradoxically, in China, 
although the peasants do not have serious problems of access to land, their land can   145 
still be grabbed by others in the context of the absence of land trading, which has 
triggered mounting cases of social conflicts over land use.   
 
The  absence  of  an  effective  control  system  over  state  behaviour  and  the 
powerlessness of the peasants in collective negotiation in matters concerning their 
rights  and  participation  in  legal  and  policy-making  processes  exercise  a  major 
constraint on their capacity to hold the cooperative leaders accountable. They must 
have the freedom to form organized groups, which are strong enough to represent 
their collective rights in their participation in land governance. When this freedom is 
restricted, the current village collective supposed to represent their democratic rights 
can only be taken advantage of by others. Consequently, the collective can only 
exploit peasant rights rather than protect their interests. This is exacerbated by the 
existence of small landholders whose small size of land is vulnerable to misuse by 
the village collective. Such a contracting system is unfavourable to collective farming, 
decision  making  and  social  cohesion.  The  formation  of  land  shareholding 
cooperatives may not necessarily lead to organized peasant action in land use and 
management.  
 
The study of land rights must move the focus away from economic issues in contrast 
to the current preoccupation of land shareholding cooperatives. Instead, one needs 
to  explore  the  political,  social  and  legal  conditions  under  which  peasants’  land 
shareholders rights can be created. It does not mean that China’s land reform should 
opt for absolute privatization, because the latter does not exist even in Western 
countries. In fact, citizens’ land rights are surrounded by more restrictions than as 
compared to other rights because of the state’s need for land utilization. That is why 
land always embodies the state interests in realizing its potential to cater for the 
public  interests.  The  state  has  the  final  exclusive  right  to  land  acquisition.  The 
ultimate question is who can represent the peasants’ vested interests in land use 
and negotiate with the state and businesses in this process. 
 
To Qin (2006), this question is contingent upon the degree to which peasants’ land 
rights can  be  redefined  and strengthened. Just like the cases of  those “unique” 
villages  where  the  local  communities  did  not  choose  the  HRS  when  China’s 
economic reform started and insisted on the commune system,37 the peasants ought 
to  be  given  the  flexibility  to  choose  the  best  land  rights  structure.  This  actually 
complies with the operation of the market economy, which should provide avenues 
for people to make economic choices. They ought to be given the space to organize 
themselves  around  land  management  on  a  voluntary  basis.  Nor  should  they  be 
                                                 
37 The unique case of commune villages is addressed in Chapter 6.   146 
forced to leave their chosen groups formed at their free will. It is not a matter of who 
likes it or not, rather a matter of choice for the peasants themselves. Qin’s rural 
survey conducted in Hunan Province in 1997 indicated that almost 50 percent of the 
informants  expressed  their  preference  for  more  strengthened  private  land  rights 
based on equitable principles. Solving this issue is of crucial importance to address 
the issue of who owns China’s land and who has the exclusive power to do so, which 
is deemed as a fundamental question pertaining to China’s land reform (see Ho, 
2001  &  2005).  Peasants’  landownership  should  be  recognized  by  law—be  it 
individual or collective ownership—as long as it is based on their choice. In the case 
of individual landownership, peasants can still form land groups. And in the case of 
group or common ownership, individual members should be allowed to withdraw 
their membership. Given the weakness of small-scale household farming in China in 
terms of mitigating their vulnerability to the market, it is important for the collective to 
play an essential role in organizing the peasants. But this collective must be formed 
according to peasants’ own choices. To reach this end, the law should provide ample 
space for peasant organizations (Qin, 2006). 
 
4.2  Collective choice over land rights 
Qin’s viewpoints are deemed to be overtly simplistic by others. From a historical 
perspective, peasants’ ability to make institutional choices cannot be overestimated. 
Some  argue  that  the  collectivization  period  of  the  1950-60s  was  marked  by 
strengthened  organization  of  the  peasantry.  By  comparison,  agricultural 
decollectivization under the HRS since the late 1970s has led to the disintegration of 
peasant communities (Friedman et al., 1991; Zhou, 1996). The HRS has brought 
about increased rural societal differentiation in terms of inequality in incomes and 
access to social services. To others, however, this does not indicate the weakening 
power of the peasantry. Rather, it has unleashed the market mechanisms for its 
autonomy  and  self-control, in  contrast  to  the  feudal  relations  in  respect  of strict 
control  on  labour  mobility  and  the  considerable  power  of  local  cadres  in  the 
collectivization era. And the cause of the increasing inequality has much to do with 
the underdeveloped market which has not fully reached many remote poor areas. In 
any  case,  rural  differentiation  is  a  serious  problem  for  the  government,  as  it  is 
dividing the rural society into different groups such as the peasantry, proletarians, 
capitalists and government officials (Knight & Song, 1993; Rozelle, 1994; Bramall & 
Jones, 2000).  
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Complex  rural  social  differentiation  has  strong  bearings  on  the  role  of  the 
government. With the introduction of the HRS, the central government has reduced 
its influence in rural China, which is seen in the process of decentralization. As a 
result, local governments have played a larger role in economic development, and 
they face mounting challenges of revenue generation to support their programmes 
(Bramall  &  Jones,  2000).  They  have  gained  immense  political  power  over  the 
masses, which triggers incessant cases of corruption and conflicts. As such, land 
has always been under the dominance of the state and privileged class, who can use 
their exclusive political and economic rights and control to grab the land. The power 
of this class is inextricably determined by the social structural power that consists of 
the village organization, state law and institutions and the local elite. Confronting the 
control of land rights, which power is the strongest is ultimately contingent upon the 
extent to which it can influence the other power holders. Given the unique features of 
physical and social fragmentation in the Chinese countryside because of the HRS, it 
is hardly possible for the small landholders to exert control over their land. Unlike the 
models  of  Japan  and  South  Korea  where  groups  are  united  in  their  effective 
organization, the Chinese peasants are becoming more and more powerless (Xiong, 
2009).  Given  this  situation,  stabilizing  their  land  rights  proves  to  be  a  daunting 
challenge, which has complicated the formation of land shareholding cooperatives to 
accommodate heterogeneous interests of the shareholders. 
 
Furthermore,  where  biophysical  conditions  set  limits  to  large-scale  farming,  any 
attempts to consolidate the HRS in farmland management can only exacerbate the 
existing  land  fragmentation.  More  land-induced  conflicts  will  occur  because  of 
multiple claims over the same land plot. Tackling this problem would make way for 
the exploration of new institutions. Thus, if the reform is inclined to land privatization, 
the ruling class can again easily infringe the peasants’ land rights (Cheng, 2006; Cao, 
2005; Wen, 2004; Xiong, 2009). The next question returns to the current issue of 
collective  landownership,  which  has  been  criticized  by  many  scholars  as 
ambiguous—the key to land grabbing (Ho, 2005).  
 
The existence of the institution of collective land ownership has its social roots which 
cannot  be  simplistically  understood  from  economic  and  legal  angles.  It  has  its 
inherent social contractual and cultural meanings. Because of the rules implicit in 
land relations, collective land rights reflect the nature of bundles of rights and thus 
complicated  social  relations.  As  these  relations  are  themselves  ambiguous,  any 
attempt to clarify the current land rights structure will not lead to the stabilization and 
securing of the peasants’ rights. Even though the law gives the peasants all the 
rights that they may deserve, it does not necessarily mean that these rights are 
safeguarded and enforced effectively (Zhe & Chen, 2005; Zhou, 2005). Land rights   148 
in any country have never been exclusive to the landowner, land cooperative, the 
state or other entities. Facing the challenges to food security, the state has become 
more important in intervening in land use to ensure the production of quality food and 
agricultural produce. In this sense, the market can never play the role that some 
deem as the best instrument in regulating land use. Given the weakness of the small 
landholders in agricultural production, it is important to organize the peasants in 
order to realize the full potentials of the market, peasants and the state in satisfying 
the  national  need  for  the  preservation  of  farmland,  thus  ensuring  national  food 
security (Xiong, 2009). 
 
The development of property rights especially in the aftermath of the promulgation of 
the 2007 Property Law signaled the state’s interest in strengthening individual land 
rights.  No  one  knows  whether  it is  a  sign  of  transition to a  fully-fledged  private 
property ownership regime. It is far too early to draw conclusions due to other social, 
economic and political conditions that set their limits. These limits affect the degree 
of land rights stability, which can only be maintained if the rural society is strong and 
effective enough to carry out the laws and rules imposed by the state, law and 
market. State institutions need to understand the local conditions and the law must 
be able to play an essential role in ensuring its effective enforcement to safeguard 
the rights of the affected (Qiang, 1997). Moreover, to make the law work for the poor, 
democratic village governance in respect of village elections, for instance, must be 
improved to ensure effective legal changes. This also means that legal reform to 
strengthen  property  rights  should  be  enhanced  by  mechanisms  to  hold  leaders 
accountable (Deininger & Jin, 2009). Against this backdrop, it is no wonder that the 
current land shareholding cooperative systems present a last resort for the Chinese 
government to safeguard the peasants’ rights and maximize the land use efficiency, 
despite many cases of failure due to a lack of mechanisms for assuring the effective 
execution of peasant shareholders’ rights in cooperative organizations and village 
governance  as  a  whole.  It  is  far  too  early  to  ascertain  their  impact  on  village 
governance, a topic which requires further studies (Po, 2008). 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
The land  shareholding cooperative  system represents  a  hybrid  form of  capitalist 
shareholding  and  socialist  cooperative  institutions.  There  exists  a  considerable 
divergence  between  original  policy  intentions  and  the  eventual  outcomes  of  the 
cooperatives. In fact, these cooperatives only have clarified land rights to a limited 
degree, partly due to the power penetration of the local authorities (Zeng, 2005). It is   149 
doubtful that their ongoing practices are directly linked with improvements in the 
shareholders’ land rights, rural development and governance. Sound management of 
the land shareholding cooperatives to strengthen the existing rights of the peasant 
shareholders is absolutely needed. 
 
One has to understand the nature of the current land management system and its 
underlying  social,  economic  and  political  relations.  Undoubtedly,  when  individual 
peasants  are  entrusted  with  clearer  and  enforceable  land  rights,  their  power  of 
choice over land use in terms of transfer and self-investment would be significantly 
improved.  Nevertheless,  the  enforcement  of  these  rights  can  be  severely 
undermined by many complex political, economic and social factors. Moreover, local 
authorities may see the strengthened land rights of the peasants as threats to their 
power.  They  would  have  fewer  incentives  to  implement  the  relevant  laws  and 
policies properly. And they may seek last resort measures to intervene in the ways in 
which the peasants’ land rights are delimited, determined, used and managed in the 
name of land consolidation for the purpose of scaled-up agricultural production. This 
can be complicated by the issue of lack of transparency and accountability in the 
management  of these  cooperatives.  Thus,  in  any  case, it  can  be  seen  that  the 
development  of  the  land  shareholding  cooperative  system  serves  the  economic 
interests of the local state and corporations far more than the livelihoods and political 
rights of the peasant shareholders. 
 
The current land shareholding cooperative system is not a panacea to solve the 
underlying issues concerning efficient and optimized land use in China. Peasants’ 
reluctance to vacate their land to facilitate the development of the land lease markets 
in shareholding arrangements indicates a certain level of market and institutional 
failure. Furthering the market-oriented land tenure reform without addressing the key 
governance issues will not improve the current situation. The arguments developed 
here run counter to those who simply believe that the market-oriented system can 
break down the institutional barriers (see Yao, 2000). However, it does present an 
alternative  to  land  privatization  that  is  unfeasible  within  the  current  political, 
economic and social parameters. It is an institutional innovation to demonstrate how 
the  complex relations among different  stakeholders  can be re-formulated  for  the 
sake of intensive and efficient land use that can benefit all especially poor small 
landholders. In essence, the land shareholding cooperative system is a reflection of 
the government’s intent to create viable land institutions based on fulfilling the roles 
of the government and the market in promoting economies of scale in land use to 
improve agricultural production significantly. It is a further indication of the aim of the 
government  economic  reform  to  integrate  rural  and  urban  development 
characterized by equal rights and opportunities for both rural and urban residents.   150 
Nevertheless, these grand plans and practices have much to do with the assumption 
that land should be in the hands of the capable peasants who can cultivate it more 
efficiently and profitably than the average peasants. For those who will have lost 
their  land  and  who  have  been  incorporated  into  urban  development,  the  social 
welfare system has to be significantly improved to sustain their livelihoods. However, 
this has not been a smooth process due to the fact that the public finance system is 
poorly developed and unable to tailor sufficient resources to meet the needs of the 
poor losers (DRC & World Bank, 2006).  
 
The Chinese government has taken a cautious approach to land reform. On the one 
hand, it tries to stimulate market-induced mechanisms for land reform; on the other 
hand, it has to strengthen its power to control corruption and misuse of power by the 
local  government.  As  an  official  from  the  Chinese  Ministry  of  Land  Resources 
remarked on latest policy developments: 
 
The public media has spread the wrong message about the latest policy 
developments. In fact, no matter how peasants are allowed to transfer 
their land rights, this must be done within the limit of local and regional 
land use planning under the direct control of the village collective. This 
means that the peasants’ rights to do so will still be determined by the 
village administrative committee and local government.38 
 
The crux of the matter is how to ensure that land transfer is under proper control. 
And the long-term nature of the process must be recognized whereby the social, 
political and economic dimensions of the land reform play a crucial role. Moreover, 
the land cooperative system, like other forms of land transfers, must be a process to 
allow the peasants and other stakeholders to participate on a voluntary and self-
initiated basis (Tang, 2009). Only on this basis will the full potential of peasants’ 
collective knowledge and power be realized. Certainly, relevant land laws, policies 
and institutions ought to fill this gap by creating the mechanisms for peasant-centred 
collective action in land shareholding cooperatives to realize sustainable land use 
and rural development. In addition, laws are needed to clarify the legal rights of land 
shareholders  in  order  to  safeguard  their  rights  and  benefits  (Sun,  2008).  Land 
shareholding cooperatives reflect the fact that any attempt to advocate a uniform 
system of land tenure in rural China is doomed to fail due to its immense diversity 
(Kung, 2000). 
 
                                                 
38 Interview with the deputy chief of the Division of Cadastral Management of the China Land 
Survey and Planning Institute on 13 June 2009.   151 
One needs to understand the ongoing village democratization processes in which 
peasants’ rights need to be significantly improved so that they can wield more power 
to  participate  in  decision-making  processes  concerning  land-related  institutional 
development. Policy-makers and theorists ought to avoid using the institution of land 
shareholding  cooperative  as  a  prototype  of  land  reform  without  allowing  for 
community-centred approaches to institutional innovation that better suit their needs 
in the local context (see Banks, 2003). Further studies of the impact of the land 
shareholding  cooperatives  on  the  members’  rights,  livelihoods  and  agricultural 
development  as  well  as  member  organizations  and  their  responses  to  the 
institutional  changes  are  required.  Policy-makers  would  need  to  ensure  that  the 
promotion of this institution is not at the cost of marginalizing the poor shareholders 
whose active participation should be tied to their own benefits through wider village 
governance reform measures. Otherwise, the land shareholding cooperatives will 
continue to negatively affect the livelihoods of the poor as well as China’s agrarian 
future.  
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Chapter 6  Innovative  collective  land  tenure  for 
the  poor:  case  study  of  a  village 
commune  
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
Chinese peasants do not always follow the state-led reform agenda. An illustrative 
case is the Yakou commune village in Guangdong Province. This chapter discusses 
the major drivers for peasant-centred land collectivization in this village, where both 
livelihoods  and  land  resources  of  the  commune  members  are  assured,  in  stark 
contrast to the neighbouring villages. The success of the commune lies in a hybrid 
land  tenure  system  in  which  both  communal  and  market-based  institutional 
arrangements are made by the members to take full advantage of their economic 
and biophysical conditions. Moreover, village governance is closely linked with the 
legitimacy  of  the  system  and  strong  village  leadership.  However,  in  the  face  of 
mounting criticisms from the members and the local state, the commune has not 
consolidated the existing institutional mechanisms to sustain itself. Facing economic 
and  political  uncertainty  over  its  future,  the  village  needs  to  incorporate  more 
effective member participation in decision-making concerning village development. 
Nonetheless, this alternative path chosen by the peasants explains a critical factor 
for land tenure reform that is often ignored by policy-makers, that is, that the local 
economic and resource dynamics and governance are interwoven with land tenure 
patterns.  Their  intrinsic  relationships  and  conditions  for  community-centred  land 
tenure deserve further research. 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
I have discussed both individual and collective land tenure systems (chapter 4 and 5) 
that reflect the mainstream policy developments and local practices concerning rural 
land tenure reform and its linkages with governance and development. It is important 
to  note  that  both  the  so-called  market-oriented  individualistic  land  tenure  and 
shareholding arrangements are not contradictory but complimentary. On the one 
hand, more strengthened individual peasant households’ land and property rights are 
deemed essential in safeguarding their interests and assurance of tenure security.   158 
On the other hand, this mechanism is assumed to lead to the transparent operation 
of  the  land  shareholding  cooperatives  as  individuals  can  use  rights  to  hold  the 
cooperative management accountable. In this respect, the two in combination reflect 
the  current  policy  trend  towards  the  collective  landownership  reform  due  to  its 
induced problems discussed earlier. However, I have shown that both systems have 
brought  about  unintended  consequences  of  social  conflicts,  economic 
marginalization of the weaker groups and land resource misuses, as the ostensible 
“rights”-based approach diverges from its underlying context.  
 
This chapter offers a unique example of a shift away from state-led approaches to 
locally-based land tenure. In fact, the complex nature of rural development and land 
tenure  reform  in  terms  of  regional  economic,  social,  cultural  and  physical 
environmental requires diversified approaches to the coupling of land tenure and 
sustainable rural development to suit different regional characteristics. There is a 
commonly-held  view  across  the  globe  that  a  successful  land  policy  cannot  be 
designed at the national level, but must cater for the possibilities and limitations of a 
particular  environment.  Furthermore,  land  policy  should  aim  at  improving  the 
livelihoods of the majority poor, while creating a viable basis for production growth 
and sustainable land use. To arrive at this goal, transparent land governance is 
essential (Zoomers & v.d. Haar, 2000: 70). Despite the stronghold of the state in 
prescribing its institutions to the peasantry, local resistance to these changes and 
development of the peasants’ own preferred modes of land use and management do 
exist in the vast Chinese countryside. This chapter’s focus on a village commune 
reveals  why  and  how  the  communal  system  has  existed  and  confronted  the 
mainstream market economy. It has been proven to be more effective in equitable 
rural development and in safeguarding the best interests of its members than state-
led approaches.  
 
Dating  back  to  1950s-60s,  state-led  agricultural  collectivization  especially 
represented by rural people’s communes came under fire because of their failure to 
generate  increased  agricultural  production  and  peasant  incomes.  Explicit  in  its 
planned nature in organizing the peasantry and food grain supply and marketing, 
many members were excluded from participating in overall management and use of 
land resources. Interestingly, the justification of the commune was based on the 
state’s aim to tackle the structural problems of rural inequality—differences between 
rich, middle and poor peasants, and in particular, the reality of small landholdings 
which  were  identified  as  hampering  agricultural  organization  and  mechanization 
(Bandyopadhyaya,  1971).  The  same  objective  behind  the  current  land  policy 
changes  appears  to  address  the  issue  of  land  fragmentation,  but  in  practice 
obstructs more efficient farming and marketing of agricultural produce as illustrated   159 
in chapter 5. Yet, policy changes have not led to the expected outcomes as long as 
they remain inextricably linked with the lack of transparency and accountability of 
village governance. To a certain extent, the current practice in land shareholding 
cooperatives resonates with the institution of the commune, since collective force in 
agricultural  production  is  assumed  to  be  more  powerful  in  realizing  scaled 
agricultural production. 
 
The key to successful rural land institutional development, to a large extent, hinges 
on  the  mechanisms  to  bring  about  stable  economic  development  and  rural 
governance.  As  the  case  study  of  the  commune  village  in  southern  China 
demonstrates, peasant deliberation and choice over the persistence of the commune 
system support this argument. Any type of land tenure, be it individual ownership, 
shareholding cooperatives, or communal ownership, is a manifestation of local state-
society interactions. This would require strong village governance with innovative 
design of land institutions to cope with political, economic and social constraints. In 
the context of mounting social inequality and rural poverty in China, the institution of 
the revitalized commune in this case study further sheds light on the role of collective 
action in overcoming these social dilemmas (see Ostrom, 2005). 
 
In the context of agrarian reform in many other developing countries, the role of 
customary institutions has been controversial. Despite their positive contribution to 
land management in terms of greater space for social equity than modern institutions 
of individual land holdings, customary institutions are often criticized for entrenched 
unaccountability and even corrupt land management resulting from ongoing land 
administrative reform. To a large extent, village leadership or chieftaincy is often 
claimed to be critically responsible for elite capture and its associated impact on the 
poor in land reform processes (Ubink & Quan, 2008).  
 
In contrast, the case of the commune village in this study shows that the village 
leadership is crucial to democratic governance and economic development, which 
does  not  necessarily  follow  government  policy  dictates.  Its  capacity  to  keep  the 
institution of the commune intact from state intervention is revealing. It is important to 
note  that,  as  compared  with  other  country  cases  and  even  the  old  Chinese 
communes in the 1960s, the current institution displays a hybrid system in which 
both communal land management and market-oriented mechanisms such as land 
leasing and shareholding cooperation co-exist and reinforce each other. Moreover, 
the village leadership, in the use of its power to define the communal rules derives its 
legitimacy in serving the needs of the poor rather than its own interests as seen in 
many other cases (see Chanock, 1985, Firmin-Sellers, 1995; Oomen, 2002). This 
means that the economic, social and political dynamics of this system determines its   160 
sustainability and value in rural development and land management. It is a case in 
point  that  demonstrates  the  utility  of  a  suitable  governance  framework  that 
empowers the poor in land use and management.  
 
Against this backdrop, this chapter focuses on land use and management in relation 
to  the  broader  context  of  regional  development,  the  drivers  responsible  for  the 
continuation of the commune system, land management and governance issues of 
the  commune,  commune-state  interaction,  and  emerging  issues  concerning  the 
sustainability of this institution and the implications for China’s pathway to market-
oriented land institutional reform.  
 
2.  Regional land development and policy environment 
 
This  case  study  was  conducted  in  the  Yakou  Village  of  Nanlang  Township, 
Zhongshan  Municipality  situated  in  the  Pearl  River  Delta—the  most  developed 
economic  region in  south-eastern  Guangdong province (see map  6.1). Yakou  is 
claimed to be one of the few commune villages left in China.39 Guangdong province 
was ranked 3rd most populated region among China’s 31 sub-national economies. It 
is the province where the first parcel of land was “sold” to foreign investors in 1987, 
and  where  many  so-called  innovative  rural  land  use  arrangements  were 
experimented in response to growing market demand for land (Prosterman et al., 
1998). It was particularly in the delta area in the 1980s that the rapid process of land 
development took place. As many investors from Hong Kong originated from this 
region, the vast land of many villages became their destination of direct investments. 
As elsewhere in the country, land expropriation by the local governments and village 
administrative  committees  (village  collectives)  for  housing  and  infrastructural 
development  is  commonplace.  They  gain  lucrative  revenues  by  charging  the 
investors a relatively high price, while paying little compensation to the land losers. 
During the period  of 1996-2004, agricultural land shrank drastically.  Accordingly, 
land used for industrial and urban development expanded by 19 percent. And land 
used for transportation increased by 40 percent (Lin & Ho, 2005). 
                                                 
39 The exact number of commune villages in China is unknown, but there are a few spread out in 
certain provinces such as Jiangsu, Henan, Hebei and Zhejiang (Nanfang Daily, 2008).   161 
Map 6.1  Yakou Village, Guangdong Province, China 
 
 
 
Despite unprecedented economic growth far ahead of other regions, Guangdong 
faces severe challenges to ensure that its farmland continues to sustain peasants’ 
livelihoods and food security. It has paved the way to land enclosures that have 
spread through the entire province as Hong Kong real estate companies pour huge 
investments  into  the  region  (Miao,  2003).  The  alliance  between  the  state  and 
businessmen has dominated the development process in which peasant and state 
properties such as land can be illicitly plundered. Rampant conversion of agricultural 
land to non-agricultural uses has exerted an adverse impact on the poor peasants’ 
livelihoods and sustainable land use (De Angelis 2001; Hu 2005; Li, 2006; Chan 
2007). Rising landlessness among the poor is also coupled with widening social 
inequality in this province over the last two decades (Fewsmith, 2007). Thus, the 
study of this developed region at the micro level of the village can yield important 
lessons for other Chinese regions that are struggling with the effects of marketization 
and globalization.  
 
In Guangdong, land policy responses have displayed certain features of institutional 
innovation that allows for more market-oriented approaches to land transfers, for 
instance, in form of land shareholding arrangements. However, the province has also 
confronted problems that arise and disadvantage the peasantry during land transfer 
processes.  These  problems  reveal  the  fact  that  the  rule  of  law  has  not  been 
effectively enforceable in practice. And it is insulated from the daily practice of land 
management whereby peasants have little power to resort to the law to defend their 
interests. According to the Provincial Land Department, this is exemplified by the 
lack of appropriate stipulations on peasant land rights in law, which is exacerbated 
by  the  lack  of  coordination  and  clear  division  of  responsibilities  among  the  line 
agencies. For instance, in respect of land resource administration, the relationships   162 
between the land department, construction, forestry and water departments are often 
blurred. Their conflicting interests in land management can only lead to increased 
land administration costs, poor land governance and loss of landed assets.40  
 
The  policy  of  rural  collective  land  use  rights  registration  aimed  at  clarifying  and 
protecting  individual  household  land  use  rights  is  a  priority  for  the  Guangdong 
provincial government as elsewhere in China. In practice, rural land registration is 
not based at the level of individual households (except for housing land); rather, the 
village collective remains as the basic unit of registration. In some well-managed 
villages,  land  registration  certificates  are  issued  to  the  natural  village  to  resolve 
disputes and avoid conflicts over village boundaries and unsettled claims. Even in a 
developed  province  such  as  Guangdong,  overall  land  registration  at  the  natural 
village level is unfeasible due to a lack of technological equipment and skills in land 
survey and cadastral management. As such, rural land registration mainly serves the 
needs  of  land  administration  or  policy  mandates  rather  than  addressing  the 
complexity of land relations and protection of peasant land rights. 41 In short, land 
registration, to a certain extent, remains an empty institution and has not proven to 
be  effective  in  improving  land  management  to  settle  various  land  disputes  and 
historical claims whereby peasants’ interests in land can be safeguarded (Ho, 2005).  
 
Rural land registration conducted at the collective level does not seem to suit this 
province which was the first to implement economic reform. However, the provincial 
government does not favour individual land tenure because it does not facilitate 
economies of scale in agricultural production especially in those areas where land 
has become a major market factor. Thus, land registration at the collective level 
would reduce administrative costs and facilitate large-scale agricultural development. 
This is more needed in relatively developed regions where farmland production has 
given  way  to  land  investments,  as  a  result  of  which  rural-urban  migration  has 
become  paramount.  Moreover,  in  these  regions,  peasants’  legal  awareness  and 
ability to participate in village governance are more developed than those in poorer 
regions. Thus, they have more capacity to oversee land governance processes. The 
more  developed  a  region  is,  the  better  the  rural  land  is  collectively  used  and 
managed, which can facilitate smoother land transfers. This view overtly contradicts 
the Household Responsibility System (HRS) stipulated in law that assigns long-term 
land use rights to individual households. By contrast, in remote areas where farming 
remains the basic means of subsistence, the HRS should be upheld, as the land 
                                                 
40 Interviews with Guangdong Provincial Department of Land and Resources officials in May 2008.  
41 Interviews with Guangdong Provincial Department of Land and Resources officials and experts 
of the China Land Survey and Planning Institute in May and July 2008 respectively.   163 
itself has not much market value and can still be in the hands of the contracted 
households that rely heavily on the land to conduct their traditional way of life.42  
 
These perspectives reflect the fact that the overarching central government land 
laws and policies are reinterpreted and even transformed by the local implementers. 
Moreover,  because  of  a  lack  of  consensus  on  the  type  of  land  rights  and 
management  that  best  suit  the  needs  of  the  peasantry,  local  governments  and 
businesses, land institutions may favour the imperative of economic development 
more than the livelihoods of the peasantry. The disjuncture between land policies 
and  local  realities  has  continued  to  obstruct  the  way  in  which  land  use  and 
management ought to be carried out. Against this backdrop, the following account 
shows how the village collective has responded to the policies and how they have 
organized land use and management to the maximization of their collective interests.  
3.  Local responses to land institutional reform 
 
Yakou  Village  seems  to  have  remained  unaffected  by  the  mainstream  political 
economy especially with regard to its own village development patterns. It is among 
the top 10 most beautiful villages in the province with a large potential for tourism 
development. With a total population of 3,131 and 928 individual households, it has 8 
natural villages consisting of 13 groups or so-called production teams. It is rich in 
natural resources such as fertile soil, water and forests with 3,000 mu (15 mu=1 ha) 
of land for rice cultivation and over 20,000 mu of tidal land developed for fisheries 
over the last 20 years. Above all, its farmland has always been kept under the 
management  of  the  village  collective—the  village  administrative  committee 
underpinned by the commune system.43 
 
In  China,  with  the  nationwide  implementation  of  the  HRS  to  replace  the  rural 
people’s communes in the late 1970s coupled with the market reform, the early 
period of 1978-1984 saw dramatic increases in annual rural incomes of 15 percent 
per year. But since then, the Chinese peasants have encountered multiple difficulties, 
which shows that the HRS has not functioned to the degree as originally envisioned. 
Increases in peasant incomes began to slow down, contract and in some regions 
even reverse (Hart-Landsberg & Burkett, 2004).  Moreover,  in  recent years,  food 
security has been put at top of the political agenda due to the fact that by 2004 
                                                 
42 Interviews with Guangdong Provincial Department of Land and Resources officials in May 2008. 
43 However, they do not always call the village a commune village. There is no definition of 
commune in the market economy, because in certain media sources Yakou is called the last 
commune. And even some local peasants also claim the village to be the last commune in China, 
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China’s agricultural trade deficit was high as a result of a jump in imports (Chan, 
2006). With China’s entry into the WTO, the Chinese peasants have experienced 
negative impacts on their livelihoods and become more vulnerable to local, national 
and international changes related to agriculture.  
 
In this context, right from the beginning the Yakou peasants faced difficulties over 
the future of their commune in relation to the mainstream HRS. In fact, even before 
the  HRS  was  implemented,  they  had  experienced  the  trend  of  outmigration  as 
farming  gradually  became  less  adequate  for  them  to  rely  on,  while  off-farm 
opportunities provided an alternative. The majority of them who remained were not 
capable labourers. If they had followed the HRS, they would not been able to till the 
land  as  efficiently  as  possible  due  to  a  lack  of  capabilities  and  mutual  support, 
according to the village administrative committee. The village Party Secretary, who 
has  been  in  power  since  1974,  strongly  believes  that  the  HRS  fragments  rural 
relations  and  undermines  the  village  capacity  in  pursuing  collective  solutions  to 
human and biophysical problems. He asserts that some village assets like the land 
should  not  be  divided  up  and  distributed  among  individual  households,  whose 
conflicting interests are not easily compromised. Land quality differs from plot to plot, 
which would only result in conflicts if it is individually owned. And its fragmentation 
would further lead to peasants’ vulnerability to natural disasters. In addition, the HRS 
would result in farmland conversion in the hands of the state and businesses, for 
individual land users cannot challenge the power of the state in land expropriation. 
And this would be a disaster for the landless poor. After heated discussions within 
the  village,  a  referendum  was  held  and  consensus  on  the  continuation  of  the 
commune system was reached based on the rationale outlined and the need to 
protect the vulnerable groups. The village’s stance on the latter lay in the power of 
the collective in leading local development. Thus, it was strongly believed that the 
village  ought  to  be  a  self-help  organization  for  the  community  instead  of  an 
enterprise as is the case in other villages in China. The decision to continue the 
commune system was luckily supported by the then local government.44  
 
The priority placed on the commune and agricultural development was also based 
on trial and error. In the 1980s, ideas on industrial development to trigger fast growth 
were  tried  out  in  the  village  with  some  positive  outcomes  obtained.  Later  on, 
however, with their vulnerability to the market economy and increases in capital 
costs, the village administrative committee found that they would shoulder more risks 
in industrial development than agriculture, as the former had a more negative impact 
                                                 
44 This account was derived from interviews with the village party secretary and other village 
leaders in June 2008.   165 
on the natural resources. They decided to close down a number of factories and shift 
their development priority to the land itself through land leases at the full cost of the 
lessor (Wang, 2007). Moreover, they understood all the time that China had two 
social welfare systems for urban dwellers and the peasants partly due to the HRS 
(Perry & Selden, 2003). The latter have nothing to rely on but their land to meet their 
needs for livelihoods and social security. By fully developing the agricultural potential 
of their village, they believed that the double goal of agricultural development and 
social  protection  of  the  commune  members  could  be  ensured  (Yakou  Village 
Administrative Committee, 2005). 
 
4.  Land resource management in Yakou and its 
adjacent villages 
 
4.1  Land for rural enterprise development in Yakou 
Yakou villagers cultivate over 60,000 mu of land annually and they have attained the 
“xiaokang” standard (enough to eat and live on) since 2000.45 This is demonstrated 
by the fact that 10 percent of the households owned private cars and 95 percent live 
in modern houses built in the 1990s— an outstanding achievement largely due to the 
way in which the village is managed and how its endowed natural resources for the 
development of fishery and paddy rice farming are utilized.  
 
As land is treated as an invaluable asset by the village leadership, over the last 10 
years,  Yakou  peasants  have  turned  the  sand  deposited  by  tidal  waves  into  a 
cultivable area covering 26,000 mu. This means that they have reclaimed the land 
from the sea and extended their coastline by 2.5 kilometres (Nanfang Daily, 2008). 
Given the fact that many local peasants do not have the know-how to utilize the 
reclaimed  land  economically,  the  village  committee  promptly  decided  to  take 
advantage of the market to lease this land to some peasants from the neighbouring 
provinces to develop the fishery sector.  
 
In  order  to  maximize  the  benefits  from  the  use  of  the  tidal  land  and  improve 
peasants’ livelihoods, in 2002 the village committee established the Agricultural Land 
Shareholding Foundation to institutionalize the use of this land. The foundation is 
responsible for the management of land leases, land rent collection and distribution. 
It is  open  to  all  the  peasants and  enables especially  women and  the  elderly to 
                                                 
45 The “xiaokang” standard is the long-term development goal of the Chinese government, as 
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become  land  shareholders.  Land  shares  can  be  inherited  but  not  transferred  to 
outsiders in order to ensure the management integrity. It stipulates that of 17,000 mu 
of  tidal  land  that  falls  within  the  domain  of  the  foundation,  each  shareholder 
maintains an average of 5.5 mu that constitutes their land share and the basis of 
dividend  distribution—a  major  step  to  ensure  equity  in  land  share  and  dividend 
distributions (see table 6.1). As a result, till 2007 there had been an annual increase 
of  RMB  500-800  in  each  shareholder’s  income.  This  figure  is  expected  to 
substantially increase as the gains from investments materialize in the coming years.  
 
Table 6.1  Yakou tidal land shares distribution 
 
Natural 
villages 
Number of 
households 
Population  Number 
of males  
Number 
of 
females  
Number of 
Land shares 
to each 
peasant 
(mu) 
Total area 
assigned to each 
natural village (mu) 
Dongbao  150  520  273  247  5.5  2,860 
Pingshan  66  231  112  119  5.5  1,270.5 
Yangjia  124  435  225  210  5.5  2,392.5 
Zhongbao  153  5,267  2,534  2733  5.5  2,8968.5 
Huamei  52  176  97  79  5.5  968 
Xiangxi  120  382  172  210  5.5  2,101 
Lujia  95  345  170  175  5.5  1,897.5 
Xibao  156  511  252  259  5.5  2,810.5 
Total   916  7,867  3,835  4,032  5.5  43,268.5 
Source: Yakou Village Administrative Committee 2005 Yakou Village Record, p 69. 
 
Non-agricultural land is also contracted to factories for the purpose of rent collection, 
which  constitutes  another  major  source  of  revenue  for  the  village.  The  village 
administrative committee upholds the principle that the village itself is not involved in 
direct manufacturing to avoid capital and management costs. Moreover, no large-
scale industries are allowed in the village in order to prevent air and water pollution, 
and all investments must undergo a preliminary check to ensure that they meet 
environmental  protection  standards  set  by  the  committee.  Land  management  is 
underpinned by transparent governance to ensure peasant participation in decision-
making over land contracting matters. For instance, decisions over the approval of 
land investment schemes are based on the consensus reached by the committee 
members and the representatives of each natural village. In total, more than 70 
signatures are collected before the decision is made in order to ensure a high-level 
of peasant consensus.  
 
In short, the utilization and management of the tidal and non-agricultural land in line 
with the market are aimed at providing the peasants with the means of survival given   167 
the unique advantages of the land resources that carry great economic value for fast 
profit.  In  the  context  of  the  rural-urban  divide  in  China  and  in  terms  of  social 
inequality  between  urban  and  rural  residents,  sustainable  land  utilization  for  the 
maximization of economic benefits is seen as fundamental to the peasantry whose 
lack of employment and other economic opportunities make the land their last means 
of their livelihoods (Yakou Village Administrative Committee, 2005). 
 
4.2  Land for communal agriculture in Yakou 
The village collective strongly believes that the farmland is the backbone of rural life 
and should never be sold or used in any other way. This is the fundamental reason 
for the continuity of the commune system whereby the farmland has never been 
contracted to individual households and outsiders except for those tiny pieces of land 
acquired by the state over the last 20 years. Furthermore, it was the collective action 
marking the Chinese revolutionary success that the village leadership and majority 
members believe to be crucial to land equity. In the early 1950s, 83.7% of the land 
was owned by the landlords, whilst the rest were owned by others (Yakou Village 
Administrative Committee, 2005: 77). To a large extent, under the commune system, 
the peasants have been able to sustain and substantially improve their livelihoods, 
since it is the system that cares about the poorer group and creates the incentives 
for members to participate in village development. 
 
In  practice,  the  organization  of  rice  farming  is  based  on  three  levels--the 
administrative village (often called brigade), natural village (production team) and 
individual  households.  Each  production  team  is  accountable  to  the  brigade 
responsible for target setting, technical support and oversight of production. Division 
of labour depends on demographic differences and no compulsory tasks are given to 
the members. In contrast to the old commune system in the 1960s, labour inputs are 
directly linked to the distribution of rice harvests in the end. A system to record 
individual labour inputs called gongfenzhi (system of work points) was inherited from 
the past with some modifications to ensure the accuracy of each worker’s time spent 
in the field. Received benefits do not differ much not as the use of extensive labour is 
relatively low due to the employment of tractors and other machinery. In this sense, 
work  is  not  harsh,  nor  is  there  disparity  in  labour  inputs.  After  the  harvest,  the 
brigade purchases the grain from each production team at a price that is 50 percent 
above the market value and then sells it to the members at 30 percent lower than the 
market price. In particular, since 2001, children below 16 years of age and elderly 
peasants above 60 years (for women it is 55 years) and disabled groups have been   168 
provided grain ration free of charge. After all, only a small proportion of the grain is 
sold on the market. The commune adopts this rule to deal with unexpected food 
insecurity and to maximize the members’ benefits and interests in farming.  
 
Further rules  on helping  the  vulnerable  poor  are put in place. For  instance,  the 
peasants  who  migrate  to  cities  can  always  return  to  the  village  and  become 
commune members to till the land, in case they encounter unemployment in the 
cities. In the event of return and their wish to work in the field, they are required to 
seek the village’s approval in the beginning of the year and to pay a fee of RMB 100. 
Once they have been regrouped into the production team and started farming, they 
cannot move out in the same year. This is to ensure that farming is not affected. 
Although they seem to have limited freedom, all these measures aim to keep the 
balance in the overall agricultural production and demographic changes to ensure 
that the commune runs smoothly. But for those who are unwilling to work in the field, 
they do not enjoy this treatment. Thus, a system of equality is ensured that is open to 
every  peasant.  No  one  is  not  forced  to  take  part  in  any  communally-organized 
activities. Till 2008, of 1,700 capable labourers, over 600 peasants participated in 
farming over 3,500 mu of paddy fields. Equitable distribution of remuneration for farm 
labour is guaranteed. This differs from the commune in the 1960s when everyone 
could enjoy daguofan (eating food together from the same bowl) (Nanfang Daily, 
2008).  
 
The Yakou commune members point out that this system enables scaled agricultural 
production without fragmentation of individual farmland. This view certainly differs 
greatly from the property rights school that argues for individual landownership to 
achieve similar development outcomes (see Bramal 2004; De Soto, 2000). To the 
village leadership, organized farming and industrial development is essential to the 
provision of social welfare to the peasants. In fact, few profits are derived from rice 
farming per se, which is subsidized with the revenues from the collection of tidal land 
and other non-agricultural land rents. This is an important approach of the commune 
to  take full  advantage  of the market economy. As a  result, the  entire  economic 
development of different sectors is balanced out (Cao, 2002-2004). The market still 
plays an important role in revenue generation that supports agriculture and social 
welfare. With the well-developed social welfare system including provision of housing, 
clinics, pension and special care for the elderly, few Yakou peasants wish to move to 
the cities. Especially the women are not willing to apply for urban residency when 
they marry urban residents. By doing so, they can still retain their social welfare 
benefits. As some informants revealed, becoming urban residents mean that they 
would become “hungry residents” afterwards.    169 
4.3  Land  for  developers  in  neighbouring  villages  and  stakeholders’ 
perspectives 
 
4.31  Land use development for commercial gains 
In stark contrast to the case of Yakou, neighbouring Cuiheng village (see map 6.1) 
presents a case of farmland loss and aggravation of peasants’ livelihoods. According 
to the Cuiheng village administrative committee,46 the average household annual 
income is in the region of 6,000 Yuan, which is much lower than that of Yakou. 
Yakou and Cuiheng used to be one village, but split after the rural administrative 
reform in 1998. Since the 1990s, Cuiheng has experienced state land acquisition at 
an alarming rate. To date, tens of thousands mu of land have been converted to real 
estate and industrial development uses. Not only farmland, but also large tracts of 
tidal  land  and  mountainous  land  were  appropriated.  However,  much  of  the 
expropriated land remains either underutilized or idle. The affected peasants were 
given  the  choice  to  buy  new  houses;  however,  with  very  limited  compensation 
received, they could not afford them but had to move to other places. The local 
government  has  begun  to  redress  these  issues  since  2007  by  improving  land 
acquisition procedures including issuing land use certificates to land occupants to 
safeguard their property rights. Yet, not more than a few hundred mu of farmland are 
left in Cuiheng, as most peasants have either migrated to cities or stayed in the 
village but involved in non-farming activities. The village administrative committee 
has  made  use  of  the  remaining  land  for  industrial  development  to  raise  some 
revenue. Besides, they also induced the peasants from other regions to work on the 
land, taking advantage of the latter’s skills and techniques in growing cash crops. 
Almost 70 percent of the remaining land has been leased to them, but for those who 
have lost their land their source of income is limited.  
 
Home to Sun Zhongshan, founder of the Republic prior to the People’s Republic, 
Cuiheng is known for its history. The local government has strived to make it a tourist 
destination  as  well  as  an  area  for  business  development.  Two  instances  of 
development are prominent examples to demonstrate the impact of new land use 
development on the livelihoods of the poor and responses of the local peasants and 
village committees. 
 
In the first instance, the establishment of 300 mu of Zhongshan Movie and Television 
Town was a huge project to showcase the history of the village and the nation’s 
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great leader. It also has hotel and entertainment venues. In order to exhibit the 
village architecture to tourists, a large proportion of the village houses have been 
kept intact in the style of the Qing dynasty. All the residents were asked to vacate 
their houses and land, which sounded odd to them in terms of the need for it. Most 
households  have  left  for  the  cities  and  other  villages.  Only  a  few  households 
remained together with a few guards and cleaners. Compensation for the displaced 
households has not been agreed on especially for those who remained on the site.47 
 
In the other case, the expansion of a reputable secondary school also met with 
difficulties in terms of obtaining the agreement from the affected households. The 
latter’s concerns were mostly about the unsatisfactory resettlement plan and the 
amount of compensation provided by the government. This project was listed as one 
of the major undertakings of Zhongshan municipality, since the school is under the 
jurisdiction of the Zhangshan Educational Bureau. Also as a nationally-designated 
priority school, it attracts students nationwide. Strict student selection procedures are 
applied. In a request or rather a demand to the municipal government, the school 
management put forward two issues constraining the school expansion process—
delayed and incomplete household removals and 101 mu of litchi land that had yet to 
be acquired. Immediately, the government gave the project a higher priority and 
convened  a  meeting  to  coordinate  with  different  line  agencies  as  well  as  the 
township government that had been blamed for being too slow in completing the 
project land use plan and warned that further delay would cause the failure of the 
school to admit new students in the next semester. All these pressures were placed 
on the Cuiheng village administrative committee that was obliged to accelerate its 
land acquisition process in which more peasants would be affected. Apart from the 
issue of insufficient compensation for the affected households, some did not want to 
vacate because they saw the increasing value of their properties especially for those 
living in close vicinity to the market. “Even if I am given a compensation fee of RMB 
1 million, I still want to stay here. But it is not possible to win any battles with the 
government that can use any force including public security guards to make us to 
leave”, as one informant pointed out.48  
 
Overall, on average, each household received an estimated RMB10,000 as land 
compensation  without  any  social  insurance  guarantee.  Although  they  were  also 
provided new houses, they did not receive housing ownership certificates due to the 
unwillingness of the real estate agencies to apply for the certificates for them. And 
                                                 
47 This is a further example of people’s refusal to vacate their land for development, which 
resonates with the cases of nail houses found in other parts of China.  
48 Fieldwork in Cuiheng village in June 2008. This section and the following paragraphs are based 
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the  cost  of  a  few  thousands  Yuan  also  deterred  many  from  applying  for  the 
certificates.  
 
Likewise, another neighbouring village, called Xiasha, has suffered from land loss 
since the 1990s. In 1992, under the pressure of the local government, Xiasha had to 
vacate almost all the land except the 300 mu of land earmarked for building a new 
village for the evicted peasants. Although they were offered new houses, they only 
received an average of RMB10,000-20,000 as compensation. At that time, this was 
seen as a big sum, which caused jealousy among some Yakou peasants. However, 
a large proportion of the expropriated land was left undeveloped, and it was no 
longer suitable for farming. Furthermore, many evicted peasants had left the village 
to seek off-farm opportunities in the cities and could not return to the village because 
there was no land left for them (Cao, 2008). 
 
4.32  Divergent perspectives  
In  the  discussions  about the  pressing land issues, it  can  be  seen  that  Cuiheng 
shares with other regions in China. The village leaders reaffirmed the importance of 
making land valuable for the village. They see the role of the government in guiding 
land development through scientific and integrated development plans rather than 
pushing peasants into the land market where the peasants can transfer their land 
freely.49 More importantly, the land acquisition process must include an element of 
fair compensation to the peasants whose approval of the plan must be made a 
priority.  Currently,  70-80  percent  of  affected  peasants  must  agree  to  the  land 
acquisition and compensation plan as required by the land law. Village leaders also 
admitted  that  some  peasants  and  even  some  village  leaders  were  unwilling  to 
embark on landed rural development (indirectly pointing to the case of Yakou), which 
can be attributed to their limited insight, knowledge and capacity. They pointed out 
that rural development in China had always been a huge challenge and there was 
little to learn from the experience of the past and from other villages, as conflicting 
interests of groups and individuals always pose huge difficulties to decision-makers. 
For instance, where land acquisition is concerned, peasants differ hugely. Some do 
not want to vacate their land; but in Cuiheng, many elderly people do because of 
their age and little hope of prosperity from the land itself. They would rather rely on 
the income earned by their children in the cities. Thus, they think highly of education, 
which they see as the only means to get out of the rural area. Again, this shows the 
divergent views of the peasants and village leaders over land use in terms of how 
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land can be best utilized to benefit local development and the poor. In this respect, 
traditional farming may not be always profitable; rather, replacing it with cash crop 
farming may be better in light of current market demand. 
 
The Cuiheng village leaders foresaw that land would be privatized sooner or later in 
China.  They  did  not  explain  this  but  emphasized  the  unstoppable  trend  of  land 
market  reform. Yet how land  privatization could  be  brought  about  and what  the 
effects on the poor peasants would be remained a puzzle to them. When asked 
about the land registration progress which is supposed to play a role in clarifying 
landownership and protecting peasants’ land rights, they said that it was ongoing 
since it was started not long ago. But they did not think that it was important to land 
management  and  overall  local  development,  for  it  was  just  an  administrative 
formality. For them the government’s priority should be placed on ensuring peasants’ 
land rights in land management process. In other words, provided that all the land 
acquisition procedures satisfy the needs of the peasants, the latter would be willing 
to give up the land eventually. Moreover, they pointed out the importance of land use 
planning that should be further strengthened. Failure to do so had much to do with 
the  government  abuse  of  power  and  the  lack  of  sound  governance  processes 
concerning farmland conversion. 
 
Compared to the village leaders, the majority of the peasant informants in Cuiheng 
held the view that it would be better if they were allowed to sell their land directly so 
that they circumvent the intervention of the local government. First, they believed 
that they could not do anything about the future of the land in the face of forced 
removal by the government. They realized that the land would be given away to the 
government sooner or later. And some even argued that there would be no farmland 
left  in  Guangdong.  Second,  agriculture  in  Guangdong,  like  in  most  parts  of  the 
country, is not  profitable  at all,  which is  a  stumbling  block to  their incentives in 
farmland  investment.  Third,  they  simply  want  to  keep  small  land  plots  for  their 
housing  and  other  needs  and  even  lease  the  land  when  they  find  off-farm 
employment opportunities. Above all, a lack of access to legal aid and other means 
of social support add fuel to the burning tensions between them and the local state. 
This is compounded by the ineffectiveness of land law and policy that can be easily 
manipulated by the alliance of local government, businessmen and village leaders. 
For example, the law only requires two-thirds of the villagers to agree to the land 
acquisition plan. Yet they knew that in most cases as long as the alliance members 
could strike a deal, the peasants themselves would be left with little leeway but to 
sign the agreement. In this sense, they even argued that at the very least land 
privatization would give them more secure rights than collective ownership. 
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More  interestingly,  when  commenting  on  the  neighbouring  village  Yakou,  the 
Cuiheng village leaders hinted that the Yakou peasants would have been better off 
had the land been contracted out because rice farming was being run at a loss. This 
view also resonated among some Yakou peasants who were concerned about the 
sustainability of the commune itself.  
4.33  Yakou’s responses to the criticisms 
The  Yakou  village  leaders  pointed  out  that  Cuiheng  had  nothing  left  but  the 
unfinished buildings and fragmented housing land. For instance, they revealed that 
most of the enterprises in Cuiheng had not secured profits after land expropriation. 
As a consequence, the Cuiheng peasants had become landless, and in particular, 
their customs, language and kinship relations had been severely affected because of 
the fragmentation of the village social relations. 
 
Furthermore, the  Yakou  village  leaders uphold the commune  as  a model in  the 
reform era, as an opposing force against industrial infiltration into the farmland. They 
showed their discontent with the market reform as compared with the pre-reform era 
in which the people’s commune was paramount. Neither did they understand the 
meaning of the Chinese revolution in respect of the current situation where peasants’ 
land is forcibly taken away by the local government and developers. Resonating with 
many villagers’ complaints in other Chinese regions, they basically questioned how 
social harmony, social equity and moral righteousness achieved in the collective era 
of the 1950-60s could be brought back (see Hurst & O’Brein, 2002; Jacka, 1998; Lee, 
2007).  For  instance,  they  criticized  the  model  pursued  in  Dongguan—a  small 
booming  industrial  city  in  the  province  whose  development  has  driven  many 
peasants off their land. As a result, the farmland has become a site for industries 
which caused air pollution and environmental damage to the surrounding natural 
resources. In their view, this type of rural development only benefits the government 
and businesses. Thus, the commune is an effective institution that offers protection 
to the peasants against losing their land to the mighty few. But they recognized the 
role  of  the  economy in  sustaining the  commune  system.  Yakou  is  unique  in  its 
geographical location and natural resources—the key to the local economy. The 
same type of commune could not be feasible in other regions. In any case, the land 
redistributed to them through the revolution of the Communist Party ought to be 
preserved rather than snatched by others. Thus, the development of the land market 
and even potential land privatization would negate the Communist Party’s struggle 
and meaning of the revolution. In the spirit of equitable development and collective 
management of the village, the Yakou peasants managed to donate RMB 110,000 to   174 
the Sichuan earthquake victims and their families in May 2008, while only a few 
thousand Yuan was collected in the neighbouring villages such as Cuiheng.  
 
5.  “Silent struggles” in rural land governance 
 
Land to the Yakou village leadership has never been the means to short-term profit 
gains. On the contrary, land preservation and its sound management have been 
given the highest priority. In fact, “never sell our land” has been one of their guiding 
principles. This is evident in their worship of the “god of land” in all households that 
regard it as the symbol of peace and prosperity. Nonetheless, for the village leaders, 
maintaining the commune has never been an easy task given the mounting political 
and economic pressures discussed earlier. They have had to cope with the internal 
discontent and even the intervention of the local government in their silent struggles.  
 
In recent years, there have been several rifts among the peasants as to whether the 
commune system ought to be continued. Obviously, in the absence of strong village 
leadership, many members believed that the commune would not have functioned 
effectively. One-third of the informants disagreed on who really owned the land. But 
most of them thought that the real owner was the collective. Concerning land use, 
some contended that the paddy fields should be sold to outsiders so that they could 
use that money to do whatever they wanted. They also expressed their concerns 
over the commune’s agricultural inefficiency. As some young peasants argued, they 
would rather use the land for other more efficient purposes, because they have the 
opportunities to seek off-farm employment. Some even contended that there was 
nothing wrong with land privatization as long as equality and their benefits from the 
land are ensured. They felt that they had lost the rights to directly use the land, which 
the  HRS would otherwise  have granted them.  As some  saw it,  the  peasants  in 
Cuiheng were in a better position to gain meager profits from land expropriation, but 
the Yakou peasants have lost this golden opportunity.  
 
Moreover,  the  commune  was  criticized  for  lacking  insights  to  adopt  advanced 
technology  and  initiate  innovative  agribusiness  activities.  It  was  thought  that  the 
commune should be transformed into to a more effective institution that helps the 
poor members out of poverty, as a large group of them could only make their ends 
meet.  Even  though  they  work  on  the  paddy  fields,  on  average  they  could  only 
receive RMB 700 per person according to the village statistics of 2007.  
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For the elderly and unemployed, the farmland provides a minimum safety net on 
which  they  can  always  rely.  Thus,  they  were  against  partitioning  or  further 
fragmentation  of  the  land.  Furthermore,  they  thought  that  in  the  event  of 
implementation of the HRS in this village, they would not gain much in light of the low 
agricultural  subsidy  from  the  government  and  rising  capital  costs  of  farming.  In 
addition,  land  privatization  or  decollectivization  would  cause  further  economic 
disparity within the village. They also mentioned that only those who managed to find 
nice jobs outside the village would favour the HRS. Overall, about 70 percent of the 
informants showed their contentment with the fact that land still remains in the hands 
of the village, which was the biggest achievement of the commune. At the same time, 
they thought that neither the commune nor land privatization would be the weapon 
against illegal land evictions. They advocated more solutions to improve land use 
efficiency. 
 
These views reflect the ongoing challenges for the village leadership to address. The 
village  leaders  argued  strongly  that  discontinuation  of  the  commune  was  short-
sighted, unwise and lacked thorough factual basis. They did not believe that the land 
sales  can  contribute  to  the  maximization  of  profits  from  new  development 
opportunities  given  the  vulnerability  of  the  market  economy  and  the  lack  of 
opportunities for the commune members. As the Party Secretary contended,  
 
Dismantling the commune by dividing up the land or even allowing for land 
transfers might yield quick income to the members, but they must not forget 
that when the money is used up, they cannot do much for themselves and 
for their offspring who will have no land to rely on in the end.50   
 
To the commune leaders, the only way to ensure equity is to keep the land as it is 
now. It is believed that in the era of economic uncertainty especially low economic 
returns from agriculture, the commune plays an essential role in the rural economy. It 
also regulates all kinds of activities and relations that can safeguard the peasants’ 
best interests. However, they also recognized that there mounting pressure on the 
paddy fields. The more people kept returning to the village from cities, the more 
difficulty it was for the commune to accommodate their needs.  
 
Struggles  over  the  existence  of  the  commune  between  the  peasants  and  the 
commune  leaders  reached  a  climax  when  a  few  members  formed  the  “anti-
corruption action group” publicly accusing the village committee especially the Party 
Secretary of corruption and abuse of power in 2001. This group also sent letters of 
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petition  to  both  the  Zhongshan  municipal  and  provincial  governments.  Their 
accusations  focused  on  two  issues--transparency  in  land  management  and 
continuation  of  the  commune.  This  action  aroused  the  serious  attention  of  the 
Nanlang township government which sent four special task teams to the village to 
carry out household investigations. It also sent township auditors to examine the 
village financial accounts of 1997-2004. Based on the 752 household surveys (87% 
of the total number of households) and the auditors’ reports, these allegations were 
refuted. In particular, the findings showed that the Party Secretary had enjoyed a 
high reputation among the commune members that explained the effectiveness of 
the village leadership in the fight against poverty and village governance. As a result, 
the village committee was cleared of all the charges, which enabled the commune 
system to continue (Yakou Village Administrative Committee, 2005: 164). 
 
The village-state land struggles also take place in silent and sometimes undetectable 
ways. The strong village leadership has managed to deter many claims and deflect 
discontent over the commune. To deal with this, the local state could only resort to 
other means to use the village land. To promote tourism, for instance, it built roads 
for  the  development  of  a  forest  park  at  a later  stage in  the  hills owned  by  the 
commune. By doing so, it may claim its ownership after the park is built, since by 
then the village would probably find it extremely difficult to manage the mountain 
resources, according to the village committee. Another example shows that the local 
development also uses its policy agenda to promote its interests. As Yakou is prone 
to typhoon and flooding, mangrove trees were planted along the coast to prevent 
natural disasters. However, according to the local peasants, this practice may not be 
effective and moreover, it could affect the marine ecosystem. Again, this was seen 
as another step by the local state to extend its power to the village. Step by step, it 
could lead to the fragmentation of village land and collapse of the commune system, 
according to a member of the village committee. Furthermore, he held the view that 
the village and local state did not always have the same development goals, which 
was a driving force behind the struggles over limited resources and power to control 
them.  
 
Furthermore,  Yakou  village  is  claimed  to  be  the  only  one  village  without  rural 
collective land registration as required by the 2007 Property Law and mandates of 
the central and local governments, despite numerous local government notices and 
warnings issued. As the farmland in this village has never been contracted out to the 
individual households, the village leaders had a strong reason to refuse registration. 
Local government had no other response but to complain about the backwardness 
and stubbornness of village leadership who were not open to further discussions. It 
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leadership especially the village Party Secretary whose insistence on the commune 
system had averted many of their interventions. However, in an interview with village 
administration committee, the main reason for this lies in their unwillingness to pay 
the registration fee, although no information on the fee was released. Obviously, 
there were more underlying issues behind their stance. According to the local land 
bureau,  the  Yakou  village  committee  was  concerned  about  land  acquisition  and 
farmland loss to the local government in the event of land registration. This also 
reflects the fact that local government or any public oversight over the land use 
arrangements  is  ineffective.  The  local  land  bureau  does  not  possess  sufficient 
knowledge of details about how the farmland is leased and cultivated to determine 
whether they meet relevant policies and requirements. Again, the village collective in 
managing the commune seems to be able to make the best use of the collective 
landownership as a weapon against the arbitration of the local government.  
 
6.  Commune as an effective governing institution? 
 
This case demonstrates that the institution of the commune can be a weapon of the 
weak that empowers them to manage their land and tackle some of the economic 
and political challenges facing them. In contrast to most of the village collectives that 
do not serve the collective interests, the Yakou commune manifests itself as a better 
community-centred  collective  institution.  Because  it  serves  the  interests  of  the 
members, the village leaders can use it as a strong excuse to deter local state’s 
interest in land. In the current Chinese context, sound rural land governance requires 
a strong village leadership through a reasonably established democratic governance 
system as exemplified by their daily management and elections in the case of Yakou. 
Primarily, the village Party Secretary is recognized as their rightful leader—someone 
who is not involvement in corruption, who is self-disciplined and passionate about 
helping his fellow villagers and with a strong belief in the power of collective action in 
village  development  and  governance.  Not  only  is  the  village  Party  Secretary  an 
experienced village leader, but he is regarded as the most important person for the 
commune. There is no single case in which he was involved in banquets or dinner s 
with visitors and local government officials. He is thrifty—most of the time he goes 
barefoot and rides a shabby bicycle. More strikingly, the village committee work most 
of the time including holidays even during the Chinese Spring Festival, and usually 
till 9:00 pm.  To make everyone in the committee equal, their salaries are kept 
almost the same regardless of ranks. Moreover, they all have the power to approve 
any  village  policy  documents  and  financial  dossiers.  They  are  elected  by  the 
members through their active participation in the election process. Consequently, the 
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a  shining  example  for  the  rest  of  the  country  in  terms  of  the  dedication  of  the 
leadership to work and well-established effective working procedures.  
 
Yet, social or, more overtly, political divisions within the Yakou commune itself do not 
appear to ever cease as many interviewees confirmed. Essentially, local peasants 
want more from the commune in terms of better distribution of benefits from land 
management. With the impact of the neighbouring villages that are experiencing land 
seizures and in some cases receiving an increased amount of cash compensation, 
many  of  them  think  that  sticking  to  the  land  is  not  economically  rewarding.  In 
particular, the dominance of the local government in deciding on how land should be 
used makes them doubt the sustainability of the commune. They are at a loss as to 
how their land can be better managed to meet their increasing needs of secure 
livelihoods and more efficient economic returns. 
 
To  a  large  degree,  although  the  village  leaders  have  attempted  to  improve  the 
mechanisms for accountability and transparency built into their daily work, they have 
yet to develop more effective means to enhance peasants’ incentives to participate 
in village governance. Unavoidably, some members have expressed their discontent 
with the committee and begun to become sceptical of the power of the commune in 
dealing with external and internal oppositional forces. The village committee, like 
many other similar institutions across the globe, functions as the lowest level of 
government administration. And peasants’ involvement in village affairs is fixed in a 
structure that resembles that of the state. The art of village committee functioning is 
a just a microcosm of the bureaucratic ideal of statecraft (Fairhead & Leach, 2003; 
Ribot, 1999). This also explains the fact the village leadership plays an essential role 
in maintaining the current system, without which the commune may have collapsed. 
In addition, the rules developed by the village leaders may not favour all of the 
members and the local state. Likewise, not all the collective decisions made are 
democratic, which may not lead to stable outcomes (Nagendra & Ostrom, 2008). In 
short, how to improve village governance in the overall context of autocracy in China 
presents a daunting challenge for its effectiveness and sustainability. Nonetheless, 
compared with other villages in China, to a certain extent, Yakou is a model village, 
despite its own internal problems simply because of the fact that it manages to make 
its  own  land  tenure  system  work for  the  majority  of its members.  Even  its  own 
governance is far from being “perfect”, at least the strong leadership in maintaining 
this  pro-poor  land  tenure  system  is  virtually  unsurpassed  by  others.  A  strong 
leadership as this case describes is desperately needed in China for the sake of 
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7.  Conclusions 
 
This chapter demonstrates that land institutional change in China’s market reform 
and  economic  transition  cannot  be  understood  without  paying  attention  to  the 
conditions and dynamics of local contexts. The case of the Yakou commune explains 
the fact that the local peasantry can determine their own forms of land institutions 
that  better  suit  their  needs  and  local  economic,  political  and  environmental 
parameters. The continuity of the institution of the commune is a paradox in the 
mainstream land institutional reform—the HRS and land shareholding cooperatives, 
underpinned  by  a  market-oriented  approach to  land  use  and  management.  This 
approach has proven to be detrimental to the livelihoods of the poor as Yakou’s 
neighbouring communities demonstrate. It also explains that collective or communal 
land arrangements, on condition that village economic development suits the needs 
of the poor, do ensure land tenure security.  
 
The case of Yakou commune differs from the rural people’s communes prominent in 
the 1960s in three major aspects. First, under the people’s commune, commune 
members had no freedom to choose their jobs. In Yakou, they are absolutely free to 
decide on the opportunities that suit them, since it is an open system. Second, under 
the people’s commune, there was no individual economy; everything was organized 
by  the  commune  as  a  collective.  As  Oi  (1999)  points  out,  the  whole  incentive 
framework was distorted by the ideology of the commune. In contrast, in Yakou, 
except for the paddy fields under collective operation, the rest of the resources are 
managed in light of market principles through land leases to other parties. In this 
sense, the village has a mixed economy which allows for the achievement of both 
economic  efficiency  and  social  equity  for  the  poor.  Third,  under  the  people’s 
commune,  village  leaders  were  appointed  by  the  commune.  In  Yakou,  they  are 
democratically elected and represent the interests of the majority voters (Cao, 2002). 
All these features indicate that collective choice over land management can achieve 
better  economic  outcomes  when the collective institution is able to  adapt  to the 
demands of the market economy and peasants. Thus, the Yakou land system is a 
hybrid one that integrates both market and collective institutions, which is the key to 
its success. In facing economic uncertainty and lack of social protection for the rural 
poor,  the  Yakou  commune  provides  a  viable  alternative  for  the  majority  of  its 
members. 
 
Land is a manifestation of economic and political power struggles among peasants, 
local government and other stakeholders in the Chinese countryside. Land rights can 
be understood in terms of who actually occupies the land itself. Yet the more critical 
point is who owns the land—a contentious issue in China, which lies in the symbolic   180 
meaning of land rights. As Zhang (2007) contends, symbolic land rights are more 
appropriate. By symbolic land rights he means that land itself has its far-reaching 
implications for state control. Through manipulating power over the masses the state 
actually manages to exert the ultimate control over land rights. As a result, land 
displays its inherent feature as a symbol of state power. This is easier to understand 
for the Chinese peasants who all know that their land does not really belong to them, 
although their long leasehold and use rights have been greatly enforced. Zhang 
argues  that  it  is  hardly  meaningful  to  discuss  about  the  landownership  issue—
privately  or  publicly  owned—in  China.  Rather,  it  is  more  useful  to  explore  the 
underlying issues of dialectic relationships between land rights and power, which is 
important to understanding justice and equity concerning land rights. 
 
Following Zhang’s argument, it can be seen that the Yakou commune appears to be 
a symbol of village power in managing the land and in its struggle with the local state, 
which has far-reaching implications for China’s land governance. As the state has 
tremendous power in decision-making, and despite numerous policies and laws to 
tackle poor land governance and unsustainable land uses, without limiting the overt 
power of the state these policies and laws would be ineffective in addressing the 
mounting issues of land tenure and rural livelihoods. The government itself is still 
trapped in its transition because of poor governance (Pei, 2006). In this context, the 
chapter shows that there is a huge gap between policy and the actual local context. 
This deviation can only make the policy ineffective or it may even aggravate the local 
situation. Thus, the Yakou commune is a local institutional invention that galvanizes 
the collective power and resources to maximize local economic and political interests. 
Moreover, it appears to be a social institution—an alternative to the institution of the 
HRS that puts individual households at the mercy of the market and state control. It 
is still a powerful institution to confront the state in its use of collective force. Its 
strength  shows  that  the  system  itself  must  be  built  on  the  peasants’  needs  for 
livelihoods  and  participation  in  rural  governance  and  development.  However,  as 
peasants lack engagement with the state through formal channels such as the legal 
system, they have developed indifference to their role in working with the state in 
nation building. Thus, it is a challenge to reorganize them to provide incentives and 
enhance their capacities in participation in governance. This further explains the 
institutional vacuum of the state in its relationship with the poor. The commune fills it 
in to certain extent.  
 
Social and political relations in the rural setting always embody complex struggles 
over  land  tenure.  The  commune  is  a  reflection  of  these  struggles  and  more 
importantly,  collective  power  over  the  state  and  others.  It  is  also  an  important 
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the  powerless  and  powerful  (Coombe,  1998).  However,  peasants’  concerns  and 
disagreement over the existence of the commune reveal the urgency of tackling 
issues of rural economy, improvement in governance transparency, accountability 
and peasant participation on both village and local government levels. Without this 
approach, the covert village-state and intra-village struggles will continue. In this 
sense, at least, the commune appears to be a weapon of the weak, although it has 
less power in rebellion and revolutionary mobilization (Scott 1985; Walker, 2008). 
Thus, an in-depth study of the commune can explain the many issues and dilemmas 
concerning peasant-state relations over land and local development, which has far-
reaching implications for the understanding of collective versus individual action in 
rural land reform in China.  
 
This case study contributes to the ongoing theoretical debates on rural development 
in an international setting whereby the causes of poverty and solutions are focused 
on market-oriented and social relational approaches. The latter is widely recognized 
as  the  key  to  understanding  transformative  policies  and  political  processes  that 
restructure social relations (Bernstein 2008; O’Laughlin, 2008, sited in Borras Jr., 
2009). Thus, the institution of the commune or the hybrid land tenure systems is a 
manifestation of both approaches, without which it would not have been possible for 
the commune to achieve the current levels of land protection and equitable village 
development as compared with its neighbouring villages. Moreover, it contributes to 
the understanding of extra-legal issues of land tenure reform in comparison with the 
conventional  approach  of  formalization  of  land  tenure  earmarked  as  individual 
landownership  (Assies,  2009).  Obviously,  communal  land  tenure  in  the  case  of 
Yakou offers a re-thinking of all these approaches and important implications for 
policy options in the course of China’s transformation. It is in this process that more 
community-centred  and flexible  policy approaches  ought  to be sought by policy-
makers.  
 
It is far too early to assess the wider development impact on the village and the 
response  of  the  village  to  the  mainstream  economy.  But  the  decision  over  its 
development trajectory ought to be made by the commune members themselves. 
The crux of the matter is whether they would like to continue this system; and if they 
would, how they will be able to guard themselves against “foreign” intrusion. To a 
large extent, this will be contingent upon the power of the local government and real 
estate agencies, which even resort to force to pursue land seizures (Nanfang Daily, 
2008). Moreover, the Yakou village leaders have to mitigate the conflicting interests 
of their own members to provide them with a more effective sustainable development 
framework.  Intra-village  social  and  political  divisions  can  actually  complicate  the 
communal land rights arrangements. In other words, communal rights are not as   182 
homogenous as conceived by the proposition of common property regime (see von 
Benda-Beckmann,  2006;  Nagendra  & Ostrom,  2008).  At least, the  Yakou  model 
shows that a local land institutional design that largely suits local needs can be 
initiated, and many elements of this innovation can be shared with other regions. 
Essentially, the effectiveness of a land tenure system is embedded within the overall 
pattern of land use, rural governance and development, among other parameters. 
Yakou peasants manage to make these combined elements work in order to sustain 
its commune.  
 
For  policy  makers, it is  of utmost importance  to include land  governance  in  the 
overall framework of rural development for the design of integrated programmes, 
which maximize the potential of land through better management and reflection of 
local  realities.  The  Yakou  leaders  still  need  to  forge  wider  societal  support  for 
improved efficiency and better governance; above all, through further empowering 
the  members  in  participating  in  decision-making  and  institutional  building  more 
effectively.  The  case  of  Yakou  implies  that  the  mainstreamed  land  tenure 
approaches may not work in the interests of the poor land users, since the linkages 
between  land  tenure  and  the  social,  economic,  environmental  and  political 
determinants in a given setting are not properly understood.  
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Chapter 7  Summary, key research issues 
revisited and policy suggestions 
 
 
1.  Basic conclusions 
 
Facing the challenges of rural development and extensive farmland loss in particular, 
the Chinese government has never ceased the efforts to reform the country’s land 
laws and policies. Despite the progress made in ensuring equal distribution of land 
rights and support for household-based farming to improve peasants’ livelihoods and 
agricultural production, there are numerous unfinished tasks that must address the 
obstacles adversely affecting the land rights and livelihoods of the majority of the 
poor peasants. In most cases where the peasants cannot utilize the land to its full 
potential, the absence of an enabling environment to ensure participation in land use 
and planning process further undermines the effectiveness of the land reform. The 
existing polices lack specific targets that allow the peasants to effectively organize 
themselves in claiming their citizenry rights that suits their best interests. Despite the 
emphasis on the importance of strengthening the land rights of the peasants in rural 
development, the current state-led and market-oriented land institutions have yet to 
encourage the establishment of peasant-centred arrangements for sustainable land 
utilization. Policy failure in tackling complex meanings of land, notions of property 
relations  and  the  underlying  social,  political  and  economic  contexts  further  sets 
structural limits to current reform measures (see Sikor & Müller, 2009). 
 
This  study provides a holistic  approach to an  understanding  of land  rights, land 
institutional  change  and  sustainable  land  use  and  rural  development  especially 
focusing on the historical, political and social dimensions of the past and present 
practices of land tenure in China. It contributes to a multi-dimensional study of rural 
development and land reform linkages which are interpreted differently by different 
stakeholders. For the peasants in the vast poor rural areas, land remains their basic 
means of subsistence given a lack of social support programmes to provide a social 
safety net for them in the face of land expropriation. Yet this does not mean that they 
have the intention to keep the land intact as it is. In fact, it shows that their decisions 
over land use is contingent upon numerous external factors, and in most cases, their 
lack  of  alternative  choices  actually  frees  up  ample  space  for  the  local  state  to 
manipulate the entire process of land use and management. The mere absence of   188 
peasant-initiated  activities  and  organizations  explains  their  vulnerability  to  any 
infringement of their rights by the local state and corporations. It illustrates the power 
imbalances  among  different  actors  and  the  weak  power  of  the  peasantry  in 
determining land use. For the state, land acquisition and expropriation still constitute 
the most important means of local financing and reaching the goal of rapid local 
economic  growth,  while  paying  a  high  cost  in  terms  of  peasants’  land  tenure 
insecurity that triggers social unrest. In the process of decentralization, the local 
state continues to experience fiscal constraints on economic and social development, 
which  lead  to  a  quick  fix  through  land  sales  to  obtain  lucrative  revenues.  The 
downward cycle of land loss further exacerbates rural poverty and social inequality 
between the rural and urban dwellers. In China where legal and policy instruments 
have not functioned to the benefit of the poor, land tenure insecurity and poor rural 
governance  continue  to  constrain  China’s  path  towards  sustainable  rural 
development. 
 
Few studies have addressed the issue of the importance of land to the rural poor, the 
realization  of  land  rights  for  them  and  the  linkages  between  land  tenure  and 
sustainable land use in a broader sense. Moreover, the relationships between land 
property  rights,  peasant-organized  individual  and  collective  actions  and  village 
governance have not been sufficiently analyzed. To fill this analytical gap, this study 
takes a critical look at the historical implications of China’s land reform, the trajectory 
of socialist-centred and market-oriented land laws and policies, local interpretations 
and implementation of the laws and policies and local practices with elements of 
innovative choice over land use. It demonstrates that land property rights and land 
tenure security cannot be addressed single-handedly without the exploration of the 
institutions  that  support  policy  implementation  and  local  innovation.  And  these 
institutions  ought  to  be  designed  by  the  peasants  themselves.  Of  course,  the 
supporting roles of the state and businesses are needed. However, this remains a 
daunting  challenge  for  them  especially  in  view  of  the  lack  of  legal  and  policy 
mechanisms.  This  is  compounded  by  the  lack  of  genuine  village  democratic 
governance that further hinders the creation of peasant incentives in the land reform 
process.  It  shows  that  in  the  Chinese  cultural  and  political  context,  the  market-
oriented land reform, if not governed properly by the state, can also exacerbate land 
loss  of  the  poor  whose  capacity  in  organizing  themselves  towards  better  land 
management will be further undermined. There is urgency for the policy-makers to 
revisit their policies and examine more critically what the peasants need from the 
land  reform  and  how  they  can  be  empowered  to  participate  in  the  process. 
Otherwise, in the name of improving land governance, the local state can still take 
the laws and policies into their own hands and produce those “fancy” institutions that 
can only do damage to the livelihoods of the poor.    189 
 
2.  Summary of key chapters 
 
To understanding China’s land reform, one needs to start from its history and the 
implications  for  current  land  institutional  development.  In  chapter  2,  it  is 
demonstrated  that  social  inequality  derived  from  land  tenure  has  marked  the 
struggles between the Chinese peasantry and the state. Essentially, these struggles 
indicate that the Chinese rural society has failed the peasants whose land remains 
the most basic means of livelihoods and also the root of poverty. Being economically 
poor without entitlements to land, the peasants are marginalized in the mainstream 
rural  economic  development.  Their  vulnerability  to  land  loss  and  natural  and 
economic shocks further exacerbates their poverty. In most cases, their poverty has 
advantaged the rural elite and local businesses, which rely on peasants’ land for 
speculative  gains.  With  regard  to  the  mounting  power  of  the  local  state  and 
businesses, the Chinese empire struggled to undertake various reforms to address 
these issues. Land reform in the Ming and Qing dynasties spawned an alliance 
between the empire and local landlordism that put the poor landless peasants and 
tenants on the margin of development. Although various land reform measures were 
undertaken to curtail the power of the local state and landlordism, the local peasants 
were not able to become a consistent strong force against their masters except for 
ad hoc cases of social protests.  
 
By contrast, the communist-led land revolution marked the beginning of the new era 
of China’s social and political transformation characterized by “land for the tiller” 
programmes. In the aftermath of the 1949 communist’s victory, land was equally 
redistributed among the peasant households. Strikingly, this move was aborted just a 
few years later by the introduction of the commune system. Chapter 2 attempts to 
show that the system of “land for the tiller” had not brought about significant rural 
economic changes. Moreover, the commune system also ended in the failure to 
reorganize the peasants to achieve better agricultural production outcomes. It was 
then  replaced  by  market-oriented reforms in  which the  Household  Responsibility 
System (HRS) was introduced which aimed at creating peasant incentives in farming. 
Again, the HRS has not proven to be an effective solution to the complex rural 
problems  in  China.  In  short,  all  these  land  reform  measures  have  one  thing  in 
common, that is, reform imposed from the top without addressing the needs of the 
poor  and  tackling  the  socially  and  politically  structural  factors  constraining  rural 
development. Chinese rural societal organization has never been enabled to decide 
on the desired forms of land reform. Land reform imposed by the state has actually 
served the state’s political needs in terms of reorganization of the rural masses to   190 
consolidate control rather than facilitate peasant-centred pro-poor land institutional 
changes. 
 
Furthermore,  as  chapter  3  shows,  the  ultimate  goal  of  land  management  is  to 
ensure  poverty  alleviation  and  sustainable  rural  development  for  the  poor 
irrespective of the type of land reforms implemented. In this respect, no one-size-fits-
all  solutions  to  China’s  complex  rural  problems  can  be  found.  Rather,  peasant 
institutional innovation ought to be encouraged and fostered. But this is a daunting 
task for the government to execute. First, the political will to do so is not clear; nor is 
it easy for the local state to implement because of different incentives to govern the 
land. Second, there are few demonstration pilots available to influence policy. Third, 
it remains a challenge to implement multi-stakeholder participation in land use and 
management.  Last,  how  to  work  with  the  peasants  and  how  the  peasants  can 
organize themselves to deal with their land require the ultimate change. On this 
issue, it shows that the ongoing debates on landownership especially the focus on 
the clarification of the collective rights and ownership as well as others radically 
calling for  privatization  present  a  simplistic  approach  to  institutional  reform.  This 
approach  ignores  the  fundamental  constraints  to  rural  governance  which  is  still 
characterized as top-down and thus autocratic, although village democratization has 
brought about several advantages. Moreover, to a certain extent, the current market-
oriented land laws and policies have actually co-existed with the fragmented social 
and political relations among the peasants whose collective choice and power over 
land use and management are dramatically undermined. This caveat of the current 
land reform renders a warning to policy-makers that the incentives and social and 
political realities of peasants ought to be taken into real consideration in any policy 
changes. 
 
The  next  two  chapters  provide  critical  findings  of  both  the  conventional  and 
experimental land institutions that govern the land and people as contrasting cases 
of land management. Chapter 4 illustrates the daunting challenges of sustainable 
land use and rural development facing the poverty regions of China. In these areas 
where poverty is rampant as a result of insufficient economic opportunities for the 
poor  and  inappropriate  land  use  and  management,  among  other  factors,  land 
management has become a key item on the political agenda of the local state. In 
pursuit of a quick fix, the latter, like the majority parts of the country, has followed the 
tendency towards a more individualistic approach by applying the HRS to land and 
nature resource tenure. Yet, it shows that this approach has not resulted in effective 
solutions in terms of sustainable land use. First, stakeholders’ conflicting interests 
show their different views on how land ought to be sustainably managed. As a result, 
it has failed to enable the stakeholders to reach common objectives and strategies in   191 
land management. Second, the HRS is found to be an inappropriate approach to 
land  resources  management  especially  concerning  rangeland,  forestry  and 
agricultural land use. As the management of these resources relies on an integrated 
plan  for  sustainable  solutions,  the  HRS  has  not  facilitated  this  institutional 
development. Third, it has further fragmented social and political relations, which 
make multi-stakeholder collaboration in land management more difficult. Last but not 
the least, the HRS is a simplistic solution to complex poverty and natural resource 
linkages. In short, it demonstrates that the HRS is not a panacea to China’s complex 
land problems, as its underlying social fragmentation facilitates poor land and village 
governance  and  undermines  any  mechanisms  of  collective  action.  Thus,  policy 
improvements should take account of the existing institutions and practices on the 
ground (see Sikor & Müller, 2009). 
 
In chapter 5, the strengthening of the HRS is seen as a further step towards local 
experimentation  on  the  institution  of  land  shareholding  cooperatives.  Despite  its 
characteristics  of  collective  mechanisms,  the  role  of  this  institution  in  protecting 
peasant land and property rights and poverty alleviation is rather limited. It serves 
the needs of the local state in land expropriation to a large extent rather than the so-
called scaled development that benefits the poor. As land shareholding cooperatives 
require reorganization of peasants’ land rights and agricultural production, the role of 
the local state in carrying out this institutional change becomes paramount because 
of many contentious issues of poor governance that marginalize the majority of the 
poor  peasant  shareholders.  It  reveals  that  the  current  practices  are  far  from  a 
peasant-centred  collective  treatment;  yet  it  provokes  a  rethinking  of  inter-related 
issues of land policy and institutions, poverty and village governance. Moreover, the 
tendency towards this institutional development does show the weakening of the 
HRS in tackling land fragmentation and its underlying social and economic issues. 
Rather than strengthening the collective rights of the peasants, land shareholding 
cooperatives  may  reinforce  the  power  of  the  local  state  in  the  absence  of 
participative  village  governance  processes  to  hold the  state into  account.  Whilst 
caution should be exercised in relevant policies, policy-makers need to address the 
rights and  needs  of the peasants  and local conditions in the  experimentation  of 
collective action in land governance.  
 
By  contrast,  the  more  grass-roots-level  of  institutional  experimentation  shown  in 
chapter 6 is a case in point that illustrates peasant-centred institutional innovation 
with  similar  aims  to  that  of  the  earlier  mentioned  technocratic  and  bureaucratic 
approaches.  It  underscores  the  value  of  peasant  organization,  in  this  case,  the 
commune in uniting and representing the community as an effective collective force 
against local state interference in land management. Standing in opposition to the   192 
mainstream economy, the economic system of the commune based on egalitarian 
principles  and  practices  further  ensures  equal  distribution  of  village  assets  and 
wealth  derived  from  land  use  among  the  commune  members.  Accountable  and 
transparent  village  governance  plays  an  essential  role  in  social,  political  and 
economic processes concerning land use. In particular, under the leadership of the 
village administrative committee, the commune members are given ample space to 
participate  in  the  governance  process.  It  demonstrates  that  land  management 
centred  upon  individualistic  approaches  does  not  represent  a  single  solution  to 
China’s land reform. Instead, community-centred collective action still provides a 
viable  alternative  to  certain  institutional  arrangements  under  market-oriented 
economic reform, whilst making use of the advantages that the market economy 
offers.  This  is  particularly  relevant  when  China’s  economic  reform  has  exerted 
adverse impacts on the livelihoods and natural resources of the marginalized poor. 
However, the sustainability of the commune lies in many factors, among which is the 
continuation of the village democratic leadership, village economic development and 
more importantly, the power struggles between the village and the local state and the 
underlying  social  relations  among  different  actors  with  varying  vested  interests 
(Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Leach et al., 1999). Any changes in the policy and law of 
the latter will challenge the existence of the commune that still needs to operate 
more effectively to integrate into the mainstream political economy of the region. This 
case provides a critical angle to the analysis of the dynamics and conditions of 
locally-based  land  tenure,  which  is  essential  to  tackle  the  structural  constraints 
introduced  by  the  ongoing  market-oriented  institutional  reform  in  rural  China.  In 
essence, this case illuminates the renewed debates on land tenure, which can only 
work in poor people’s favour once it suits their needs for sustainable livelihoods, 
natural resources management and the local economy as a whole.  
 
3.  Key research issues revisited 
 
This study aims to shed light on a number of rural development issues concerning 
land  tenure  security,  sustainable  livelihoods,  village  governance  and  peasant 
choices  to  address  the  dilemma  that  China  faces  in  its  economic  and  political 
transformation. While land tenure is important to the Chinese peasantry, its location 
within  the  broader  context  of  sustainable  rural  development  reveals  its  intrinsic 
linkages with the social, political, economic and biophysical dynamics and conditions 
of a given setting. A particular land tenure regime can only be sustained provided 
that it accords with the local contexts which shape it. It is a mistake to look for 
solutions to the land-related rural problems through a single disciplinary lens. Thus, 
the study seeks to develop a relatively comprehensive scenario of land policy and   193 
practice while maintaining its anthropological and political economic focuses. It pays 
attention to four issues in China’s land reform process, namely, responsiveness to 
local  livelihoods,  connections  with  dynamics  of  authority,  interactions  with  social 
inequalities, and environmental repercussions (Sikor & Müller, 2009: 1312). How to 
make land tenure work for the poor in the name of rural sustainable development is 
the ultimate challenge for the Chinese policy-makers. Thus, the findings of this study 
further address the key issues pertinent to the cases of other countries and transition 
economies in particular. 
 
3.1  Common property regimes and social dimensions of land tenure 
Common property often refers to the property as jointly owned and managed by 
groups. As such, often it is analyzed in conjunction with customary law and land 
tenure  systems,  and  so  forth.  Common  property  regimes  are  criticized  for  their 
inability to secure the rights of the poor and to facilitate economic development. 
Instead, states and markets are seen as the appropriate institutional avenues to 
address policy failures in natural resources management (see Shapiro, 1989).  
 
China’s  collective  landownership  carries  the  characteristics  of  common  property 
regime to a certain extent. Although rural farmland is contracted out to individual 
households, it is still under the overall management responsibility of the collective 
comprised by the natural and administrative village. The latter stipulates the major 
rules of land use and management. In this sense, the political, social and economic 
relationships between the individual household land users and the collective become 
complicated and evolve over time and space. However, it demonstrates that more 
individually-oriented land policies may not be appropriate given regional diversities in 
economic and social development. Furthermore, the issue of the “tragedy of the 
commons”  is  inappropriately  applied  across  the  board  (Hardin,  1968).  As  such, 
collective land ownership has its particular relevance for the Chinese politics and 
society. The reality of a large population living in poverty and with limited land and 
other natural resources requires the interactions between the state and the local 
community and collective action towards land utilization and sustainable livelihoods. 
The mixed pattern of collective landownership with individual peasant’s land use 
rights has enabled the state to formulate flexible land policies to cater for its social 
and  economic  development  needs.  Despite  their  induced  problems,  at  least  the 
collective is still legally recognized and plays an essential role in organizing the 
peasant society. However, the challenge remains as to how to make it work for the 
poor and stimulate more meaningful collective institutional arrangements for land use   194 
and management and land conflict resolution. This requires more in-depth studies of 
changing property rights relations as part of broader social, political and economic 
changes (Ensminger, 1997; Hann, 1998; Shipton & Goheen, 1992). 
 
The existence of common property regimes in many parts of the world obviously 
reflects the importance of social relations as complex dimensions of land tenure. 
Social relations in the Chinese context exhibit an interesting area for the study of the 
role of land in reconstructing the relations among various stakeholders. Strikingly, 
the Chinese countryside reveals the existence of both fragmented land relations and 
the  predominance  of  rural  collectives  and  village  administrative  representative 
committees. Linking these dimensions to land property rights, one finds that the 
current  policy  focused  on  strengthening  individual’s  land  rights  may  further 
exacerbate land fragmentation and loosen community coherence. This may favour 
the powerful actors who impose unfavourable conditions on the poor, since the latter 
find it hard to organize collective action. Ultimately, if the law does not provide ample 
impetus for community-organized land relations and collective action, the trend of 
poor land and village governance cannot be averted. This study tries to address the 
underlying challenges for land institutional innovation constrained by the asymmetric 
power relations between the peasants and other stronger stakeholders. This is in line 
with the latest developments in common property studies (see Varughese & Ostrom, 
2001; Agrawal, 2005). 
 
Common  property  regimes  should  not  be  assessed  only  from  the  negative 
perspectives.  As  Ostrom  (1990)  argues,  the  study  of  common  property  regimes 
reveals the  micro-institutional regulation  of the  resources  and the  possibilities  of 
community especially small groups of resource users who are able to craft viable 
forms of resources governance. This is exactly the case in chapter 6 which examines 
a village commune in detail. The latter asserts that the institution of private land 
property rights  should not  be treated  as  a  teleological  and deterministic logic  to 
China’s agrarian future. This is because concepts such as private, public or common 
are just too general to sufficiently reflect the local institutional variation in resource 
governance (Agrawal, 2005; McKean, 2000). Future research on the public/collective 
and private land tenure interface and their linkages with the broader issues of the 
political economy and governance and social processes would contribute to land 
policy improvements for the Chinese peasantry.  
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3.2  Bundles of rights versus bundles of power 
Land tenure security is often recognized as the fundamental issue to be tackled for 
successful land reform programmes which should cultivate more rights for the poor. 
Thus, the concept of bundles of rights has received wide recognition in the study of 
people-land relations. However, this study shows that no matter how many rights are 
enshrined  in  relevant  laws,  when  power  is  not  given  to  the  individual  peasant 
households and collectives, their rights can be easily abused by the powerful state, 
corporations and local elite. Thus, a bundle of power instead of the property notion of 
a bundle of rights is more appropriate for the analysis of the ability to derive benefits 
from land than the right to benefit from it for the land users (Ribot & Peluso, 2003). 
This finding has important implications for any pro-poor land reforms which ought to 
empower the poor both as individuals and as a group to have a stronger voice in the 
land  reform process. For instance,  clarifying  the bundle of  rights and  enshrining 
bundle of power for the poor is important for the current land policy reform not only in 
China but also elsewhere.  
 
As a corollary, the practice of land registration aimed at the demarcation of land 
boundaries and clarification of an individual’s land rights has limitations in addressing 
the wider complex social and political relations between the landowners or users and 
other actors. That is why in many countries land registration projects have failed to 
protect  the  rights  of  the  poor  and  they  have  reinforced  the  existing  inequality 
between  different  groups  (McAuslan,  2003).  Without  first  tackling  the  power 
imbalances among different groups, this approach will be ineffective in addressing 
the fundamental issues of economic and social inequality within a given community.  
 
Land registration in China has followed the Property Law and has been executed at 
the village collective level, for the rural land is collectively-owned. As such, the power 
of  the  village  administrative  committee  as  the  registrant  vis-à-vis  the  peasant 
households seems to have strengthened. Simply, this reflects the fact that the state’s 
interest and power in strengthening individual peasants’ land rights are not reflected 
in the practice of land registration. Rather, land registration serves the purpose of 
land  administration  for  technical  purposes.  Its  drawback  lies  in  its  static  and 
technocratic approach which excludes the flexibility to address household needs. 
However,  it  is  an  easy  approach  to  land  administration  for  the  state,  since  any 
complications in land registration may unavoidably touch upon the complex issue of 
bundle of rights and power underpinning land registration. Furthermore, there is a 
certain level of mistrust between the local state, the village administrative committee 
and the peasants. As a result, land registration at the village collective level can 
realize the state’s control of the village land. Accordingly, the village administrative   196 
committee  can  relatively  easily  control  the  individual  households’  land.  Further 
research  on  the  dynamics  of  rural  power  relations  that  shape  property  relations 
among diverse social actors will throw more light on the structural constraints on 
legal empowerment of the poor in China.  
 
3.3  Rural livelihoods, land tenure security and social capital 
China’s  social,  economic  and  environmental  problems  cannot  be  tackled  with 
simplistic approaches. Rather, the use of comprehensive and systemic approaches 
should be explored. Poverty alleviation for sustainable livelihoods still counts as the 
number one task for the government. While promoting market-oriented land reform 
policies, the government has acted with due caution. However, it has not managed 
to put forward more viable solutions. This study shows that there is a need to further 
understand the particularity of each village and region in terms of the livelihoods 
patterns and the impact factors. This would require a greater level of flexibility in 
allowing for local experimentation in farmland use and management. Despite the 
claimed problems and adverse impacts, land shareholder cooperatives can be seen 
as a major mechanism for improved land management and utilization for the benefit 
of all. In this regard, individual land rights can be coupled with group rights, which will 
allow for more voluntary organized peasant cooperatives. Certainly, this remains an 
unaddressed political issue not only in China but also in many developing countries.  
 
Furthermore, this study reveals the fact that peasants’ lack of voice in the political 
system impinges on their land tenure security and more transparent land governance. 
Current land reform measures without addressing the key power struggles between 
the peasantry and the state can only undermine the power of the peasants. This 
explains why land titling programmes aimed at securing land tenure security and 
strengthening  peasant  land  rights  can  only  serve  the  interest  of  the  state  as  is 
evident in many developing countries (Smucker et al, 2002). This also indicates that 
the issue of tenure security is not limited to land itself but that it has more to do with 
peasants’  economic  and  political  insecurity.  When  these  challenges  remain 
untracked, any attempt to address land tenure security would be of little significance. 
Moreover, land tenure is not solely related to poverty, sustainable livelihoods and 
natural resources management especially when peasants lack adequate access to 
capital and public services for agricultural production and social welfare. When this 
happens,  social  capital  becomes  paramount  in  helping  the  peasants  organize 
themselves  in  combating  various  natural,  economic  and  political  constraints  on 
poverty alleviation in dealing with inadequately developed markets and other shocks 
(Amarasinghe, 2009). However, genuine self-organized peasant organizations are   197 
lacking in China, which means that the predominance of unequal economic and 
political relations between the peasants and the state still hinders the formation of 
social capital. In turn, this further undermines peasants’ capabilities in managing 
their own resources like the land to combat the constraints to sustainable livelihoods. 
Further  research  involving  empirical  cases  of  social  capital  and  even  social 
movements pertaining to land relations is needed.   
3.4  Humanitarian law 
The  realities  and  challenges  for  China’s  land  reform  and  sustainable  rural 
development  call  for  significant  rethinking  of  land  governance  approaches.  In 
particular, the failure of the current legal environment to recognize these challenges 
and put forward more diverse approaches reflects the weakness of the Chinese 
society in participating in policy and law-making processes. To improve this situation, 
it is important that the law should not only serve the need for economic reform and 
the  interests  of  the  policy-makers,  but  also  address  the  fundamental  barriers  to 
social mobilization and individual and collective power. Moreover, it ought to further 
promote, encourage and stimulate peasant self-initiated activities in the use of their 
land  to  diversify  their  livelihood  patterns.  This  would  require  more  interactions 
between the law-makers and the people in the law-making process. In addition, there 
is a need for law-makers to pay more attention to how land governance is linked to 
rural livelihoods. In this respect, the law ought to create a viable framework that does 
not restrict the prevailing livelihood practices. As seen in many parts of the world, the 
asymmetry between law and the lived experiences of the rural poor can lead to 
unintended consequences at the expense of the poor (see Agrawal, 2005).  
 
The case of China bears resemblance with other countries where the rift between 
customary law and statutory law cannot be easily reconciled. In particular, China’s 
complex  economic,  social  and  cultural  circumstances  concerning  land  use  and 
management cannot be addressed fairly with simplistic approaches. Local livelihood 
practices and community-preferred organizational forms ought to be recognized in 
statutory  law.  Above  all,  land  legislation  should  find  restricted  entry  into  the 
customary law to minimize its possible negative effects on the local community, while 
satisfying the needs of the market (McAuslan, 2003). In short, this study reveals that 
the law should be more pro-poor and humanitarian so that the poor can be more 
effectively  empowered  to  decide  on  what  is  best  for  their  land  utilization  and 
management.  Further  research  on  the  linkages  of  land  law,  governance  and 
development is necessary for well-informed legal improvements for the poor.    198 
 
4.  Policy suggestions 
 
Land is the foundation and basic source of livelihood for the Chinese society. It 
exhibits inherent complex social, political and economic relations and activities. Thus, 
land policy is ultimately about the society and the organization and governance of 
relationships between people (see McAuslan, 2003). Any attempt to strengthen land 
management without paying attention to the local relational context would result in 
inefficient, costly and possibly adverse consequences. As the Chinese government 
is  gaining  ground  in  executing  the  so-called  world’s  strictest  land  management 
policies to tackle land mismanagement and farmland loss, more appropriate policy 
measures based on local practices are needed. 
 
This study demonstrates that the asymmetries of relationships between the peasants, 
the local state and other stakeholders have disadvantaged the poor in participating in 
the land policy process. And further lack of collective action initiated by the peasants 
themselves inhibits their capacity to voice their concerns to policy-makers. When this 
happens, the state comes to play the predominant role in policy-making, which quite 
often does not suit local social and institutional contexts. It would require a strong 
commitment of the state to support the society at large (see Tessemaker & Hilhorst, 
2007).  A  pro-poor land  policy to  recognize and  balance  the  diverse  interests  of 
different stakeholders to avoid favouring a particular group, while disadvantaging the 
other, is urgently needed. To this end, the state has to confront the very structures 
that perpetuate the existing problematic conditions (Borras & Franco, 2010: 11, 23). 
 
Land policy-making processes should support more meaningful public debates with 
the peasants and other stakeholders, exchange of experiences and pilot testing of 
innovative approaches. These approaches would allow for the state’s facilitation of 
considerable flexibility for the local community to manoeuvre their use of land and 
cope with uncertainty around land tenure, land use and management (see Meinzen-
Dick & Pradhan, 2001). This is a key challenge for the state and Chinese society to 
work together to put forward an agenda of action. Strong commitment of the state is 
necessary. But without a fully-fledged civil society and more transparent and pro-
poor land institutions, land tenure insecurity and vulnerability to poverty and natural 
resource  degradation  and  depletion  will  persist  for  a  long  time  for  the  Chinese 
peasantry.  
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Nederlandse samenvatting 
 
Ondanks prestaties in rurale ontwikkeling die hun weerga niet kennen is China nog 
steeds een land in de categorie ‘lower middle income countries’. Armoede op het 
platteland en onzekerheid over land rechten worden mede veroorzaakt door verlies 
van  landbouwgronden,  toenemende  sociale  conflicten  en  marginalisering  van 
landlozen;  factoren  die  weer  veroorzaakt  worden  door  slecht  gebruik  en  slecht 
management van landbouw grond. Het huidige hybride systeem van landeigendom, 
gekenmerkt door collectief eigendom gecombineerd met individueel gebruiksrecht, 
heeft  zowel  positieve  als  negatieve  effecten  op  het  landbeheer.  De  huidige 
benadering  van  China  van  het  probleem  van  landrechten,  en  van  beleids-  en 
institutionele  hervorming,  wordt  gekenmerkt  door  inherente  tekortkomingen  die 
beletten dat de rechten en zelforganisatie van kleine boeren versterkt worden. Het 
huidige hervormingsbeleid dat zich eenvoudigweg richt op landrechten ten behoeve 
van makkelijke landoverdracht en van schaalvergroting, bewerkstelligt een risicovol 
veranderingsproces dat in negatieve zin op het beleid kan terugslaan. Hierin is de 
Chinese benadering vergelijkbaar met die van andere landen, waar de armen onder 
de hervormingen geleden hebben en die vele onbedoelde gevolgen heeft gehad. 
Men bewerkstelligt niet dat de aandacht gericht wordt op de levensvoorwaarden voor 
de  armen,  vanuit  een  perspectief  van  duurzaam  landgebruik  en  lange  termijn 
oplossingen voor de complexe problemen van plattelandsontwikkeling, maar richt 
zich op korte termijn voordelen. Het vraagstuk van plattelandsontwikkeling in China 
vereist een nieuw begrip van een systeem van landeigendom dat past bij lokale 
omstandigheden  in  de  verschillende  plattelandsgemeenschappen.  Zulk  een 
vernieuwd begrip vereist een holistische studie van systemen van landeigendom in 
China,  van  hoe  deze  in  het  verleden  werkelijk  gefunctioneerd  hebben,  wat  hun 
tekortkomingen waren en hoe deze tekortkomingen voorkomen kunnen worden in 
het belang van de armen. 
 
Dit  onderzoek  kiest  voor  een  interdisciplinaire  benadering  van  de  studie  van 
verleden, heden en toekomstperspectieven van landrechten in China. Het geeft een 
kritische  analyse  van  de  landrechten  situatie  en  haar  dynamiek,  van  rurale 
ontwikkeling, de bestuurlijke en politieke samenhangen waarin deze plaats vindt en 
de onderliggende sociale, politieke en economische verhoudingen. Ook bespreekt 
het  de  omstreden  geschiedenis  van  landhervorming  in  China  om  het  politieke 
karakter daarvan te belichten. Via een kritische analyse van China’s heroriëntatie in 
de  richting  van  meer  individueel  en  marktgerichte  politieke  en  juridische 
arrangementen schetst het onderzoek de institutionele uitdagingen voor duurzaam   202 
landgebruik en landbeheer. Ten behoeve van deze analyses werd veldonderzoek 
gedaan waarbij lokale praktijken werden bestudeerd van regulier en experimenteel 
landbeheer, zowel in arme als in rijke dorpen. 
 
Deze studie brengt de verschillende systemen – individueel, communaal, collectief 
en vennootschappelijk – in kaart en traceert hun impact op de levensvoorwaarden 
voor  de  armen.  Zij  schetst  daarbij  ook  de  impact  op  lokaal  bestuur,  lokale 
zelforganisatie  en  institutionele  innovaties  in  landbeheer.  Landrechten  worden 
daarbij als een integraal onderdeel beschouwd van rurale ontwikkeling, beheer van 
natuurlijke hulpbronnen en lokaal bestuur, dus als verweven met een veelvoud aan 
sociale, economische, politieke en fysiek-biologische parameters. 
 
Deze  studie  verdedigt de  stelling dat de beleidsdoelen wat  betreft ruraal-urbane 
integratie en schaalvergroting in de landbouw niet bereikt kunnen worden bij een 
slecht ontworpen staat-gestuurd en marktgeoriënteerd systeem van landrechten. Zo 
een  systeem  produceert  juist  sociale  fragmentatie,  zwakke  collectieven 
zelforganisatie en een gebruik van natuurlijke hulpbronnen en landbouwpraktijken 
die niet duurzaam van karakter zijn. Arme boeren zullen gemarginaliseerd blijven en 
hun belangen niet kunnen verdedigen tenzij het systeem van landrechten aangepast 
is aan een breder scala van institutionele-, politieke-, sociale- en machtsfactoren. 
Het is daarom belangrijk om de institutionele ruimte voor participatie van de armen in 
het beheer van grond te vergroten. Hoewel het systeem van land rechten belangrijk 
is  voor  duurzame  ontwikkeling  is  het  niet  de  enige  factor.  Een  systeem  van 
landrechten kan op de lange termijn alleen werken wanneer er geschikte sociale, 
politieke  en  economische  condities  voor  zijn.  Daarom  moeten  de  landgebruikers 
mogelijkheden,  keuzeruimte  en  macht  krijgen  om  hun  preferente  systeem  van 
landrechten uit te werken, daarbij gesteund door de overheid, private sector en het 
bredere publiek. 
 
Deze studie levert een bijdrage aan de studie van de transities die China doormaakt, 
niet  alleen  op  het  gebied  van  landrechten  maar  ook  in  daaraan  gerelateerde 
governance-  en sociale  ontwikkelingen. Deze  studie  behandelt ook  verschillende 
onderwerpen betreffende het beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen zoals land, water, 
bossen en grasland. Zij levert een bijdrage aan actuele theoretische debatten over 
eigendomsrechten  en  institutionele  veranderingen  die  de  armen  bevoorrechten; 
debatten die tot nu toe de kwestie van aan systeem van landrechten ten behoeve 
van de arme boeren niet bevredigend behandeld hebben. Deze studie is interessant 
voor onderzoekers, praktijkmensen, beleidsmakers en studenten, met belangstelling 
voor  ontwikkelingsstudies,  antropologie,  sociologie,  politieke  wetenschappen, 
economie,  geografie  en  bestuurskunde.  Zij  zal  hun  helpen  om  belangrijke   203 
uitdagingen  van  China  op  het  gebied  van  rurale  ontwikkeling  te  begrijpen, 
uitdagingen die vitaal zijn voor China’s ontwikkeling tot een wereldmacht.  
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